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Internet connectivity has been added to the classrooms of United States (U.S.) K-12
schools, but recognition of the security risks and related management responsibilities to
address increased risk exposure is not apparent. Providing a sufficient level of access for
K-12 students to learn through exploration and experimentation needs to be balanced
with sufficient limitations to minimize the risk of technically proficient participants
inflicting harm through school resources. Problems of inappropriate use such as
adjusting grades, tampering with work of other students, and defacing Web sites by K-12
students are already appearing in U.S. newspapers. In addition, the growing level of
Internet security incidents such as worms and malicious code puts K-12 technology
infrastructure and data at risk.
Each K-12 school and school district has a unique set oftechnical capabilities that must
be balanced against the risk of misuse to establish appropriate security. Applying
security risk management can allow K-12 administrators to identify areas of weak
security that pose unacceptable risk and plan for needed improvements. Within this
investigation, a security risk methodology was selected, tailored to incorporate
organizational characteristics and regulatory requirements unique to K-12 schools and
school districts, and successfully applied by the Scarsdale Public School District,
Scarsdale, New York. In addition, several K-12 school officials including school board
members, technology directors, and superintendents, reviewed the tailored methodology
and affirmed its applicability to their schools and school districts.
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability EvaluationsM (OCTAVE®)
Methodology was selected by this investigator for evaluating the security risk ofK-12
schools and school districts. The OCTAVE Methodology applies a security risk
management approach developed by researchers at the Carnegie Mellon® Software
Engineering Institute (SEIsM). The methodology is used by over 1,000 medical,
financial, manufacturing, and government organizations, and allows for self-direction. It
is available at no cost and provides a wide range of tailoring capabilities for adapting
SM
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Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation and SEI are service marks of
Carnegie Mellon University.
OCTAVB and Carnegie Mellon are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

security risk management to unique domains. As a result, the aCTAVE Methodology
provided a reasonable option for validating the use of security risk management in K-12
schools and school districts.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Statement of the Problem Investigated and the Goal That Was Achieved
How should school administrators establish and support appropriate educational
access to the Internet? Reports issued by the United States (U.S.) Department of
Education (ED) claim that two-thirds of the country's classrooms are now wired for
Internet use (Kavanaugh-Brown, 2000). Estimates from the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) indicate that 90% of the public schools have some form of Internet
access. According to Cattagni and Westat (2001),60% are wired for individual
classroom usage and other schools have shared computer labs and library media centers.
Federal funding for this effort through the education rate (E-rate) program had reached
$5.8 billion as of February 28,2001 (Cattagni & Westat).
Technology Use in Education
The role of technology in education is unclear. According to Holmes (1999),
much ofthe classroom use of computers is custodial in nature. Students are given
assignments unrelated to their studies to provide teachers with planning time while their
students are occupied in the computer lab (Scott, 2001). According to Cuban (2001),
who documented computer usage by shadowing students within selected schools in
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California, a small cadre of early adopter teachers used technology extensively in the
classroom, but for the majority of instruction, computer use was minimal. This same
study identified a group of students (estimated at 5%) who gained technical expertise
outside ofthe classroom and subsequently helped teachers and staff keep the technology
functioning (Cuban). Based on a survey by the National School Boards Foundation
(NSBF), students provided technical support in over half of the 811 school districts
surveyed. Student technical assistance was reported as a critical resource to compensate
for limitations in funding and availability of the school staffs technical skills (NSBF,
2002a).
Internet usage in K-12 schools and school districts is expected to grow as teachers
gain familiarity with technology and the school curriculum is adjusted to include
additional computer applications (Cattagni & Westat, 2001). The usage is expected to
expand beyond simple topic searches to include e-mail, chat sessions, library SUbscription
services, construction of Web sites, shared data and software files, videoconferencing,
and virtual classroom experiences (WBEC, 2000).

Internet Context
Convenience of access to an ever-expanding array of information and an
extensive communication environment that supports direct links with networked devices
on the Internet brings a unique suite of risks (Carpenter, 2001). The System
Administration, Audit, Network, Security Institute (SANS), a provider ofInternet
security training, estimates that between 7,000 and 10,000 devices with known
vulnerabilities are added to the Internet daily, and that hackers seeking these
vulnerabilities are initiating thousands of programs on the Internet at all times (Landers,
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2002). If such vulnerabilities are found and exploited, the infonnation resources stored
on networked devices could be corrupted and the contents damaged, lost, or copied
illegally. Moreover, the control of the networked device can be usurped by internal and
external sources for unexpected activities if proper protection mechanisms are not
established (Schneier, 2000).
K-12 school administrators must recognize and address the risks inherent in the
environment their systems have joined (Schneier, 2000). In a survey conducted in the
spring of2003 by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) and the San Francisco Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Computer Intrusion Squad, 530 computer security
practitioners working for U.S. corporations, government agencies, financial institutions,
medical institutions, and universities were asked to report on security issues from the
preceding 12 months. The summary results indicated that 95% detected computer
security breaches, 38% detected network penetration from the outside, and 82% detected
computer viruses (Richardson, 2003).
Systems are not delivered with sufficient levels of security to survive exposure on
the Internet (Carpenter, 2001). Extensive lock-down procedures that include removing
unneeded software, changing default passwords, incorporating anti-virus protection, and
restricting administrative access for every device can improve the situation based on
research of past exploits by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) (Allen, 2001).
These procedures are unique to the specific design of each device and require detailed
knowledge of the specific hardware and software for successful application. As devices
are linked into an infrastructure and connected to the Internet, protection of access to the
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devices and control of individuals authorized to use them increasingly become areas of
security concern (CERT, 1998).
Without proper controls, Internet connectivity can mean that every individual on
the network from the source point to a target destination (e.g. Web site, e-mail recipient,
chat room) can view and change all contents of any communication (Schneier, 2000).
The addition of protection devices such as encrypted communication mechanisms are
needed to assure the confidentiality and integrity of content (Parker, 1998). Protection
for Internet-accessible devices against unexpected changes and unsafe content may
require the addition of anti-virus software, firewalls, intrusion-detection capabilities, and
filtering software (Lesniak, 2002). Controlling who can use the network and retrieve
content from interconnected devices requires effective authentication and authorization
mechanisms.
User access is commonly controlled through assigned identification codes and
passwords. As a consequence, network users must choose passwords wisely and know
how to protect their access capabilities (Parker, 1998). Added network switches and
routers may be required to further limit which information assets a network user can
access. Steps to maintain the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of network
resources and communication content can be costly to implement and resource intensive
to maintain (Allen, Alberts, Behrens, Laswell, & Wilson, 2000).

Risk for Children Using the Internet
Content on the Internet is not subject to any review or rating system and adultonly material is widespread (Stein, 1999). The online pornography industry exceeded an
annual level of $1 billion by the end of 2000 (Lane III, 2000). SexTracker, a Web service
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that monitors adult sites, issued reports of26,000 active Web locations with as many as
60 million unique visitors a day (Webb, 2001). Filtering was proposed by software
developers such as Microsoft and Netscape, and Internet Service Providers (lSPs), such
as America Online (AOL), to screen out inappropriate material for minors (Hunter,
1999). However, Internet filtering has not been proved or disproved as effective in
protecting children. Censorship opponents such as the Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC) and the American Library Association (ALA) claim the risk of
unwarranted censorship exceeds the protection capabilities of available products
(Hunter).
According to Stein (1999), regulations to control Internet advertising are not in
place and, as a result, marketing companies are taking advantage of Internet connectivity
mechanisms to bombard users of search engines and other Internet services with ads.
Advertisers such as DoubleClick have developed techniques to exploit Internet
connectivity and install hidden monitoring programs on user devices to track a user's
Internet access. Prior Web site access is used to select content for banner ads and trigger
the display of Web pages, called pop-up screens, which match perceived user interests
(Scheer, 2001). Blocking mechanisms such as firewalls can be installed to restrict access
to storage on a user's device and minimize the risk ofthis level of intrusion. Companies
such as Lavasoft offer scanning software to locate these monitoring programs and
deactivate them. However, the monitoring software can be reactivated by subsequent
Web site access if blocking mechanisms are not implemented (Lavasoft, 2002).
Children with Internet access may communicate personal information
inappropriately and illegally to outside organizations and individuals. Compliance with the
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Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) has added another level of complexity
to the problem of managing Internet communications for schools with students under the
age of 13 (Anthony & Cohn, 2000). This federal law was passed in 1998 and went into
effect in Apri12000 limiting, through regulations administered by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the online collection and use of personally identifiable information
obtained from children under the age of 13 (FTC, 2003). Written parental permission is
required for the collection and use ofthis data and strict privacy restrictions apply (Cannon,
2001). Children are easily tricked into providing information through games accessible at
popular sites (Cannon). Information collection has become intense as businesses attempt to
capture online the estimated $200 billion in spending that children directly and indirectly
influence through their families (Armstrong & Casement, 2000).
Even if the child provides no specific input, the use of electronic tracking and
probes into the available data on an Internet-accessible device used by a child can be
extensive if the device is not configured to block the monitoring (Armstrong & Casement,
2000).
Software tools are available on the Internet to track the physical location of an Internetaccessible device through information sent from that device within an Internet
communication message. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in
Alexandria, VA uses one such tool called VisualRoute from Visualware. This tool
graphically displays the physical origins of communications to track threats against
children and tips received at its Web site (Moad, 2001). The Google search engine,
available to any Internet user at the Google Web site (http://www.google.com). provides an
additional trace feature that returns a location map when a telephone number formatted
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with hyphens is entered in the search request block. Any location with a listed telephone
number is included in the mapping function. While VisualRoute and Google are not 100%
accurate, the capability is sufficiently robust to place unsuspecting children at risk should
someone seek to locate and harm them (Moad).
With Internet access, network users have the opportunity to violate copyright laws
such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998. It is a simple process to
download popular music stored in Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) files that have
an MP3 file extension (designating the file as audio) by using programs, such as Napster
and Gnutella, that bypass copyright protection mechanisms (Clayton & Watkins, 2002).
The ease with which tapes and CDs can be copied promotes a disregard for intellectual
property rights (Colkin, 2002). Due to the popularity of free-music sites, the recording
companies are striking back by filing lawsuits against ISPs that allow access to Internet
sites where illegal copies of recordings are posted (Johnston, 2002). The Recording
Industry Association of America (RlAA) initiated legal action against college students
who provided free-music sites that violated copyright laws from college campus
networks. These students bypassed acceptable use requirements and technology
monitoring mechanisms that were established by the colleges and aimed to avoid
inappropriate use ofthe connectivity. These cases were settled in May 2003 when the
students involved in the suit agreed to pay between $12,000 and $17,500 each and cease
illegal song-swapping (Reuters, 2003). These same issues can apply to software and
other copyright materials that can be plagiarized easily with electronic tools. The RIAA
has threatened to sue any identified sources of illegal music (Reuters). School
administrators, teachers, and others who establish and maintain K-12 Internet
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environments must consider ways to insure that users of the vast array of intellectual
property housed on the Internet handle that content ethically (Armstrong & Casement,
2000).
Internet access can provide students and other network users with a means of
violating the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of2001. An
individual who attempts to access other Internet sites from K-12 facilities without
authorization is subject to criminal prosecution, and the school or school district would be
expected to assist in tracking the perpetrator (Mackenzie & Goldman, 2000). Police are
reporting the involvement of youth in global crimes who do not recognize the magnitude
of their actions (Snell, 2002). Since K-12 schools and school districts are actively
encouraging students to build academic skills that would, ironically, also allow them to
become hackers, careful consideration must be given to providing effective awareness
education, deterrents, and monitoring mechanisms (Cuban, 2001).
Risk for K-12 Schools and School Districts with Internet Access
Information critical to the K-12 school or school district can be endangered by
Internet access. For example, a Washington State high-school student broke into the
school's computer system and altered transcripts for other students for a fee (Lange,
Davis, Jaye, Erwin, Mullarney, Clarke, & Loesch, 2000). As K-12 schools and school
districts expand the use of Web access and consider opening the use of networks to
parents and community service groups, control of connectivity becomes more complex
and the risk of illegal use expands (PTA, 2001). In a recent court case, a Philadelphia
man was sent to prison for attacking a library Web site and posting obscene images
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(Blackwell, 2002). Web sites can be extremely vulnerable to attack unless properly
secured, and the existence of a Web site provides a footprint to the provider's network
that may make the site easier to compromise (Scambray, McClure, & Kurtz, 2001).
Tracking intruders, determining how they gain access to a particular network, and
coordinating activities between school administration and legal authorities for
prosecuting hackers require time and technical expertise (Tipton & Krause, 2000). The
flexibility ofthe Internet's communication mechanisms allows an attacker to adjust any
and all communication content to avoid detection. As a result, tracking alleged
perpetrators has become a global issue (Lipson, 2002).
Expanding network access to the Internet may also give unexpected participants
undue access to personal information about students, staff, and faculty_ Social security
numbers, salaries, medical information, home addresses, grades, and other personal
information may reside on the network (Allen et at, 2000). Restricting access to
sensitive and confidential information by appropriate users requires careful consideration
and monitoring to avoid the risk of privacy invasion, inappropriate modification, and
identity theft (parker, 1998).
Designing Internet connectivity appropriate to K-12 school or school district use
is a challenge in security risk management; there are many options with no obvious right
choice. The issues are both organizational and operational, and cannot be isolated to
technology alone (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Every option has risks that must be
identified, adjusted to specific local requirements, and appropriately managed (Schneier,
2000). Resources of time, money, and technical expertise are finite, so each school or
school district must make choices among competing requirements (Allen et aI., 2000).
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By identifying the risks of each option, evaluating their potential impact, and prioritizing
the risks, school administrators can tranSfOlTIl risk assessment results into requirements
that define policy and technology choices (Alberts & Dorofee). Applying a reusable
process that structures the issues and incorporates good general security practices can
facilitate the process of security improvement (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation SM
(OCTAVE®) Methodology was released for public use by the Carnegie Mellon®
Software Engineering Institute (SEI sM) in September 2001 (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
This methodology was developed to help organizations address operational security risk
management, which includes the management of Internet connectivity in K-12 schools
and school districts. The U.S. Department of Defense medical community selected this
methodology to meet the mandated risk assessment requirement for compliance with
Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIP AA) security regulations (Alberts &
Dorofee, 2001 c). The methodology provides a systematic approach for a complex
organization to identify the information assets that need protection, identify security
requirements for these assets, identify potential threats, identify network vulnerabilities,
and evaluate technology risks by comparing current practices to accepted best practices.
The OCTAVE Catalog of Practices is incorporated into the OCTAVE Methodology to
provide a basis of good security practices needed by all types of organizations (Alberts &
Dorofee,2001a). These practices are drawn from the analysis of Internet security
problems reported to the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center
SM
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Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation and SEI are service marks of
Carnegie Mellon University.
OCTAVE is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
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(CERT®/CC), recommendations by the British Standards Institute (BSI) and the National

Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), and SEI experience assisting U.S.
government and medical organizations with security risk management (Alberts, Dorofee
& Allen, 2001).

The goal of this research was to validate the effectiveness of a security risk
management approach tailored for the K-12 school domain. The OCTAVE
Methodology was selected for use in this validation effort based on cost and tailoring
capabilities. Through the use of tailoring capabilities within the OCTAVE Methodology,
a domain-specific security risk methodology was developed for K-12 schools and school
districts. This tailored methodology was validated at a selected school district and
successfully applied by the school district. The selected K-12 school district included
considerations of Internet security risk in its district planning to address technology
support and improvement.
Design of the tailored methodology required identification of the unique
information security issues appropriate to Internet connectivity for K-12 schools and
school districts. Appropriate options were selected to tailor the OCTAVE Methodology
to fit the unique needs ofK-12 schools and school districts (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Validation of the methodology required personnel within a selected school district to
learn and apply that methodology. An analysis team composed of five participants from
the teaching, administration, and technology units was assembled to represent the range
of technology needs and technical support throughout the school district. The analysis
team discussed Internet security within a structured process that exposed participants to

®
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the range of issues and good security practices that should be considered for use in a K12 school or school district. The structured process guided the analysis team members in
selecting appropriate protection strategies to meet the specific protection needs of their
school district (Alberts & Dorofee).
Participants from the selected school district evaluated both the results of the
methodology and the value of its use in addressing K-12 school security risk
management. To be considered for selection, the K-12 school district was required to
have a full age range of students and actively use technology within the curriculum at
most grade levels. Technology support staff needed to work for the K-12 school or
school district rather than an external provider organization to assure onsite availability
and eliminate conflicts with vendor contract provisions. Analysis team participants were
required to commit sufficient time to learn and complete the evaluation within an eight
week timeframe.
The Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD) was the selected school district for
validation of the tailored methodology. This K-12 school district met all the selection
criteria. In addition, the curriculum director and technology manager expressed strong
interest in identifying and addressing the security needs of the school district. The SPSD
consists of one high-school with an enrollment of 1,200 students, one middle school with
an enrollment of 900 students, and five elementary schools with enrollment in each
school ranging from 350 to 500 students. Every school has at least one computer
laboratory for use by every grade level. In addition to the laboratory, every classroom
has active computer connections for instructional use by teachers. A fiber-optic Gigabit
Ethernet wide-area network (WAN) interlinks all schools. The Technical Services staff,
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with third-party support, coordinates district-based technology activities. ISP services,
firewall operations, and content filtering are handled by a third party. Students attend
regularly scheduled computer classes at all grade levels. The computer education
curriculum includes courses addressing computer operations, publishing and presentation,
creativity and design, problem-solving, and research. All students, starting in
kindergarten, are provided with access to the school network.
Evaluation ofthe effectiveness of the K-12 tailored methodology at the SPSD was
based on four perspectives. The first perspective was provided by Christopher Alberts,
one of the researchers at the SEI who developed the OCTAVE Methodology. This
review focused on the process of tailoring the methodology to maintain consistency with
the OCTAVE Criteria (http://www.cert.org/octave), a set of general core requirements
that must be incorporated into every tailored version (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). These
requirements are described in detail in Chapter 3.
Participants at the SPSD, who provided the second perspective, reported an
enhanced understanding of Internet security issues within the school district and
perceived value for time spent using the methodology. Feedback from those participants
also identified the need for additional changes to the tailored methodology. Those
changes were compared to the OCTAVE Methodology to identify possible limitations in
the initial tailoring of it and issues related to the effectiveness of using it in K-12 schools
and school districts.
A third perspective from K-12 experts provided an indication of the applicability
of the risk management approach to Internet security in K-12 schools and school districts
beyond the selected school district. The tailored methodology was presented for review
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and comment to a group composed of ten individuals actively participating in the K -12
school environment including school board members, technology directors, and
superintendents. Review participants were selected from the membership of the
Consortium for School Networking (CoSN), a national non-profit organization that draws
its members from school districts and related organizations across the U.S.
The fourth perspective was assembled from observations of this researcher as the
methodology was introduced to the selected school district and used by the analysis team.
The resulting plans and strategies were expected to share commonalities with those from
U.S. government agencies, financial institutions, universities, and foreign corporations
that had already applied the OCTAVE Methodology. All organizations using Internet
connectivity are impacted by security threats, such as worms and viruses, which place the
integrity of network resources at risk (Pethia, 2003).

Relevance and Significance
The use of Internet connectivity within K-12 schools and school districts touches
a wide range of regulatory, political, and social challenges for educators (NSBF, 2002b).
Regulations for educational reform to provide greater accountability, choice, and
flexibility in federal programs were implemented in 2001 through the No Child Left
Behind (NCLB) Act (ED, 2001). School districts such as Jefferson County, Kentucky
(http://www.jefferson.kI2.ky.us) assembled years of paper records into Web-accessible
data repositories to help educators at local, district, state, and federal levels prove that the
$200 billion in federal spending initiated by the Elementary and Secondary Education
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Act (ESEA) of 1965 provided benefit to children attending K-12 schools receiving these
funds (ED). Funding through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) E-rate
program provided more than $6 billion to establish futemet connectivity in K -12 schools,
school districts, and classrooms as a portion of the ESEA funding (ED). To meet the
NCLB requirements, educators must also prove that poverty, race, ethnicity, disability,
and limited English proficiency have not hindered the progress of the children attending
schools that received federal funds (ED).
Organizations such as the American Student List (ASL) and the National
Research Center for College and University Admissions (NRCCUA) have deceptively
collected information about children using survey instruments distributed in the
classroom under the pretense of college scholarship opportunities and sold survey results
to marketing organizations (EPIC, 2003). The 2001 Education Bill included a provision
for parents to inspect survey instruments distributed in the classroom and exclude their
children from participation (EPIC). According to the Electronic Privacy fuformation
Center (EPIC), the ASL, NRCCUA, and other organizations that collect and sell
information related to children might invoke the Freedom offuformation Act (FOIA) to
obtain access to data repositories assembled by K-12 schools and school districts to
satisfy the NCLB reporting requirements. IfK-12 schools and school districts do not
implement appropriate information management, there is a high risk that parental
restrictions will be bypassed and student privacy compromised (EPIC). Appropriate
management of information access can be addressed through effective security risk
management (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
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Internet Content Filtering
Federal legislators responded to concerns of voters attempting to protect children
from seeing inappropriate Internet material with a series of laws including the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 and the Child Online Protection Act
(COP A) of 1999. Censorship opponents such as the EPIC and the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) successfully challenged these laws in the courts as
unconstitutional, based on the First Amendment freedom of speech (Hunter, 1999). In
the court rulings that struck down the CDA and COPA, filtering was championed as a
better alternative to federal legislation because it was less restrictive and designed to be
equally effective (Hunter).
In 2000, supporters in the U.S. Congress favoring protective measures for
children responded to the courts by passing the Children's Internet Protection Act
(CIP A). This act linked a requirement for filtering Internet content to E-rate funding
available for supporting Internet access for school-age children through the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Klosek, 2000). The details of implementation
including deciding when and how to apply filtering are the responsibility of each school
district (Clark, 2001). In light of federal efforts to link public funding to a requirement
for filtering, vendor hardware and software products were installed in K-12 schools and
school districts across the country to restrict access to Internet content (PTA, 2001). The
ALA and ACLU presented arguments before the Supreme Court in March 2003 that
content filtering mandated by the CIPA blocks access to material that should be available
to everyone based on constitutional protection and requested that the act be declared
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unconstitutional. A decision on this issue is expected from the Court in 2004 (Pruitt,
2003).
Existing filtering products are highly controversial. None of the options work
properly 100% of the time (EPIC, 1999b). A research team from Consumer Reports
assembled a study test of the effectiveness of six filter products against 86 Web sites
containing harmful content that filtering products should block. Their findings, described
in the article titled "Digital Chaperones for Kids," published in Consumer Reports, March
2001, indicated the blocking process for all six products failed at least 20% of the tests
(as cited in King, 2001). Without due care, the risks of exposure to illegal material and
blocked access to legitimate sources are significant (Li, 2000).
The Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU declared that the local community standard
must be applied to define the line between pornography and obscenity. This line is
critical since pornography is protected by the Constitution under the First Amendment
freedom of speech but obscenity is not (Lane III, 2000). The determination of what is
legal for adults and harmful to minors is subject to extensive local interpretation
(Fienberg, 2001). A school would be criticized if a child saw inappropriate content, but
held liable if anyone used school-provided Internet connectivity to gain access to illegal
materials (Lane III).
The U.S. Congress identified the need for filtering to protect a child from
unsuitable materials on the Internet and assigned the filtering responsibility to the parent
or legal caregiver (GAO, 1998) A group of citizens in Holland, Michigan attempted to
pass a referendum banning Internet access from library and school computers in their
community because children might be exposed to "obscene, sexually explicit or other
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material harmful to minors" (Bradsher, 2000, p. A12). The voters turned down the
referendum with 55% opposed and 45% in favor; voter turnout was double the expected
level. Exceptional voter turnout was attributed to the interest and concern of voters
regarding this issue (Bradsher). Some caregivers are turning to home-schooling to
maintain an assurance of quality and control over their child's education. In 1999, over
850,000 children were schooled in their homes (Sale, 2002).
According to consumer research, only six percent of caregivers rely on filtering
products at home when allowing children to be online without close adult supervision
(King,2001). In contrast, school technical support personnel rely primarily on content
filtering to control access to the Internet (Cope & Brewin, 2000). A survey of technology
decision makers in 811 school districts funded by the National School Boards Foundation
(NSBF, 2002a) found that 90% of the respondents installed filtering software. In
addition, 78% reported teacher supervision as the central part of their effort to provide a
safe access environment (NSBF).
The application of content filtering requires two components: (1) a rating to be
applied to each Internet address and (2) a filter module that uses the rating to determine
whether to grant or block access to a site selection. Ratings can be assigned to a Web site
through self-rating or via a third party. Also, ratings can be created dynamically within
the filter module to block any content matching selected keywords that are considered
objectionable (EPIC, 1999b).
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) developed an open standard called the
Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) that provides a means for sites to
incorporate a self-selected electronically readable rating within each Web page. The PICS
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standard provides a universal language for Web site self-rating, establishes general
rating-based rules, and defines a label format without providing guidance for the content
of the label itself (http://www.w3.org/PICS/iacwcv2.htm). Rating systems have been
developed by the Internet Content Rating Association (ICRA) (http://www.icra.org) and
SafeSurfTM (http://www.safesurf.com) to provide a means for Web developers to
implement the PICS standard (http://www.safesurf.comlssplan.htm). However, self-rating
is subject to both accidental and deliberate misinterpretation without penalty (Hunter,
1999).
The use of blocking software for the filtering module can allow the installer to
select specific words that will trigger a browser to block a site irrespective ofthe site selfrating (EPIC, 1999b). Selecting word blocking can occur based on content in ads and
banners appearing on pages that may be unrelated to the actual content of the page and
vary with each access request. The installer must select whether to block unrated pages
(EPIC). The filtering module can reside on a local device, an Internet access point at a
school or school district network, an access point maintained by an ISP, a state-controlled
Internet-access link, or a regional access point that crosses multiple states (Hunter, 1999).
When installation choices apply to a wide geographic area, the potential for disagreement
with local expectations is high, and the possibility of illegal access restrictions increases
(ALA, 1999). In an effort to balance between competing views, the Bertelsmann
Foundation released a proposal in September 1999 to establish a voluntary international
content rating and filtering system, but that proposal did not gain wide acceptance
(Hunter).
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New York State leased a product called I-Gear (later renamed Web Security) from
Symantec (http://enterprisesecurity.symantic.com) to filter Internet content for public
schools in the state. Web site access was blocked by this product based on an encrypted
list that identified sites considered unacceptable. Reverse engineering of this list by
Peacefire, an advocacy organization for freedom of access to Internet information
(http://www.peacefire.org), identified 470,000 sites that were blocked. According to
Peacefire, 76% of the Web-based educational pages, or Web addresses ending in .edu,
were blocked improperly, preventing school children from accessing educational
information defined specifically for their use (Harrison, 2000). As K-12 schools and
school districts become more reliant on Internet information sources, censorship
opponents, such as ALA, ACLU, and EPIC, become more concerned about the ability of
software filters to reflect value judgments by restricting access to selected Web content
(Hunter, 1999).
Mechanisms for circumventing a filter are obtained easily using anonymous Web
sites (e.g., http://www.anonymizer.com) or tools downloaded to a local device.
Interaction with Web sites, e-mail, news groups, and chat groups can be hidden from the
filtering module through encryption mechanisms (NSBF, 2002b). Other aids used to
disable blocking software are provided by Peacefire, based on the organization's claim
that much of the inappropriate blocking is deliberate and should be circumvented
(http://www.peacefire.org).
Blocking software should inform the user of the blocking decision process so that
inappropriate applications can be identified and corrected, but many software filtering
packages do not provide this option (Balkin, Noveck, & Roosevelt, 1999). The installer
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of the filtering module chooses how to inform the requestor about the filtering decision
by blocking the full page or only blocking out the offending words. Filtering tools cannot
evaluate words within a context or distinguish between different uses of a sequence of
letters (Hunter, 1999). For instance, the Beaver College Web site disappeared from
student availability after filtering software providers added "beaver" to their list of slang
terms. As a consequence, the 147-year-old institution changed its name to Arcadia
University (LaRue, 2000).
Typically, a third-party rating system is implemented using categories such as
violence, profanity, sex, and nudity that are created by the rating group. Screening at the
installation point is based on blocking some or all of the available categories. The rating
group assigns a category to the Web locations identified as potentially objectionable.
These assignments are stored in a proprietary database maintained by the rating group
and used by the subscriber's filtering module to apply the rating system (EPIC, 1999b).
Software programs, employed by the rating group to search for new Internet sites that
may warrant blocking, assign an automatic category based on a set of criteria developed
uniquely by each rating group (Finkelstein, 2001). Researchers working for the rating
group visually review the Web site to confirm or adjust the automatic selection to
compensate for limitations in the automated process. Web locations are periodically
rechecked for validity since Web content may change, requiring an adjustment to the
category assignment. Changes and additions to the category assignment file are provided
to subscribers on a predetermined frequency (Finkelstein).
Independent rating groups such as the United Federation of Child Safe Web Sites
(UFCWS) offer a certification for filtering systems. The UFCWS provides the
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iWatchDog™ program (http://www.iwatchdog.info) and certifies rating systems using
the iWatchDog Commercial Certification Service (ICCSTM). Any site using the ICCSTM
certified rating system, such as SafeSurfTM, can display a logo that indicates a guarantee
of a child safety rating. Organizations voluntarily submit their Web site content to the
iWatchdog™ program for review to obtain an approval rating (EPIC, 1999b). Filtering
modules can be restricted to allow access to only certified sites or to limit access to a
specific list assembled by a local user. This is considered the most restrictive approach in
that only anticipated content can be viewed, and anything not on the accepted list is
blocked (TechLearning, 2000).
All organizations are faced with risks stemming from the misuse of Internet
connectivity and the subsequent access to inappropriate content (Cohen, 2000). The
challenge in establishing access to the Internet is the inability to limit access to specific
content areas deemed appropriate by the organization. Employee time and bandwidth are
lost to entertainment opportunities for news, music, movies, and shopping (Cohen).
Also, there is the potential to access controversial content (i.e., gambling and
pornography) that carries legal restrictions in many geographic areas, as well as illegal
content (i.e., obscene material and child pornography) (Lane III, 2000). In a survey
conducted by the career Web site vault.com, 90.3% of the 1,200 U.S. employees who
were contacted claimed to have accessed sites that were against their company's
acceptable use policy (AUP) on company time (Cohen).
In response to potential liabilities, instead of trusting employees not to be
tempted, many U.S. businesses, medical facilities, and government agencies implemented
filtering programs to block employee access to inappropriate materials (Schulman, 2001).
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Websense (http://www.websense.com) was the leading filter choice for U.S. businesses
in 2002, based on sales dollars, installation locations that number over 18,000, and usage
by the largest U.S. companies, including 282 ofthe Fortune 500 organizations
(http://www.websense.com!products/index.cfin). According to the Web sense Web site,
the master database provides more than 80 possible category assignments for one billion
Web pages with weekly updates for an additiona125,000. Category assignments are built
manually, and the vendor offers a procedure for Web-page owners to dispute the category
decision (Kranich, 2001). Available options allow for restrictions based on time of day,
employee role, rating category, or keyword. Internet content and usage growth is
estimated to double every year (Oklyzko, 2000). Maintaining an effective filter when the
content base on the Internet is changing constantly requires a steady commitment of
resources, and the potential for inappropriate blocking is high (Schulman).

Internet Risks Not Addressed by Content Filtering
Cuban (2001) reports that selected students have advanced technological skills
acquired outside of school through friends, family, and self-teaching. This competence
has allowed these students to learn the details oftheir school's environment and to
augment the administrative support of its technology infrastructure. Interviews with
teenage hackers documented by Verton (2002) identify active learning of in-depth
technology skills through exploration of home and school facilities by fifth-grade
students ages 10 - 11. Some of these teenagers reported adjusting grades and plagiarizing
assignments from other students by hacking into the school system. The students
established prestige with peers, teachers, and administrators by creating school network
problems they subsequently fixed.
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Technically proficient parental and teacher authority figures helped some students
learn to establish appropriate boundaries for acceptable and unacceptable actions and
thereby avoid committing illegal acts (Verton, 2002). K-12 school and school district
administrators must maintain a difficult balance between the educational role of the
school environment to provide a learning space for children with a technology aptitude,
and the business needs of the school environment to gather and protect information that
must be kept private. K-12 schools and school districts have an added responsibility to
provide technology use to all participants in the school environment based on
commitments to E-rate and other connectivity funding sources (NSBF, 2002a).
Advanced technical skills are not always required for students to adjust online
information inappropriately. A sixth grader took the opportunity to change his reading
assignment grades after his teacher failed to close the computer session and then went to
lunch (Shah, 2003). Six students at Fremont, California's Mission San Jose High School
gained access to the student grading system and adjusted their semester grades by
collecting the teacher's authentication data using keyboard-tracking software tools they
obtained from the Internet and installed on the teacher's classroom computer (Akizuki,
2003).
Control through enforcement of AUPs can incorporate behavior expectations for
all users of the school infrastructure (Littman, 1998). AUP implementation has been
successful at the high-school and university level. However, an AUP is difficult to
implement in an environment where participants are still learning reading and
comprehension skills (Cattagni & Westat, 2001). Only 19% of the K-12 school districts
included in a 2002 survey by the National School Boards Foundation (NSBF) have tried
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to implement an AUP, and only 2% report any audit mechanism to confirm its
effectiveness (NSBF, 2002a). An AUP codifies guidelines for online communication
with specific sanctions for inappropriate use (Lange et aI., 2000). In universities, AUPs
may indicate that research activities cannot include commercial efforts (Lesniak, 2002).
LeBaron and Collier (2001) contend that the AUP should reflect an overall policy for
technology use at the school board level.
Writing an effective AUP is not an insignificant effort, and enforcement depends
heavily on the appropriate wording and a consistent application (Kovacich, 1998). LeBaron
and Collier (2001) suggest accessing Web sites that provide guidance for writing an AUP
such as: Bellingham, Washington Board Policy (http://www.bham.wednet.edulpolicies.htm);
Armadillo at Rice University
(http://chico.rice.eduiarmadillolRiceiResources/acceptable.html);
Internet Advocate (http://www.monroe.lib.in.us/~lchampe1/netadv.html); and K-12 AUPs
(http://www.erehwon.comlk12aup). Selecting an appropriate template must involve the
consideration of how Internet content is used acceptably within the school's environment
and connectivity issues that an AUP should address. Some AUPs are targeted to specific
problems such as protection from pornography, while others focus on privacy issues
(Chapin, 1999).
School administrators must consider whether the technology in place at their site
supports the intent oftheir specific AUP. Parents may be required to provide permission
in writing for their child's technology use based on the school's defined AUP (CoSN,
2002). Inconsistencies between the use of content-filtering software and school policy
can be considered an inappropriate implementation of the AUP by the school and an
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opening to liability if a child's Internet access is handled improperly (Anthony & Cohn,
2000).
In 2000, Mackenzie and Goldman reported that University of Delaware students
launched hacker attacks into commercial enterprises in violation of the university's AUP.
These attacks - at the time an internal policing issue for the university - are now in
violation of the USA PATRIOT Act of2001 (EFF, 2002). By providing the access
means for illegal acts, a K-12 school or school district assumes part ofthe liability of the
student's actions unless a clear pattern of definition and enforcement of acceptable use
can be shown (Kenneally, 2002). University students throughout the world who have the
access, skills, and time increasingly participate in attacks on other Internet users
(EDUCAUSE,2002). As the skills needed to execute attacks decrease, the risk of
younger children's involvement in Internet abuse is expected to rise (Schwartau, 2001).
The amount of critical information about each child assembled at school Web
locations is growing based on the recognition that caregiver involvement in the child's
schooling is a key ingredient in student achievement and accountability (ED, 2001). Web
site access provides an inexpensive and effective communication channel to link a child
with parents and other individuals outside ofthe classroom environment who influence
the child (ED, 2000a). Personal information about each child, such as a social security
number, address, homework assignments, grades, and electronic report cards, can be
accessed via the Web along with school calendars, school activities, and other general
information (NSBF, 2002a). As more personal content for a child becomes remotely
accessible, the risk increases that organizations and individuals such as peers, non-
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custodial parents, advertisers, and pedophiles will attempt to use the content
inappropriately (Quittner, 200 I).
Computer access and the availability of Internet connectivity is expanding beyond
the boundaries of the classroom for school children. For instance, two elementary
schools in Pennsylvania participate in an experiment to provide 2417 (24 hours a day, 7
days a week) connectivity aimed at proving the value of ubiquitous technology for
education (O'Toole, 2002). In another experiment, fifth graders in Iowa schools are
provided with a small handheld device for their individual use at all times (Levine, 2000).
As school-provided access expands beyond classroom time, the teacher can no longer be
expected to provide complete monitoring for Internet use. University administrators
already experience many problems (such as the e-mail harassment of students and
experimental hacking) that are attributed to expanded access to unrestricted Internet
communication capabilities. These problems are expected to increase among younger
students as unmonitored connectivity expands (Mackenzie & Goldman, 2000).
Universities report a growing struggle to balance open access with security
management (EDUCAUSE, 2002). Faculty and administration in post-secondary schools
have an increased awareness of security challenges and risks based on the national
recognition of the technology capability available within this environment of high
participant turnover, highly decentralized management, and broad technology diversity
(EDUCAUSE). For example, in March 2003, a student at the University of Texas (UT)
was charged with the largest information theft to date involving a university. In this case,
the personal information of over 55,000 students, staff, and faculty was compromised
using a security-access weakness that allowed a student to execute a program at the UT
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Web site and retrieve data that the assigned authorization level should have blocked
(Brulliard,2003).
According to administrators at the University of Delaware, success in managing
its networked environment requires an extensive emphasis on training students, faculty,
and administration, coupled with enforced policies and practices that discourage abuse,
assure the fair adjUdication of offenders, and provide protection for victims (Mackenzie
& Goldman, 2000). Programs such as Safeguarding the Wired Schoolhouse, funded
through the Consortium for School Networking (CoSN, 2002), issue a similar message to
K-12 schools and school districts - that the issues facing higher education are also a
growing concern for younger students (CoSN).
Updegrove and Long (2001) in a presentation on March 19,2001 to the
EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Task Force on System Security identified six challenges for
information security in higher education: (1) the tradition of freely sharing information;
(2) limitations in direct control over individual participants; (3) a broadly disbursed
technology environment; (4) limited financial resources already taxed to meet basic
functional needs; (5) an extensive individual autonomy in defining and expanding
available resources; and (6) a limited understanding of the role of centralized control on
technology. Many of these challenges are applicable to K-12 schools and school districts
as their technology environments expand. According to Updegrove and Long (p. 14),
"K-12 school system networks are the only sites (in the U.S.) which have worse network
and system security than higher education."
There is an expanding realization that any poorly protected site on the Internet is a
potential threat to all Internet users (http://www.cert.orgltech_tipslhome_networks.html).
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Attackers can take control of unprotected devices and use them as remote staging areas for
attacking others (Allen & Sledge, 2002). Negligence claims against the owners of insecure
networks are proposed as a means of promoting responsible behavior by victims of hacker
attacks (Kenneally, 2002). Responsible network management for every organization
requires effective policies and procedures for managing acceptable use by network
participants and sufficiently knowledgeable technical support to maintain the systems at a
level where vulnerability exposure is minimized (Wadlow, 2000).
Security Risk Management

Trust was a key component of the Internet design when it was implemented
initially in 1969 (Schneier, 2000). Internet connectivity with cross-country linkages grew
from four hosts distributed on four nodes in 1969 to 15 nodes and 23 hosts in 1971. The
connectivity was used to facilitate communication among research and government sites
(Zakon, 2003). The protocols established at that time such as the Border Gate Protocol
(BGP), which allows routers to direct Internet traffic efficiently, were designed to scale
easily and cheaply by building a communication environment using links among existing
local area networks (LANs). Those links were based on an assumed level oftrust that is
no longer valid (Schneier).
The Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) was
established in 1988 through a collaborative agreement between Carnegie Mellon and the
U. S. Department of Defense. This agreement was established in response to the Morris
worm, a self-replicating program released by William Morris that crippled the Internet
earlier the same year and impacted worldwide communications (CERT, 1998). The
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number of reported incidents ofwonns, viruses, and denial of service (DoS) attacks has
risen from six in 1988 to 137,529 in 2003, doubling in volume each year (CERT, 2003a).
Analysis of incident data at CERT/CC indicates that shrinking levels of
knowledge are needed to mount ever-expanding levels of attacks via the Internet (CERT,
2003b). Wonn and virus attacks are spreading at an increasing speed and affecting a
greater number of sites more rapidly. Reactive methods of protection are failing because
software vendors cannot create and distribute patches ahead ofthe attack impact cycle
(Staniford, Paxson, & Weaver, 2002).
The initial creator of a new attack process is highly skilled technically, but others
with much less capability who learn of the exploit through electronic bulletin boards can
easily adapt the code and reuse it against different targets (Parker, 1998). As
communication capabilities on the Internet expand, the speed at which new attack
infonnation becomes available to less skilled agents increases (Allen, 2001). In its
January 2003 report to the U.S. Congress, the Institute for Infonnation Infrastructure
Protection (I3P) included organized crime, terrorist groups, and citizens in foreign
nations as being increasingly involved as major attack agents (I3P, 2003).
The ease of installation for Internet connectivity and the availability of
standardized software tools from database vendors such as Microsoft and Apple to build
Web access for existing data have lulled new users of technology into a false sense of
security (Carpenter, 2001). The same tools that aid in building Web access are used in
generating attacks (Scambray et aI., 2001). The Google search engine, a widely used
Internet tool available at the Google Web site (http://www.google.com). provides
knowledgeable hackers with a list of unprotected Web-enabled databases that use
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standard software templates when searches are initiated using default text phrases built
into the templates (Null, 2003). Apple Corporation and the Drexel University College of
Medicine were notified by Null when unprotected FileMaker Pro databases containing
sensitive personal and medical information appeared in a search-query response contains
phrases used by FileMaker Pro Web Companion, a component that provides Internet
access to databases built using FileMaker Pro tools. Because of the low knowledge
threshold and ease of use, tools such as FileMaker Pro are selected for use by K -12
schools and school districts (NETS, 2002).
Reactive protection strategies are insufficient due to the increased attack speed
and severity (Allen, 2001). Vulnerability assessments are used by many organizations to
identify and fix software security problems, but the results of those assessments are
hampered because oflimitations in the available assessment tools (Peltier, 2002).
Vulnerability tools can identify patterns that match known problems in the technology
infrastructure, but they cannot identify poor administration practices and missing or
incomplete policies (Alberts, Behrens, Pethia & Wilson, 2000). Using vulnerability tools
requires specialized technical skills, and the improper use of such tools can damage the
technology infrastructure. The volume of output can be overwhelming and difficult to
analyze. The recommended actions selected by these tools can be in opposition to the
needs of the organization. Careful skilled review is needed before changes recommended
by a tool are selected for implementation (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Experience with the limitations of vulnerability assessments in providing
sufficiently context-sensitive results led researchers at the Carnegie Mellon Software
Engineering Institute (SEI) to develop a security risk management methodology that an
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organization could self-direct and tailor to fit its specific needs (Alberts & Dorofee,
2002). A security risk management approach that includes both organizational and
technological issues addresses a broader range of security risk than vulnerability
assessments (Peltier, 2001). Security risk management emphasizes recognition,
resistance, and recovery based on the premise that total avoidance is not feasible (Peltier).
Each organization has a unique information environment and a finite level of resources
with which to identify and establish controls in addressing security risk (Alberts &
Dorofee). One of the major challenges in the security risk management field is the
identification of relevant risk for a specific organization (Alberts et aI., 2000). Each site
has a unique network structure, a unique mix of technical capabilities, and a unique mix
of network services and users. The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) Methodology was released in September 2001 to
address unique organizational security risk management needs (Alberts & Dorofee,
2001c).
The OCTAVE Methodology incorporates a Catalog of Practices (Alberts et aI.,
2001) that contains good security practices drawn from the analysis of problems reported
to the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC), standards
from internationally recognized organizations, and results from in-depth evaluations at
medical, manufacturing, and government organizations (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
These practices represent good general security practices every organization should
address to exhibit due diligence in handling security risk. However, detailed actions and
domain-specific issues such as regulations and role-specific needs are not included in that
catalog (Alberts et al.).
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With the realization that organizations have neither unlimited resources nor
unlimited time to devote to security risk management, each organization must select the
appropriate security practice areas to mitigate based on its unique site characteristics,
current operational environment, and applicable legal and regulatory mandates (Alberts
& Dorofee, 2002). Instructions are provided within the OCTAVE Methodology for
tailoring the processes and practices to address the needs of specific types of
organizations (Alberts et aI., 2001). OCTAVE tailoring capabilities were used in this
investigation to incorporate unique security practices for K-12 schools and school
districts into the methodology.

Barriers and Issues
Designing and maintaining an appropriate and secure Internet connectivity
solution that accommodates educational and legal requirements and is suitably flexible to
handle the unique local needs ofK-12 schools and school districts is a complex problem
(Wasserman, 2000). Stakeholders such as teachers, librarians, students, parents, school
board members, school administrators, and educational funding groups at local, state, and
federal levels come from different disciplines with varying perspectives on security.
Issues can be politically charged (Armstrong, Sibley, & Samara, 2003).
Accountability for the federal dollars spent on technology support for education is
increasing without a clear definition ofthe expected role of technology in education (ED,
2001). Studies of the learning process, such as those conducted by the Archimedes
Project at Stanford University's Center for the Study of Language and Information,
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confinn the promise of technology to facilitate access to infonnation, but indicate that
access does not necessarily correlate to a better learning environment (Scott, 2001).
Teachers have been slow to adopt technology to enhance the educational
experience, based on a survey of middle-school and high-school students by the Pew
Internet and American Life Project in 2002 (Sarkar, 2002). Cuban (2001) identified the
availability oftechnical assistance as a key ingredient for the expanded use of technology
in the classroom. School administrators have focused on technology to help address
existing resource constraints to meet administrative and regulatory responsibilities
without recognizing the need for expanded resources to enhance the adoption of the new
education medium (NSBF, 2002a). Federal programs and legislation such as the No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of2001 increased the need for monitoring and reporting
capabilities to meet the growing accountability focus of U.S. federal funding sources
(ED, 2001). K-12 schools and school districts have responded by assembling online
reporting facilities containing confidential and sensitive data (EPIC, 2003).
Controlling access to systems and services is more complicated in an environment
with a transient population and heavily distributed management (Annstrong et aI., 2003).
Common practices used in business environments, such as individual access accounts
with passwords and digital signatures, are more difficult to establish and maintain with a
constantly changing population of young people (McNabb, Valdez, Nowakowski, &
Hawkes, 1999). Closely monitored usage is recommended for very young students with
progressive independence, as they prove able to act responsibly (Marcroft, 1998). The
primary focus for monitoring online security has been the teacher, as reported by 78% of
the 811 school administrators in the NSBF-sponsored 2002 survey (NSBF, 2002a).
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Given the wide range of skills exhibited by teachers in the field of technology, the
potential for inappropriate use of Internet access is high (NETS, 2002).
Technology support in the not-for-profit sector is difficult to obtain. Funding
sources are inconsistent and often nonexistent (Schneider, 1999). The heavy reliance on
volunteer support becomes an additional issue for school administrators (PTA, 2001).
Students, teachers, and administrators may need to share network resources for costeffective solutions (McNabb et aI., 1999). When the available technical support cannot
meet their minimum needs, K-12 schools and school districts supplement this support
with student assistance (NSBF, 2002a). Teachers are urged to expand the use of
technology with limited support and limited training (LeBaron & Collier, 2001). These
same teachers are responsible for monitoring the appropriate use of technology by
students (NSBF).
The expanded accountability imposed by NCLB regulations has motivated school
officials in Maryland and Mississippi to seek assistance from industry volunteers such as
AWS Convergence Technologies, Inc., which established a subsidiary company named
OnTarget to provide a service that houses K-12 student data and provides reporting
capabilities that meet NCLB requirements (AWS, 2002). Schools in these states input
years of detailed student assessment information into databases that reside at corporate
locations (Morgan, 2000). By using an environment for assembling and reporting
sensitive data with which they have only a limited formal relationship, school officials
risk alternative uses ofthat content without their knowledge (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
While many information protection strategies are available for addressing a wide
range of specific Internet security issues, typically those strategies involve large financial
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commitments, and the implementers are trained security professionals familiar with the
intricacies of Internet communication (Parker, 1998). A low-cost methodology for
information owners untrained in the details of information security to use to identify and
address their own security risk is a recent development (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Released in September 2001, the OCTAVE Methodology is one of the first
methodologies available for general use that can be tailored and self-directed by an
organization without additional cost for training and support (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001c).
Through the expanded application of the OCTAVE Methodology in its first year, the
value of creating versions of the methodology unique to specific domains based on
differences in organizational structure, regulatory climate, and risk exposure was
confirmed (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Security practices within the OCTAVE
Methodology are too general for domains with unique regulatory requirements (Alberts
& Dorofee, 2001c).
Recognition of Internet security as a requirement within the K-12 school
environment is relatively recent (CoSN, 2002). The primary focus at the national level is
on accountability for the $200 billion of federal money that was spent on technology for
education since the passage ofthe Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of
1965. The NCLB Act of2001 is an extension ofthe ESEA with enforced accountability
tied to standard test results (ED, 2001). The total cost of ownership is a major initiative
ofthe U.S. Department of Education (ED) in understanding the full cost of technology
including support, connectivity, replacement, disposal, retrofitting, and training (CoSN).
Security is not included as a specific attribute in that program. Federal funding for
security implementations is available at post-secondary institutions but not at K-12
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schools and school districts at this time (Keith Krueger, personal communication,
February 20, 2003).

Limitations and Delimitations of the Study
This researcher has not attempted to address the value of technology in education.
Many forms of technology have been applied to education over the years, and their
success or failure must be based on the met or unmet needs of each school (Scott, 2001).
The vision of how technology can be applied and the goals for using technology within
the environment of student learning must already be established before an information
security evaluation methodology can be used (ED, 2000a). This researcher has not
addressed the definition of measurements for evaluating the penetration of technology
into classroom use. Metrics such as classroom hours in the computer lab or assignments
with computer-usage components were identified by Chambers, Lieberman, Parrish,
Kaleba, Campen, and Stullich (2000) in a report commissioned by the U.S. Department
of Education (ED), but the utility of such metrics has yet to be confirmed.
An appropriate Internet environment must support the learning goals and

objectives defined by educators and not attempt to delineate a solution for educational
problems with technology (Holmes, 1999). A general migration of education away from
a teacher-centric focus to a student-centric one places a greater burden on K -12 schools
and school districts for individualization (Hanson, 2001). Technology is identified as a
low-cost way to meet this need, but the value of this transition is as yet unconfirmed
(Norris, Solloway, & Sullivan, 2002). Researchers such as Healey (1998) identified
problems caused by exposing children below a specified skill level to technology too
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soon in their learning process. The concern that classroom time is consumed by devices
when it should be focused on human interactions was not addressed by this research
(Sabelli,2001). Each school must establish the use oftechnologywithin the curricula
selected for its students. A school's security issues must be considered subordinate to its
learning goals. As such, the applicability of the technology must be determined before
appropriate security controls can be defined (Healy).
The methodology used in this study addresses the planning aspects of information
security and not the details of security monitoring and intrusion detection within an
individual environment (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The OCTAVE Methodology
provides a process for developing information security plans to protect critical
information assets within a K-12 school or school district. Approaches to include
evaluation results within a continuous planning cycle, as well as acquisition strategies for
new technology, are suggested but not specifically incorporated within the OCTAVE
Methodology (Alberts & Dorofee).
This researcher has not addressed a means of evaluating specific Internet content
for value and accuracy. Internet connectivity offers access to valuable information as
well as misinformation that is deliberately or accidentally misleading (polly, 2001).
Defining the line between appropriate controls and over-control must be handled by each
individual K-12 school or school district. Within a range of behaviors, each K-12 school
and school district establishes a level that is appropriate for the students, administration,
teachers, parents, and others who are granted access to the local infrastructure based on
local controls (CoSN, 2002).
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Technology provides a means of establishing the standardized enforcement of
selected security controls that apply equally to all participants. The OCTAVE
Methodology provides a structured process for the identification of security risk to guide
the selection of appropriate technology controls (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). This process
has neither defined the value of selected controls, nor identified a preference for
centralized versus distributed control. Each K-12 school and school district must
establish the level and manner of control appropriate to its needs before using the security
risk methodology to identify inconsistencies that could allow the selected level of control
to be subverted (Quittner, 2001).
This researcher has not tried to compare the value of different security risk
assessment methodologies for K-12 schools and school districts. Rather, this researcher
employs a methodology that is widely used, available at no cost, and capable of
incorporating the context-sensitive issues unique to a domain such as K-12 schools and
school districts. In addition, the methodology selected for this research is specifically
identified not to promote or reject specific technology standards, equipment, or
connections since K-12 schools and school districts use a wide range of devices and
connectivity solutions (Cattagni & Westat, 2001). Prior to defining information risk,
each entity must define the hardware and software environment that best fits its needs
within the regulatory and financial limitations imposed on it both internally and
externally (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
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Definitions
Asset - Something of value to the entity such as information, systems, services, and
people. An asset is considered critical if its inappropriate disclosure or
modification, unavailability, or destruction would prevent the K-12 school or
school district from fulfilling its mission (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Availability - The period of time or frequency that an asset is present or usable (Alberts
& Dorofee, 2002).

Best Practices - Security practices identified by security experts as effective in
addressing Internet security risk (Parker, 1998).
Confidentiality - The need to keep information that is private, sensitive, personal, and
proprietary inaccessible to unauthorized users (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Evaluation Criteria - A measurement of risk to the K-12 school or school district as
expressed through a set of negative occurrences that could happen and the
qualitative degree (high, medium, or low) to which an occurrence will impact the
mission and continued existence of the entity (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Exploit - The use of technology to violate security policies established to protect critical
information assets (Peltier, 2001).
Filtering Module - Software or hardware that prevents access to certain Internet sites or
Web content based on assigned criteria (EPIC, 1999a).
Generic Threat Profile - Based on SEI experience with threat analys.is, a general set of
threat profiles developed to apply to a wide range of organizations. These profiles
group threats into four categories: (1) human actors using network access; (2)
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human actors using physical access; (3) system problems; and (4) other problems
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Information Assurance - Protection of the data available within a networked environment

to provide a specified level of availability, integrity, confidentiality, and
authenticity (McKnight, 2002).
Integrity - Validity and wholeness of an information asset (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
OCTAVE Approach - A framework that incorporates aspects of organizational

management, risk management, and information security risk evaluation for
application to security risk management (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ia).
OCTAVE Catalog ofPractices - Good general security practices for strategic and

operational security areas drawn from the analysis of security problems reported
to the CERT/CC, the SEI's experience in security risk evaluations, and security
practice standards from the British Standards Institute (BSI) and NIST (Alberts &
Dorofee, 2002).
OCTAVE Criteria - Key concepts referred to as principles, characteristics ofthe key

concepts referred to as attributes, and defined results referred to as outputs that
define the requirements for a methodology that supports the paradigm for security
risk management defined in the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
OCTA VE Methodology - A three-phase process that is based on the OCTAVE Approach

and used to apply risk management to information security through the
identification and analysis of information assets, threats, and vulnerabilities
within organizational and technological infrastructures. The OCTAVE
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Methodology supports the development of plans for improving the security of
identified assets based on good security practices (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ic).
Rating System - Criteria used by a vendor to assign Internet sites to categories for access
blocking through the use ofa filtering module (EPIC, 1999a).
Risk - A threat with an associated impact. Risk involves a triggering event that may be
initiated by a human, technology, or natural causes. That event will impact an
information asset, but whether or not the event will occur is unknown (Alberts &
Dorofee, 2002). The severity of each risk varies for each organization based on
its selected risk evaluation criteria (Peltier, 2001).
Security Practices - Actions initiated by an organization that help implement and
maintain security (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Security Requirements - Qualities of an asset (e.g., confidentiality, availability, and
integrity) that are important for the organization to protect. Failure of a security
requirement results in a security compromise outcome (disclosure, modification,
loss/destruction, or interruption) (Parker, 1998).
Technology Vulnerability - Weakness in the infrastructure that allows an asset to be
compromised. Technology vulnerabilities are introduced through the application
design, implementation, and configuration of the network infrastructure (Alberts
& Dorofee, 2002).
Threat - The potential for an occurrence of an undesirable event that would compromise
the security requirements for an asset (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
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Threat Profile - A visual depiction of the sources of a threat to an infolTIlation asset
composed of an access means (network access, physical access, system problems,
or other problems); an optional actor (insider or outsider); an optional motive
(accidental or deliberate); and a security compromise outcome (disclosure,
modification, loss/destruction, or interruption) (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).

Vulnerability Assessment - An evaluation of a network infrastructure and/or selected
components such as servers, desktop computers, firewalls, and routers. A
vulnerability assessment employs software tools written to identify known
security problems based on missing software patches; default configuration
options; and other design, configuration, and implementation errors that allow
intruders to compromise the device or infrastructure (Peltier, 2001).

Summary
The expanded use ofInternet connectivity in K-12 schools and school districts
provides access to a vast array of content and enhances communication capabilities that
may improve teaching and administration (PTA, 2001). Extensive resources through
programs such as E-rate were applied to connect schools with the Internet (ED, 2001).
Content filtering is mandated for Internet connectivity supported by E-rate funds (ED),
but the value of filtering remains controversial (Hunter, 1999). Court challenges have
been successful in removing requirements imposed by the Communication Decency Act
(CDA) and the Child Online Protection Act (COP A), and a similar fate is expected for
those imposed by the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIP A) in 2004 by the Supreme
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Court (Pruitt, 2003). Extensive resources were applied to insert Internet connectivity into
the K-12 school environment. However, issues related to the security ofK-12 Web
connections, network resources, and safeguarding users from access to materials deemed
inappropriate did not receive an equivalent level of attention (NSBF, 2002a).
Teachers with limited technical training and limited technical support are required
to address a wide range of technical needs for the K-12 schools and school districts
(NSBF,2002a). Students with access to technology outside of the classroom both
challenge and assist the capability of teachers, and gain broad access to school
technology resources that may not be sufficiently supervised (Schwartau, 2001).
Efforts by K-12 schools and school districts to address the accountability
requirements of student performance imposed by the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act
of 200 1 through the construction of data repositories have expanded the volume of
personal student information available via the Web (AWS, 2002). The protection
mechanisms applied to this sensitive information appear insufficient (Allen, 2001).
Risks to information assets from Internet access have multiplied, options for
attacking Web-based information assets have expanded, and the technical expertise
needed to inflict great damage using Internet connectivity has rapidly decreased
(Schneier, 2000). Each K-12 school and school district has a unique set of technology
requirements, participants, and infrastructure that define potential security threats within
its environment (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Also, each K-12 school and school district
has a different level of risk tolerance based on the potential impacts a realized threat
would deliver. Identifying the threats, risks, unacceptable impacts, and ways of
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effectively applying protection is best accomplished through information security risk
management (Peltier, 2001).
The OCTAVE Methodology, a three-phase approach to information security risk
management, has been applied successfully in over 1,000 medical, government, financial,
and manufacturing organizations throughout the world (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The
OCTAVE Methodology provides a suitable framework for addressing security risk in K12 schools and school districts. This methodology is a self-directed process that
incorporates good general security practices with tailoring mechanisms for addressing
unique security needs (Alberts & Dorofee). This researcher identified the unique security
practices and issues appropriate to K-12 schools and school districts. Those unique needs
were applied to the OCTAVE Methodology to develop a tailored security risk
methodology. The Scarsdale Public School District used that methodology to address its
security risk management needs.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Historical Overview of the Research Literature
Three streams of research converge to establish the basis for using security risk
management for the protection of Internet connectivity in K-12 schools and school
districts. One stream centers on research into the actual uses of technology within K -12
schools and school districts, and the perceived value of infusing technology into
education. The identification and response to perceived problems arising from the use of
the Internet by K -12 students form a second stream. This second stream is interlinked to
the growth of access to pornography, gambling, and other adult-only content, as well as
ready access to undesirable elements that prey on the unsuspecting via the World Wide
Web. The third stream is built on research stemming from the recognition by medical,
financial, and government organizations of the need for information security risk
management to balance the expanding reliance on Internet connectivity with the growing
risks connectivity introduces. Each stream has a wealth of research literature that, when
blended together, establishes a critical need for security risk management within K-12
schools and school districts.
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Use of Technology in Schools

The establishment of the E-rate provided a major funding source for inserting
technology into the K-12 classroom (ED, 2000b). Preliminary surveys commissioned
through the U.S. Department of Education (ED) identified this infusion as a success
based on the growth ofIntemet access in the K-12 classroom from 1994 to 2000
(Cattagni & Westat, 2001). A large portion ofE-rate funding was targeted to support K12 schools and school districts in less financially capable regions, and to address the
perceived digital divide assumed to exist between the affluent and poor geographic
regions (ED, 2000b). An ED study released in 2000 indicated that the geographic areas
evaluated with the highest level of poverty had the lowest percentage of application
requests for available E-rate funding.
Measuring Technology Value
The Web-Based Education Commission (WBEC), in a report to the U.S. President
and the U.S. Congress in December 2000, predicted that computer usage would have a
direct and positive impact on student learning, and underscored the need for expanded
teacher technology training and research in the application oflearning tools in K-12
schools and school districts (WBEC). Another study performed by Norris, Soloway, and
Sullivan (2002) considered the impact of technology over the last 25 years on a range of
possible effects on student performance, including higher test scores and increased
student motivation. Study results indicate a negligible impact so far, and the authors
claim that the potential impact will not be realized until technology is as readily available
to the student as the textbook (Norris et al.). On average, nine children share each
computer in K-12 schools in the U.S. (NSBF, 2002a).
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Research reported by Armstrong and Casement (2000) identified two assumptions
that form the basis for emphasizing technology in K-12 schools and school districts. The
first is that computer technology makes education more productive, relevant, and
interesting for all students. Based on that assumption, the installation of any technology
facilitates student learning (Armstrong & Casement). The second assumption is that if
children are to fully participate in a society that is increasingly dependent on technology,
schools must teach them about that technology. LeBaron and Collier (2001) assembled a
set of success stories on the benefits of infusing technology into the classroom. Since
most ofthe examples they cite occurred in 2000 and 2001, it is too soon to evaluate the
long-range impact of technology availability and use on student learning. Kallick and
Wilson (2001) attempted to define a way to measure the value oftechnology within the
K-12 classroom by identifying changes within the school environment. Those changes
included planning approaches for technology use and specific assignments that use
multimedia capable of providing added value to the learning process. However, the
success of that attempt is unconfirmed except by individual comments from teachers and
students.
A study by Cuban (2001) involved an in-depth review of technology usage in
three California K-12 schools. The results were evaluated based on the characteristics of
the student and teaching populations of each school. Cuban sought to identify a
correlation between economic levels and years of experience, or some other indicator of
teacher motivation in support of technology adoption. According to Cuban, the primary
indicators that motivated technology adoption were administrative support provided in
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the form of recognition, the allocation of additional time for teacher skill building, and
the availability of skilled technical resources for problem resolution.
The U.S. Department of Education (ED) identified a greater availability of
technology in schools, the effective usage of technology by teachers in the classroom,
and student's increased technology literacy as emerging priorities in 1996 at the Forum
on the Future of Technology in Education (ED, 1997). The International Society for
Technology in Education (ISTE) established qualitative standards of excellence for K-12
schools and school districts. Based on those standards, the ISTE defined strategic goals
for the effective use of technology by administrators, teachers, and students in the
National Education Technology Standards for School Administrators (NETS-A),
National Education Technology Standards for School Teachers (NETS-T), and National
Education Technology Standards for School Students (NETS-S) (ISTE, 2002). The
Consortium for Technology Standards for School Administrators (TSSA) has contributed
strategic planning approaches to technology with an emphasis on the added value
technology brings to administration (TSSA, 2001).
The ISTE and TSSA emphasize the quality and benefits of technology. However,
few metrics exist with which to compare the value of the technology-enhanced classroom
approach to the traditional classroom approach. Norris, Soloway, and Sullivan (2002),
using brief survey questionnaires administered to 10,000 teachers over a range of five
years, compared the application of technology in the classroom to state and district
achievement test results for the students exposed to the technology. No significant
impact from technology use has been achieved so far (Norris et al.). Technology infusion
into the classroom has been attempted in the past with television broadcasts, cable
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programming, and video projection. According to LeBaron and Collier (2001), much of
this equipment remains unused with no impact on classroom learning. Without clear
value, teachers will likely view the process associated with deploying technology and
transiting from one media to another for curriculum delivery in the classroom as timeconsuming and costly and therefore resist it (LeBaron & Collier).
Fisher (2000) suggests that a technology tools that provides content manipulation
and deconstruction (such as zooming, stop-action, repositioning, and moving images)
adds value to the teaching capabilities because it allows each student to manipUlate
curriculum content for individual learning. Potentially, each child will have a preferred
media for learning just as individuals have a preferred communication style (Armstrong
& Casement, 2000). Kallick and Wilson (2001) do not think that specific technology
characteristics have intrinsic educational value because the tools for content manipulation
and deconstruction are changing too quickly to be analyzed effectively. According to
Kallick and Wilson, the successful adoption of technology in the classroom depends on
individual teacher acceptance within the existing course content and budget planning
mechanisms. Further decomposition of the technology's potential uses does not increase
its educational value (Kallick and Wilson).
Legislative Mandates
K-12 schools and school districts must adhere to the regulations issued by local,
state, and federal agencies to assure accountability and standardization in educational
practices. The range of regulations that apply to each K-12 school and school district can
differ based on the types of additional services provided to the students (such as health
care and psychological counseling) and the level of access to course materials granted to
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students and teachers (Salomon, Cassat, & Thibeau, 2003). Regulations that apply to
most K-12 schools and school districts are described in the remainder of this section.
The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of2001 establishes measurements for the
accountability of the local and state decision-making processes in providing assistance to
disabled and under-served children, including the homeless and those who live in the
inner city. Local and state officials must assure that all K-12 schools meet or exceed
statewide proficiency goals (ED, 2001). Children served in unsafe or poorly performing
schools can transfer to another school with the help of federal funds. A school losing a
significant portion of its student body through this transfer mechanism will close (ED).
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) mandated protection
for the privacy of student's educational records (ED, 2002a). Parents have the right to
inspect their children's school records and request corrections, and children who turn 18
can inspect and correct their own records. Written permission is required from the parent
or child over 18 to release student school information to parties not specifically
exempted. Exempted requests would originate from school officials with legitimate
educational requirements, another school to which the student is transferring, financial
aid providers, and emergency health care providers (ED). Directory information
consisting of student's name, address, telephone number, date and place of birth, honors,
awards, and dates of attendance may be released without consent, but the parent or child
over 18 must be notified in advance and provided with an option to be removed from the
directory (ED). Advertisers and other mass-mailing organizations request directory
information from educational institutions under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
for use in targeted solicitations (Saloman, Casset, & Thibeau, 2003).
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The Electronic Privacy Infonnation Center (EPIC) (http://www.epic.org)
presented arguments to the U.S. Supreme Court in January 2003 through a brief filed in a
FOIA case (BATR v. City of Chicago). The EPIC claims that technology can allow
broad, open access and public oversight to government infonnation if that technology is
applied appropriately to protect private data. The EPIC is joined by 16 legal scholars and
technical experts in advocating the use of technology to encode personal data instead of
removing it before responding to FOIA requests. If the Court agrees, infonnation
providers will no longer be responsible for limiting access to private data, but will be
required to apply the data-encoding technology needed to restrict access (Pruitt, 2003).
K-12 schools and school districts that collect personal student data need to evaluate the
mechanisms currently in place to meet FERPA regulations and consider how those
mechanisms may be impacted by future changes in regulations (pruitt).
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIP AA) of 1996 was
enacted to protect the privacy of patient's medical data. K-12 schools and school districts
that participate in the health care of students and teachers may be obligated to comply
with the specific mandates of the privacy and security regulations within the HIP AA
issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) (Salomon et aI.,
2003). Entities subject to HIP AA regulations were required to provide written notice of
electronic infonnation practices to all participants by April 14, 2003. To assure
compliance, these practices must include manual or technology-based mechanisms that
monitor and confinn the protection of health infonnation within the entity (Salomon et
al.).
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California voters approved regulations that apply to all entities collecting personal
information about California residents. Those regulations mandate individual notification
when personal information is sUbjected to inappropriate disclosure. Other states are
expected to follow this lead (Salomon et aI., 2003). An education reporter in Palo Alto,
California was able to access student's grades, phone numbers, addresses, medical
information, psychological evaluations, and photographs using the Palo Alto Unified
School District's insecure wireless network (Metz, 2003). This problem was later
addressed by the district superintendent, but not before there was adverse publicity and
threats oflegal action from parents who had not been notified of the disclosure (Metz).
K-12 schools and school districts that work closely with colleges and universities
are impacted by the Technology Education and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act
of2001 (Salomon et aI., 2003). This law relaxed certain copyright restrictions to provide
a broader use of materials within the framework of technology-mediated educational
settings. Unauthorized retransmission is strictly prohibited, and technology controls for
authentication and access protection are required (Salomon et al.).
There is a growing reliance on technology to enforce federal school regulations.
Without effective management, limitations in the technology expertise in K-12 schools
and school districts will increase the risk of regulatory noncompliance (Salomon et aI.,
2003).

Protection for Children Using the Internet
Early studies by Stein (1999) pointed out that increased computer usage by
children ofK-12 school age reduced the number of hours children spent in front ofthe
television. Parental concern for children's use of the Internet to access inappropriate
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content was accelerated by warning reports issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) (1998) and federal committees such as the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation (GAO, 1998). The visibility and profitability of the
pornography industry rely on the strong communication capability of the Internet based
on documentation by Lane III (2000). Regulations such as the Communications Decency
Act (CDA) of 1996 and the Child Online Protection Act (COP A) of 1999 were passed to
mandate the behaviors of Web site providers for handling content inappropriate for
children. The constitutionality of the mandates was successfully challenged in the courts
as violations of the First Amendment by censorship opponents such as the EPIC and
ALA (Biskupic, 1999). The U.S. Congress shifted the regulatory effort to the K-12
schools and school districts by linking Internet access supported through E-rate funds
with a filtering mandate to protect each child from accessing unsuitable materials on the
Internet (ED, 2000b). As a result, each K-12 school and school district that implemented
connectivity funded by the Child Internet Protection Act (CIP A) through the E-rate
program was required to implement content filtering before July 2002 (ED).
A study by Neumann and Weinstein (1999) pointed out that every parent has a
unique definition of what is harmful to a minor based on individual beliefs and no single
definition can be successfully applied by a central authority. Content filtering should
allow for parental involvement in the guidance role, but no regulation currently supports
this recommendation. There is no clear agreement on what is harmful to minors
(Neumann & Weinstein).
Filtering opponents such as the EPIC launched a series of studies identifying the
major faults of available filtering products (EPIC, 1999a). The National Coalition
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Against Censorship (NCAC) published a public policy report by Heins and Cho (2001)
analyzing available content-blocking products, and all were identified as performing
inappropriately depending on the selected test sites. On May 31, 2002, a three-judge
panel in Philadelphia ruled that the CIPA was in violation of the First Amendment. An
appeal was granted for U.S. Supreme Court review, but the response of the Court is
unknown at this time (EPIC, 2002).
The extensive increase in unwanted e-mail generally containing references to
pornography, illicit pharmaceuticals, physical-enhancement procedures, sweepstakes, and
other topics inappropriate for children is regarded as a major problem by Symantec
Corporation, an Internet security provider (Symantec, 2003). Symantec funded a survey
conducted by Applied Research to identify children's responses to inappropriate e-mail
content. In this survey, 1,000 children between the ages of seven and 18 were
interviewed to determine the extent to which they are subjected to unsolicited e-mail and
their response to those intrusions (Symantec). Over 80% of the children using e-mail
reported receiving inappropriate content daily, and 46% responded that they gave their
personal e-mail addresses to unfamiliar Web sites or strangers without their parents'
consent (Symantec). When the child is under 13 years of age, both acts are in violation
of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). K-12 schools and school
districts must consider the accountability issues for inappropriate actions by Web sites
when school-provided connectivity is used as the access mechanism (Anthony & Cohn,
2000).
A study by Verton (2002) identified children with advanced technical skills as a
growing risk to other Internet users. Much of the available research is anecdotal and
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obtained through interviews with convicted juvenile hackers. However, technical
analysts at the SEI have confirmed the ready availability of technical tools that can be
used for broad Internet attacks with limited technical skill (Pethia, 2003). The growing
technical capability of children with unsupervised access to technology presents an
increasing potential to create Web-based problems (Carpenter, 2001).
One incident at the Newark Junior High School in New Jersey involved a seventh
grader who hacked into the school system and deleted grade files for ten of the 55
teachers, resulting in a two-day delay in home progress reports (Kuznia, 2003). The
impacted teachers blamed the lax technical security on recent budget cuts in technology
support (Kuznia). In a separate incident, a junior at the Marion High School near
Rochester, New York deleted all the password-protected student folders where class
projects were stored (Legon, 2003). The student in New Jersey was expelled, and the
student in New York was arraigned on felony charges. In yet another incident, a student
at Richard Middle School in Richland Hills, Texas sent an e-mail to every computer in
the school using an obscure system utility. Teachers determined that use ofthat utility
constituted unacceptable use even though no acceptable use policy (AUP) was in place
and the student was suspended for three days (Lieber 2004).

Security Risk Management and the OCTAVE Approach
The transition from stand-alone computers to networked environments increased
the importance of protecting the information accessible through the Internet (Lange et aI.,
2000). Scambray, McClure, and Kurtz (2001) provide a comprehensive reference to
techniques and mechanics used to create Web-based security problems. Most of the
attacks are software specific and tied to selected operating systems, browsers, computer
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software development languages, and communication enablers such as e-mail and chat
software (Allen, 2001). Protection requires an in-depth assessment and adjustment of
purchased systems to remove security weaknesses that are often provided by a vendor to
allow for ease of installation instead of secure functioning (Allen). Extensive technical
knowledge of the specific hardware and software tools used in the construction and
support of each network component is required to establish a secure infrastructure
(Allen). Detailed steps, also called security practices, are provided by organizations such
as CERT/CC and Mitre Corporation that research illternet vulnerabilities to help the
installer minimize the likelihood and impact of technical attacks (Wadlow, 2000).
Standards for information technology security practices, such as ISO 17799, are
published by the International Standards Organization (ISO).
ill addition to techniques for the secure installation of selected hardware and
software, specific protection tools are available that focus exclusively on network
security. Encryption techniques, firewalls, and intrusion-detection tools address a range
of technical protection requirements such as the confidentiality of information during
transmission, the rejection oftransmitted information that matches known vulnerability
patterns, and the identification of potentially inappropriate network access (Stallings,
2000). Each added security function requires special technical skills as well as additional
financial resources to evaluate and implement it. Organizations with finite resources for
technology, such as educational institutions, are faced with a difficult choice between
added functional capabilities and security protection (Updegrove & Long, 2001).
Defining appropriate protection requires the identification of potential risks to
information assets in the infrastructure and the ensuing impact should the risk be realized
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(Peltier, 200 I). Many security risks, such as password management and policy
enforcement, materialize through the organizational use of network capabilities and are
outside of the direct control of the technicians (parker, 1998). Educational institutions
that do not regard technology as part ofthe primary organizational mission may not have
a standard mechanism for addressing organizational security issues (Alberts & Dorofee,
2002). An information gap exists between the technical staffwho react to the
infrastructure security problems and organizational managers who focus on the
expanding information needs of the organization (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa,
2001). Organizational managers are slow to realize their responsibility for provisioning
information security due in part to a lack of recognition of the reliance level the
organization has on technology (Lipson & Fisher, 1999).
The gap between the organizational perspective and the technological perspective
of security was recognized by researchers within the continuous risk management
program at the SEI (Alberts et aI., 2000). A need existed for a proactive organizational
approach to defining and addressing security risk by blending the perspectives of multiple
levels ofthe organization. That need was met through the design of a security risk
management framework that relied on a cross-functional team to identify, analyze, plan,
track, and control risks within acceptable levels (Alberts et al.). The experience and
techniques from SEI research in project risk management were applied to security risk,
leading to the development of the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE) Methodology. That methodology addressed the identification,
analysis, and planning needs for security risk management (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
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SEI researchers Christopher Alberts and Audrey Dorofee developed the
OCTAVE Methodology and produced a technical report (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a) that
summarized the aspects of organizational management, risk management, and
information security risk evaluation that were incorporated into the OCTAVE Approach
design framework. The OCTAVE Methodology is a security risk management
methodology designed using the OCTAVE Approach and tailored specifically for large
medical and government organizations (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Other tailored
security risk management methodologies can be constructed using the OCTAVE
Approach as long as the tailoring guidelines, referred to as the OCTAVE Criteria, are
applied (Alberts & Dorofee).
OCTAVE Methodology activities are focused on the planning portion of the risk
mitigation effort to establish a communication mechanism across the organization and to
formalize a means for recognizing and addressing security risk (Alberts & Dorofee,
2002). Once the plan is defined using the OCTAVE Methodology, the organization will
need to implement, monitor, and control the specific elements within the plan, and
subsequently adjust the plan based on its effectiveness (Alberts & Dorofee). These
additional requirements are not part of the methodology, but are necessary for the
organization to benefit from the planning effort. Figure 1 provides a diagram of the
sequence of steps needed to implement security risk management within an organization,
highlighting those addressed through the application of the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts
& Dorofee).
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In applying the OCTAVE Methodology, or another tailored version of the
OCTAVE Approach, an organization addresses the Identify and Analyze steps, and
initiates the Plan step of security risk management.

..

Identify - Capture organizational information assets and related security
requirements, capture organizational and technological threats to information
assets, and compare current organizational protection strategies to best practices.

..

Analyze - Define organizational impact criteria, evaluate risks to information
assets, and prioritize risks based on the level of their impact on the organization.

..

Plan - Develop risk mitigation plans to protect critical information assets, action
plans to address critical weaknesses in the technology infrastructure, and a
protection strategy to address broad organizational risks.

Information Security
Risk Evaluation

,

Figure 1: Role of the OCTAVE Methodology in Security Risk Management
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002)
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After completion ofthe OCTAVE Methodology activities, the organization must
complete the Plan step and apply the mitigation plans and protection strategy throughout
the remaining security risk management steps.
•

Plan - Develop detailed plans for the projects, resources, and actions required for

implementation.
•

Implement - Execute action plans, mitigation plans, and a protection strategy.

•

Monitor - Implement vulnerability management and other means for acquiring

data about the status of the infrastructure, and evaluate the effectiveness of plans
through audits and other measurement options.
•

Control- Identify changes in the infrastructure and risk areas that require further

analysis. Adjust plans based on those identified changes.
The first version of the OCTAVE Methodology was released for public purchase
in September 2001 (http://www.cert.orgloctave). It was applied first in medical facilities
to address the risk assessment required by HIP AA security and privacy regulations
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Since September 2001, over 1,000 organizations have used
the methodology, including financial institutions, universities, manufacturing companies,
and government agencies throughout the world.
OCTAVE and Other Security Risk Methodologies

The Facilitated Risk Analysis Process (FRAP) is considered the most widely used
security risk methodology (Peltier, 2003). The FRAP uses an analysis approach similar
to the OCTAVE Methodology but does not provide steps for organizational informationgathering activities. Moreover, applying this methodology requires the purchase of
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specialized materials and the use of a trained and licensed FRAP facilitator (Peltier,
2001).
Vulnerability analysis was proposed by Parker (1998) to address security risk
within the technology infrastructure of the organization. This approach does not fit
within organizations with few controls in place, since the evaluation critiques how well
existing controls are applied (Peltier, 2001). Also, vulnerability analysis only addresses
the technology components ofthe infrastructure, thereby omitting the organizational
security issues (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
The Computer Security Institute (CSI) provides an Information Protection
Assessment Kit (IP AK) that consists of a questionnaire developed by industry security
experts. The IP AK is self-administered and can be purchased through the CSI, but it
cannot be tailored (Peltier, 2001).
The use of security risk management is widely recommended by the audit
community, and audit methodologies have been expanded to include appropriate
practices for IT management (Lanz, 2002). The Information Systems Audit and Control
Association (ISACA) sponsors a framework called Control Objects for Information
Technology (COBIT) that includes security risk management as an element in the audit
review. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) also developed
an information assurance methodology called SysTrust that includes information security
risk analysis (Lanz).
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Research Literature Specific to the Topic
K-12 schools and school districts have expanded the use of technology in data
gathering and reporting to improve the administrative efficiency of public education
(Armstrong, Sibley, & Samara, 2003). This trend is driven by regulatory pressures for
increased accountability as established in the NCLB Act and a steady decline of funding
available for administration in K-12 schools and school districts (Armstrong et al.). The
information security response in K-12 schools and school districts has focused primarily
on limiting student and teacher access to Internet content and communication tools such
as e-mail (Armstrong et al.). A survey of811 school districts funded by the National
School Boards Foundation (NSBF) cited 91 % implementation of content filtering by
participant districts (NSBF). The initiative for Safeguarding the Wired Schoolhouse
funded through the CoSN provided a list of issues that K-12 schools and school districts
should consider when selecting a filtering option (CoSN, 2002). Chapin (1999) identified
the need for acceptable use policies (AUPs) along with appropriate physical and technical
monitoring to effectively implement content management in K-12 schools and school
districts. However, only 19% of the respondents in the NSBF survey reported
implementing an AUP. Auditing AUP adherence was addressed by only 2% ofthe
surveyed school administrators, and only 2% reported the establishment of a security
position for monitoring Internet and infrastructure activity (NSBF, 2002a).
Higher education has been a focus of national security concern for several years
(EDUCAUSE,2002). Stoll (2000) documented one ofthe initial discoveries of computer
hacking in his analysis of the infrastructure of a higher education institution to determine
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the cause for accounting discrepancies in computer usage. Those discrepancies resulted
from unexpected levels of activity on dormant computer accounts. By establishing
additional dormant accounts seeded with access to fictitious research data and monitoring
the network activity on these new accounts, Stoll determined that passwords were
systematically guessed to gain access to the system. Once an account was compromised,
the account privilege level was elevated providing access to system functions, and
operating system capabilities were modified to establish administrative access that
provided full computer control to the intruder (Stoll). His research led to institutional
changes in account management and acceptable password requirements to reduce
opportunities for unauthorized access (Stoll).
University of Delaware administrators Mackenzie and Goldman (2000) described
infrastructure-based security problems at this institution that included harassment, illegal
hacking, copyright violations, and illegal commercial activity. These problems were
subsequently addressed through strengthened security policies and procedures, user
education, and increased enforcement mechanisms to identify and punish violators
(Mackenzie & Goldman).
At the University of Buffalo, Lesniak (2002), the Director of Academic Services,
listed seven key strategies that are applied by this higher education institution:
1. Educating staff, faculty, and students to recognize unsafe practices and understand
security threats;
2. Deploying technology tools to protect the infrastructure such as anti-virus
software, intrusion detection tools, and firewalls;
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3. Monitoring Internet security organizations such as SANS and CERT/CC to
identify good practices and new security problems;
4. Prompting the application of vendor-supplied patches on critical systems;
5. Removing unneeded services that are available by default on installed
components;
6. Activating and monitoring system logs to identify patterns of abuse; and
7. Creating a response team of key individuals responsible for identifying and
repairing security incidents.
Because the infrastructures ofK-12 schools and school districts are similar to those of
higher educational technology environments (as identified by Updegrove and Long
[2001]), each K-12 school and school district should consider applying these same
strategies.
The report issued by the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
(CIPB) titled National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (CIPB, 2003) provided national
visibility to the issues ofInternet security. The strategy was issued to "engage and
empower Americans to secure the portions of cyberspace that they own, operate, control,
or with which they interact" (CIPB, p. 8). A comprehensive national program to
"empower all Americans - businesses, the general workforce, and the general population
- to secure their own parts of cyberspace" (CIPB, p.13) was identified as a key initiative.
Higher education was specifically identified as a component of the critical national
infrastructure (http://www.picb.org). A strategy focused on the needs of higher education
to approach security management within an educational environment was released by
EDUCAUSE (2002), an organization for university and college administrators.

66

Approximately 100 universities and colleges responded to an online survey
(http://www.educause.edulsecurity/security-survey.html) that provided input to the
EDUCAUSE pUblication titled Higher Education Contribution to National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace.
The Exploring the Future of Learning (EFL) Spring 2003 Forum recommended
that "a national K-12 Network Security Initiative be created to provide school leaders
with vital information on education security networks, data collection, and acceptable
policies in order to ensure privacy and the security of data within their systems"
(Armstrong et aI., 2003, p. 20). Because of the technological similarities among K-12
schools and institutions of higher education, the EDUCAUSE strategy can ensure that the
K-12 Network Security Initiative considers shared critical issues (Updegrove & Long,
2001).
K-12 schools and school districts have not considered the unintended
consequences that can arise from inappropriate access to the growing repositories of
detailed student records that are accessible using Internet connectivity (Armstrong et aI.,
2003). According to school administrators participating in a focus group at the EFL
Spring 2003 Education Forum, K-12 schools and school districts are amassing detailed
student information beyond the needs of current regulatory requirements such as the
NCLB Act in anticipation of future needs. However, accountability for controlling
access to that information is unclear (Armstrong et al.). Also, school administrators are
not considering the need for limitations on the length of time information is maintained in
Web-accessible repositories. As a consequence, access to personal information may be
available through K-12 school and school district sources permanently (Armstrong et aI.).
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Each K-12 school and school district must define the appropriate role for
technology within its educational curriculum to make effective and appropriate use of
technology (Holmes, 1999). The security threats and impacts vary based on the use of
technology within each K-12 school and school district, but the need to address relevant
risks is common to every entity with Internet connectivity (Peltier, 2001). Security risks
are those that represent a potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability to
information assets within an infrastructure (Parker, 1998). Identifying security risks that
should be considered by K-12 schools and school districts requires the identification of
events and related consequences that could result in a non-negligible impact to the entity
ifthe event occurred (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Alberts & Dorofee structure a security
risk into three components: (1) a security event, (2) a consequence, and (3) a degree of
uncertainty. A security event is initiated by a human or natural event that exploits
organizational or technological vulnerabilities to invoke a consequence. To reduce the
potential impact on the entity, security practices that reduce the likelihood of a security
event are applied (Alberts & Dorofee). Each security risk must be linked to one or more
security practices that an entity can apply to mitigate the potential impact if the security
event occurs.
In a detailed evaluation of references included in this literature review, this
investigator applied the structure described by Alberts & Dorofee (2002) to identify
security risks relevant to K-12 schools and school districts (see Appendices A and B).
For each security risk, the components of event and consequence were identified based
on information in the reference source. In addition, associated security practices that
would reduce the potential impact of the risk were identified based on the mapping of
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infonnation from each literature source to the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (Alberts &
Dorofee). The degree of uncertainty, the third security risk component, is defined within
the context of an individual K -12 school or school district and is not meaningful in a
general context (Alberts & Dorofee).
Texts and journal articles identified in the bibliography for this dissertation were
reviewed to identify K -12 security events. In addition, this investigator monitored the
following electronic sources that collect and broadcast security and K-12 domain news
and reviewed available archive copies for the period beginning January 2002 to identify
specific source documents for K-12 security events to augment literature sources:
•

Top Ten Tech Issues provided weekly by AIG Online from American
International Group, Inc. (http://home.aigonline.com),

•

ComputerWorld Daily Update provided daily by ComputerWorld
(http://www.computerworld.com).

•

SANS News Bites published weekly by The SANS Institute
(http://www.sans.org/newsletters),

•

TechLearning News published bimonthly by the CoSN and Technology &

Learning Magazine (http://www.techLearning.com).
•

Educational Technology News published biannually by the North Central
Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL) (http://www.ncrel.org/tech/etnews),
and

•

Daily Open Source Infrastructure Report published daily by the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security Infrastructure Analysis Infrastructure Protection
(DHS/IAIP) (http://www.nipc.gov/dailyreports/dailyindex.htm).
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To identify the security risks unique to K-12 schools, the security practices
assembled by this investigator were compared to a representative set of security practices,
specifically, the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices, to identify those not widely used
(Alberts et aI., 2001). The representative set of security practices were developed from
CERT/CC experience and widely accepted standard security practices provided from

organizations such as the ISO and NIST. That catalog is referred to as the OCTAVE
Catalog of Practices because it is used within methodologies that follow the OCTAVE
Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
Security risks and linked security practices identified by this investigator that are
not included in the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices are assembled in the table in Appendix
A. The security practices that are a part of the current OCTAVE Catalog of Practices and
associated K-12 security risks are assembled in Appendix B. The large number of
security issues identified as unique to K-12 schools and school districts (see Appendix A)
provides a strong indication of the need for a security risk methodology with extensive
tailoring capabilities in addressing K-12 school and school district security management
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Identifying evaluation criteria appropriate to the K-12 school and school district is
an important part of security risk management. Security threats must have a defined
impact based on criteria appropriate to the organization before the threats can be
considered risks to the organization (Peltier, 2001). The OCTAVE Methodology uses a
set of impact categories derived from research in U.S. Department of Defense medical
organizations. These categories include reputation, life and health of customers,
productivity, regulatory fines and legal penalties, and financial loss (Alberts & Dorofee,
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2002).

Regulatory fines and legal penalties, as well as reputation, are potential areas of

impact important to K-12 schools and school districts (LeBaron & Collier, 2001). Other
impact categories that establish evaluation criteria appropriate to the K-12 school
environment are suggested by Norris, Soloway, and Sullivan (2002) in their review of
technology use in education:
..

Insufficient access to technology for students and teachers - No specific target
levels are identified, but a one-to-one relationship is projected as needed.

..

Teacher preparation and technology support - Training in technology use,
techniques for incorporating technology into classroom use, and technical support
of Internet connectivity.

..

Student achievement results - Changes in student achievement that are traced to
use of Internet connectivity will impact technology access.

..

Financial support for school and school district administration - Limitations to
provisions for funding teacher and student training, and limitations in technical
support to maintain an appropriate working level of the technology could severely
impact Internet connectivity.

..

Community reputation - The reputations of K -12 schools and school districts in
the community could be impacted by the inappropriate use of technology.
The Exploring the Future of Leaming (EFL) Spring 2003 Education Forum

identified student information privacy and educational effectiveness as defined by the
NCLB Act as key areas of impact on each school (Armstrong et aI., 2003). Failure to
maintain student information privacy could enable high impacts such as identity loss and
inappropriate physical access to a child. Failure to meet the effective educational
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standards could lead to increased regulatory monitoring, remedial actions, and possible
school closings if a sufficient number of students transfer to other schools (Annstrong et
al.).

Summary of What Is Known and Unknown About the Topic
Anthony and Cohn (2002) documented the need for parental control of Internet
interactions for a child to assure protection of that child's privacy. Armstrong and
Casement (2000) identified limitations of technology in meeting educational
requirements for every child. Caregivers and parents are on both sides of this issue.
Some are exerting efforts toward greater control in the protection of their children by
prohibiting Internet access in schools and libraries (Bradsher, 2000). Others are pressing
to expand the use of technology within the classroom as a mandate for effective
education (Armstrong & Casement). Regulations related to Internet access in K-12
schools and school districts such as the COPA and CDA have been implemented and
removed by the courts (Hunter, 2000). The usage requirements for E-rate funding
defined in the CIPA mandated the implementation of content-blocking capabilities in K12 schools and school districts by July 2002 (Heins, 2001). However, these
requirements, like earlier regulations, have been challenged in the courts and may be
removed (Pruitt, 2003).
The reactions of 811 school administrators to technology security issues as
summarized by the National School Boards Foundation (NSBF) show the focus for
security protection on content-blocking with less consideration of other security concerns
such as anti-virus protection, acceptable use policies (AUPs), and auditing (NSBF,
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2002b). To meet reporting requirements for the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of
2001, K-12 schools and school districts continue to expand extensive data repositories
with sensitive information for use by local, state, and federal officials via the Web (ED,
2001), thereby expanding opportunities for the inappropriate use of that information.
Information gathered by the CERT/CC shows that the number of vulnerability
incidents doubled each year between 1998 and 2003 (Pethia,2003). Analysis ofthese
incidents indicates that increased availability of enhanced attack tools contributes to the
capability of individuals to initiate attacks with broader impact (Carpenter, 2001).
Available tools are capable of compromising large volumes of Internet-connected sites
just minutes after a vulnerability is exposed (Carpenter). These tools are disseminated to
all interested individuals through Internet communication facilities such as bulletin
boards, chat rooms and listservs (pethia). Responding to each vulnerability incident as it
is identified is no longer a reasonable approach to security management (pethia).
A compromise can lead to disclosure and modification, as well as the permanent
loss of information or temporary loss of access (Parker, 1998). According to Richardson
(2003), survey results by the San Francisco FBI Computer Intrusion Squad (CIS)
indicated that 530 computer security practitioners from U.S. corporations, government
agencies, financial and medical institutions, and universities reported heavy financial
losses involving Web-initiated intrusions. Currently in its eighth year, the FBI survey
documents problems that persist each year with growing frequency and expanded impact
as organizational reliance on technology increases (Richardson).
The Technology Standards for School Administrators (TSSA) and International
Society for Technology in Education (ISTE) promote the expanded use of technology
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within the K-12 school environment for administration, teaching, and learning (TSSA,
2001). Funding sources such as the U.S. Department of Education (ED) support the
expansion of technology in K-12 schools and school districts. However, security
considerations are not included as part of the evaluation results (ED, 2000a). Regardless
of the reason, incorporating technology into the K-12 classroom introduces security
issues that must be addressed once connectivity to outside networks is implemented
(Parker, 1998). Cases of children in the sixth grade using poor security practices to
illegally adjust grades have been reported (Shah, 2003). Moreover, high-school students
use tools readily available on the Internet to break into school databases and change
information (Akizuki, 2003).
In K-12 schools and school districts, minimum standards of best practice are not
yet established (Armstrong et aI., 2003). Limitations oftime, money, and technical
expertise have conspired to promote less than optimal solutions (Cuban, 2001).
Technology use in the classroom is inconsistent, resulting in a wide variance of security
risk among K-12 schools and school districts. Students and parents continue to demand a
greater use of technology in education, increasing the potential for security risk (ISTE,
2002). Reliance on volunteer assistance and student technical expertise increases the
need for security risk management (Armstrong et aI.).
Security risk from Internet-connected sources increases annually (Schneier,
2000). K-12 schools and school districts can benefit from applying general security
practices (see Appendix B) but require the ability to tailor a selected security risk
methodology to meet the needs related to domain-specific issues (see Appendix A).
Financial and technical resources for technology support available in the K-12 schools
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and school districts are limited with strong indications that greater limitations will be
forthcoming (NSBF, 2002a). Extensive help from volunteers and student assistants is
needed to meet current minimal support levels (Cuban, 2001).
Many types of security risk methodologies are available for addressing
information technology risk, but many widely used options involve a purchase fee and
special training. In addition, many require the inclusion of areas such as auditing, which
extend beyond the scope of this research effort (Lanz, 2002). To meet the domainspecific requirement for K-12 schools and school districts, a methodology with extensive
tailoring capabilities is required. The OCTAVE Methodology fulfills these requirements
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).

The Contribution this Study Makes to the Field
When an information security risk methodology that addresses the unique needs
of K -12 schools and school districts is applied, improvements in security management are
possible. Improvements for K-12 schools and school districts can be similar to those
experienced by U.S. health care organizations, financial institutions, government
agencies, and manufacturing organizations in which information security risk
management is already widely adopted (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). K-12 technology
planners can use the tailored security risk management methodology to articulate
requirements, identify accompanying security risks, and define good security practices to
address unacceptable levels of security risk (Alberts & Dorofee). As a result, technology
planners for K-12 schools and school districts can consider security risk management as
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part of the technology-related needs oftheir students, teachers, student's parents, and the
local community.
This researcher identified the infonnation security requirements for K -12 schools
and school districts through a broad literature review. These requirements were applied
to the OCTAVE Methodology using in-place tailoring capabilities. The tailored
methodology was used at a selected K-12 school district and reviewed by K-12 experts,
confinning the validity of the identified requirements. A framework for identifying and
prioritizing infonnation security risk focuses attention and resources on security issues
with the greatest impact (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). A self-directed infonnation security
assessment for use by K-12 schools and school districts is of great interest to the
Consortium for School Networking (CoSN) as identified by Keith Krueger, CoSN
Executive Director (personal communication, July 31,2003). With a methodology
tailored to meet their needs, K-12 school administrators can proactively construct and
evaluate the ability of their networking solutions to facilitate safe and secure access to
Internet-accessible resources.
A correlation exists between the security threats identified within higher
education such as those reported by administrators at the University of Delaware
(Mackenzie & Goldman, 2000) and those expected in K-12 schools and school districts.
That correlation indicates that a successful security risk methodology tailored to the
unique needs ofK-12 schools and school districts would also be of value to technology
planners in higher education. Higher education is one of the critical sectors for national
security as identified in the CIPB (2003) National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace report.
Members ofthe EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Security Task Force plan to review the K-12 Risk

76

Methodology as part ofthe development process for a risk methodology tailored for
higher education and based on the OCTAVE Approach (Rodney Peterson, Security Task
Force Project Coordinator, personal communication, October 29,2003).
K-12 schools and school districts have no regulatory mandate for information
security and have not addressed security risks (Updegrove & Long, 2001).
Documentation of the steps taken and issues encountered while identifying security
requirements and applying a security risk methodology tailored to K -12 schools and
school districts provides a template for inserting a security risk management process into
organizational sectors that exhibit limited recognition of security risk (Armstrong et aI.,
2003).
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Research Method Employed
K-12 schools and school districts increasingly support expanded Internet
connectivity. However, survey results issued by the National School Boards Foundation
(NSBF, 2002a) indicate a lack of recognition by school administrations ofthe need for
protecting users and devices connected to the Internet through the K-12 infrastructure.
Moreover, an understanding ofthe importance of monitoring K-12 Internet connectivity
to ensure that its use is limited to legitimate functions is also lacking (NSBF). The
Internet is by design an environment of trust (Schneier, 2000). Security options were
developed and applied as participation expanded exponentially and the validity of trust
provided in the original design proved inappropriate (ClPB, 2003).
Medical organizations must perform periodic technology risk assessments under
the Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HlP AA) provisions (DHHS, 2003).
Provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 require financial institutions
to perform a security risk assessment (Lanz, 2002). The Government Information
Security Reform Act (GISRA) requires every U.S. government agency to perform a
security risk assessment to assure the appropriate levels of security protection needed for
continued technology funding from federal sources (Swanson, 1998). Based on the
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number of regulatory mandates across a wide range of organizational domains, K -12
schools and school districts should consider the importance of applying a security risk
assessment (Annstrong et aI., 2003).
The lack of clear standards for good security and confusion over appropriate
security assessment mechanisms motivate organizations to apply risk management in the
area of information security (Peltier, 2001). Lanz (2002) reported options for security
risk management that were considered by the American Bankers Association (ABA).
The framework sponsored by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association
(ISACA) and called Control Objects for Information Technology (COBIT) was included.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AlCP A) information assurance
service called SysTrust was included. Additionally, the OCTAVE Methodology and the
NIST Self-Assessment 800-26 used by federal agencies to validate federal regulatory
compliance were included for consideration.
Lanz (2002) noted that COBIT and SysTrust are broad audit assessments covering
much more than security. According to Lanz, the OCTAVE Methodology is a
comprehensive self-directed approach for large organizations using risk considerations to
first determine which information assets need protection, and then define how protection
should be applied based on security practices assembled from academia and industry.
Lanz reported that the NIST Self-Assessment 800-26 is focused primarily on U.S.
government security regulations.
In addition to the options identified by the ABA, Peltier (2001) identified the
Facilitated Risk Analysis Process (FRAP) as the most widely used security risk
assessment methodology in business and finance. The OCTAVE Methodology and the
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NIST Self-Assessment 800-26 are both self-directed and available via the Web at no cost.
The OCTAVE Methodology can be tailored to fit the unique context of an organization
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2001), but the NIST self-assessment requires strict adherence to the
specifications established within the methodology (Swanson, 2001). The FRAP is
applied by security experts who are trained and licensed to deliver the methodology
(Peltier). An Information Protection Assessment Kit (IPAK) consisting of a series of
questions developed by security experts can be purchased from the CSI, but no tailoring
options are available for it (Peltier).
This researcher used the OCTAVE Methodology for this investigation in applying
security risk management for Internet connectivity in K-12 schools and school districts.
The methodology accommodated financial limitations for technology usage in K-12
schools and school districts (CoSN, 2002). The methodology does not attempt to impose
those regulatory compliance requirements appropriate for banks or hospitals. K -12
schools and school districts lack specific security regulations beyond content filtering
(NSBF,2002a). The methodology supports the unique context of the educational
environment, which requires a blending of academic and business needs with limited
technical support expertise (Cuban, 2001). Also, the methodology does not enforce any
general auditing requirements that exceed the proposed focus of this research effort
(Lanz, 2001).
The OCTAVE Methodology takes into account the unique characteristics of each
individual K -12 school and school district. In addition, this methodology provides a
comparison of current security procedures to the general best practices assembled from
the security standards of the BSI, NIST security recommendations, and the CERT/CC
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vulnerability analysis (Alberts et al., 2001). Moreover, the OCTAVE Methodology
provides a systematic process for guiding a K-12 school or school district in the
identification of its unique security risks and the development of a plan for addressing
those risks (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The OCTAVE Methodology has been
implemented by over 1,000 medical, government, university, financial, and
manufacturing operations throughout the world (http://www.cert.org/octave). The U.S.
Department of Defense medical community has selected the OCTAVE Methodology to
meet its mandated security risk assessment requirement for compliance with Health
Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIP AA) regulations (DHHS, 2003). The
OCTAVE Methodology is publicly available as part ofthe SEI program to improve the
overall state of security risk management in networked environments (Alberts &
Dorofee).
For this study, this investigator tailored the OCTAVE Methodology using options
provided within the methodology (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Although the methodology
was constructed for large organizations, tailoring options were available to streamline the
steps for any size entity (Alberts & Dorofee). The tailored methodology was validated as
being appropriately based on the OCTAVE Approach through the use of the OCTAVE
Criteria. The OCTAVE Criteria consist of principles, attributes, and outputs that define
the required elements of risk management for an effective security risk management
evaluation using the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). Validation ofthe
tailored methodology using the OCTAVE Criteria confirmed that tailoring adjustments
did not impact the value of the security risk assessment (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
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The tailored methodology is referenced throughout this dissertation as the K-12
Risk Methodology. A tailored methodology that continues to carry the OCTAVE name
requires licensing from Carnegie Mellon. Based on previously identified financial
resource limitations for technology in K-12 schools and school districts, the added
licensing cost of using the OCTAVE name was deemed a deterrent by Steve Miller,
CoSN Executive Board member (personal communication, February 24, 2003). As a
consequence, the OCTAVE Methodology is referenced as the basis for the K-12 Risk
Methodology, but the OCTAVE name is removed from all documents within the tailored
version (http://www .cert. org!octave/licensing.html).
The OCTAVE Methodology addresses the overall planning aspects for Internet
security within the K -12 school and school district, and not the details of applying
security technology within the school environment (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The
OCTAVE Methodology establishes a general process for the initial development of
information security plans to protect information assets within the organization.
Approaches for including evaluation results within the continuous planning cycles of an
organization, as well as acquisition strategies for new technology, are suggested but not
specifically provisioned within the OCTAVE Methodology (Alberts & Dorofee).

OCTAVE Methodology Description

The OCTAVE Methodology is applied through a series of structured workshops
performed by an analysis team composed of carefully selected individuals who represent
the range of technology interests and responsibilities across the organization (Alberts &
Dorofee,2001c). The members of the analysis team must assemble their individual
knowledge into a shared perspective to define both the current technology security
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environment and the needs ofthe organization that technology must support. This effort
can take from three days to two months depending on the level of effort applied by
analysis team participants (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). OCTAVE Methodology
workshops are grouped into three phases: (l) Organizational View, (2) Technological
View (which is optional), and (3) Security Strategy and Planning.
Phase I: Organizational View
In the first phase, the analysis team establishes the organizational view through
the identification of information assets (systems, software, applications, and people) that
are important to the organization. For each asset, security requirements are identified.
Moreover, the organizational perspective of how the information is protected and/or
threatened by the existing environment is ascertained. From the first phase, the analysis
team selects the most critical information assets, generally three to five, to carry forward
to the remainder of the process. Assets that represent large adverse effects when their
security requirements are violated are considered critical assets (Alberts & Dorofee,
200Ic). For each selected critical asset, threats to confidentiality, integrity, and
availability are identified and assembled into threat profiles (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ib).
The activities in Phase I support the assembly of an organizational view of assets,
threats, vulnerabilities, and current security practices. Assets are identified through a
series of facilitated workshops with participants from several organizational layers,
including senior management, operational management, administrative staff, and
technical staff. Current security practices and organizational vulnerabilities that could
adversely impact the assets are also identified. Each workshop group selects the three to
five most important assets from their list of important assets and identifies the security
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requirements that should be in place to protect them. The analysis team summarizes the
information collected from all the workshops for use in subsequent methodology
activities. From that summary, the team selects three to five critical assets and refines the
security requirements to carry forward through the remainder of the evaluation as a
representative sample of all the organizational assets (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). For
critical assets, threat profiles are constructed using generic threat profiles based on the
summarized organizational vulnerabilities identified in the workshops and gaps identified
in the current security practices (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001b). The final outputs of Phase I
are the following:
•

Organizational assets, organizational security concerns, and security requirements
summarized from a series of data collection workshops;

•

Critical assets selected by the analysis team and related security requirements
them;

•

Threats to critical assets identified using generic threat profiles; and

•

Current security practices.

Phase 2: Technological View
In the second phase, which is optional, the analysis team plans and executes a
targeted vulnerability assessment to identify weaknesses in the technology infrastructure
that confirm and augment the threat profiles for the critical assets developed in the Phase
1. Components of the infrastructure that are linked to each critical asset and relevant to
processing, storing, or transmitting data are selected for assessment. Firewalls, routers,
and switches, as well as external service providers and links from other devices that
provide access paths to critical assets, are also selected for assessment (Alberts &
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Dorofee, 2002). Phase 2 is perfonned only when the organization can readily hire
individuals experienced in vulnerability management to perfonn the assessment (Alberts
& Dorofee, 2001c).
The vulnerability infonnation is used to identify major weaknesses in the
infrastructure that need immediate attention and to define ways the technology allows for
asset compromise (Allen, 2001). In addition, vulnerabilities may represent additional
threats to critical assets that augment the threats assembled during Phase 1 (Alberts &
Dorofee, 2001a). The outputs of Phase 2 include the following:
•

Infrastructure components important to each critical asset, and

•

Summarized technological vulnerabilities from the targeted assessment of
selected components.

Phase 3: Security Strategy and Planning
In the third phase, the analysis team defines the organizational impact of each

threat identified in the prior phases. The combined threat and corresponding impact
represent a risk to the organization that must be considered for acceptance or mitigation.
Evaluation criteria that define the level of concern an impact represents to the
organization are assembled. The evaluation criteria allow the analysis team to quantify
risks (high, medium, or low) so that resources for protection can be applied to risks that
represent the greatest organizational impact. Risk mitigation plans for each critical asset
are developed to address high-impact risks by analyzing the gaps between the
organization's current security practices and best practices described in the OCTAVE
Catalog of Practices. The analysis team develops an organizational protection strategy by
reviewing the risk mitigation plans for the critical assets to identify commonalities that
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should be applied broadly across the organization. Results are assembled into a series of
reports that identify near-term actions, mitigation plans focused on specific information
assets, and an organizational protection strategy that identifies the framework for
establishing the appropriate protection for current and future assets (Alberts & Dorofee,
2002).
Evaluation criteria to prioritize financial impacts and threats to health and safety,
productivity, fines and legal penalties, and reputation are suggested by the methodology
as a reasonable baseline for impact analysis (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Each critical
asset risk is analyzed using the evaluation criteria and valued to provide a scale for
prioritization. Security practices that need improvement are compared to the highest
priority risks to identify the practices most needed by the organization. The analysis
team identifies immediate, near-term, and long-range activities for applying security
practices that address the highest risks to critical information assets (Alberts & Dorofee,
2001a). The analysis team presents the proposed plan to the organizational decision
makers to obtain approval from appropriate groups within the organization to carry the
plan forward to implementation. The outputs of Phase 3 are the following:
•

Risk measures, also called evaluation criteria;

•

Risks to critical assets;

•

Action items or plans for immediate activities;

•

Mitigation plans or plans for near-term activities related directly to critical assets;
and

•

Protection strategies or plans for long-range activities across the organization.
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OCTAVE Criteria Principles
The OCTAVE Methodology is based on the OCTAVE Criteria principles,
attributes, and outputs that define the required elements of risk management for an
effective security risk management evaluation using the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts &
Dorofee,2001a). Principles are defined as fundamental concepts of risk management
that must drive the nature of the evaluation. Attributes are characteristics of a successful
evaluation for risk management. Outputs define the results that must be achieved to
accomplish a successful evaluation. The tailored methodology must incorporate the
OCTAVE Criteria to validate its application of the OCTAVE Approach for security risk
management (Alberts & Dorofee).
The principles in OCTAVE Criteria define key concepts that describe the nature
ofthe evaluation (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). These principles are built from the SEI
research experience in risk management, organizational management, and information
security risk management and each is described in the remainder of this section (Alberts
et aI., 2000):
•

From SEI experience in information security risk management, the principles of
self-direction, adaptable measures, defined process, and foundation for a
continuous process are drawn (Alberts & Dorofee).

•

From the field of risk management, the principles of forward-looking view, focus
on the critical few, and integrated management are included (Alberts & Dorofee).

•

From organizational management, the principles of open communication, global
perspective, and teamwork are drawn (Alberts & Dorofee).
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Principles from Security Risk Management
The self-direction principle allows people in the organization to manage and
direct the evaluation process. This principle is based on the assumption that personnel in
the organization understand how to manage organizational risk, but must be guided in
identifying and managing security risk (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
The adaptable measures principle results in the application of flexible
measurements that are adapted to work within the unique context of the organizational
environment. Available measurements include known security threats and known
technological weaknesses that are identified by authoritative sources such as the
CERT/CC and the Mitre Corporation (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).

The defined process principle requires the use of standardized evaluation
procedures within which the analysis team is required to assign each activity or action to
a responsible individual or group (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). The procedures used by
the analysis team include: defining all evaluation activities, assigning responsibilities for
each evaluation activity, specifying evaluation mechanisms, and creating a common
format for documenting evaluation results. Defined evaluation procedures are structured
from template worksheets including detailed instructions that make up a structured and
consistent framework for the identification and analysis of security risk. In addition,
documentation within the methodology of the processes used to identify risks, impacts,
and plans in addressing critical risks contributes to defined evaluation procedures
(Alberts & Dorofee).
The foundation for a continuous process principle establishes security
management as ongoing. Each evaluation provides a framework for the identification,
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analysis, and planning of security requirements for the organization. This framework
forms the basis for implementing, monitoring, and controlling information security to
complete the cycle of continuous security management (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
Principles from Risk Management
The forward-looking view principle enables participants to look beyond the
existing environment and establish a protection strategy that will allow for continuous
change. Change can occur in the composition of an organization's information assets and
the technology infrastructure that supports the assets. Change can also be triggered by
threat events that are initiated either internally or externally and that put the infrastructure
and assets of the organization at risk (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
The focus on the critical few principle provides a mechanism for addressing
security risk within the limitations of organizational resources. The efficient use of these
resources focuses organizational attention on the highest priority risks. The methodology
is structured to provide an effective and efficient means for limiting the volume of data
under consideration at each activity (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
The integrated management principle points to the need to have security policies
and strategies consistent with overall organizational ones. Trade-off choices made in
organizational policy setting at the highest levels of the organization must be reflected
consistently in the choices applied to security policy (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Principles from Organizational Management
The open communication principle emphasizes the need for broad participation
across many areas of the organization. A collaborative effort is required to assemble
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information and develop decisions that are shared among participants assembled across
the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
The global perspective principle requires that consensus be reached in addressing
security issues since it would be ineffective for one part of the organization to act under
one set of policies and procedures while other parts ofthe organization use a different set.
Security requires consistency at all levels across the organization to appropriately address
threats to the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
The teamwork principle emphasizes the challenges involved in dealing with an
issue as complex as information security. No one individual or group of individuals can
have all the knowledge and requisite response information. Information must be pooled
from the broad range of participants within the organization and possibly include experts
outside of the organization to assemble data and develop the appropriate plans that
address the security needs of the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).

aCTA VE Criteria Attributes
Attributes define the structure of each process within the methodology and
establish essential elements that must be present for an appropriate application of the
OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). Within the OCTAVE Criteria,
attributes establish the characteristics of the principles. The following attributes are
included in the OCTAVE Criteria: analysis team, augmentation of analysis team skills,
catalog of practices, generic threat profile, catalog of vulnerabilities, defined evaluation
activities, documented evaluation results, evaluation scope, next steps, focus on risk,
focused activities, organizational and technological issues, organizational and
information technology participation, senior management participation, and collaborative
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approach. Along with principles, attributes must be maintained when any tailoring is
applied to assure consistency with the OCTAVE Criteria (Alberts & Dorofee). A
summary list of principle and attribute links is provided in Appendix C. Some principles
map to multiple attributes, and some attributes link to multiple principles (Alberts &
Dorofee). A description of each attribute, grouped by the principle to which it applies, is
provided below.
Attributes for Self-Direction
An analysis team composed of personnel from within the organization is
assembled to lead the evaluation activities. Personnel who use technology within the
organization, as well as technology specialists who implement and support the
organization's infrastructure, must work together to forge a unified view of the security
risk from an organizational perspective. The organization's leadership must take
ownership of identified information risks and agree to the steps developed by the analysis
team to address the risks, thereby ensuring that appropriate measures will be taken to
implement plans built using the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ia).
Augmentation of analysis team skills extends the ability of the organization to
address the complexities of security management and the challenge of assembling a
sufficiently strong team to cover all needed aspects. This attribute provides a mechanism
for adding skills without transferring organizational responsibility. Through the selective
expansion of the team to address specific areas where analysis team skills are limited, the
OCTAVE Approach provides a mechanism for addressing skill and knowledge variations
without jeopardizing ownership and responsibility for the results (Alberts & Dorofee,
2001a).
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Attributes for Adaptable Measures
Use of a catalog of practices ensures that the organization will consider the range
of strategic and operational security practices important for good security risk
management. The OCTAVE Catalog of Practices is assembled from experience at the
CERT/CC in responding to reported Internet vulnerabilities, results from the SEI's
experience in performing security evaluations, and security practices from recognized
international standards organizations such as the British Standards Institution (BSI). The
BSI published a code of practices in 1995 that was adopted in 2000 by the International
Standards Organization (ISO) as ISO 17799 (Brykczynski & Small, 2003).

The

OCTAVE Catalog of Practices incorporates the practices from the BSI publication BS
7799: Part 1: 1995 (BSI, 1995). That body of knowledge provides a basis of security best
practices against which an organization can measure its own internal efforts and identify
opportunities for improvement (Alberts et aI., 2001).
With the use of a generic threat profile, the organization considers a range of
threats that are formalized into structured profiles (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001b). A threat
represents a potential combination of a security event source identified as an threat actor
performing a deliberate or accidental action that results in an undesirable outcome. The
outcomes are security compromises to information assets that result in disclosure,
modification, loss/destruction, or interruption, thus causing undesirable consequences for
the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001 a). The OCTAVE Methodology incorporates
four structured threat profiles representing threats from four actor sources: (1) human
actors using network access, (2) human actors using physical access, (3) system problems
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such as hardware and software defects, and (4) other problems such as floods and power
outages (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001b).
Using a catalog of vulnerabilities assures that infrastructure vulnerabilities are
evaluated in terms of standard sources such as the Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE). The CVE consists of a list of known vulnerabilities developed
collaboratively by security professionals and maintained by the Mitre Corporation
(http://cve.mitre.org). The list also provides characteristics of vulnerabilities so that
security experts and assessment tools can detect when a specific vulnerability is present
in an infrastructure. A severity rating for each vulnerability (high, medium, or low)
based on the ease of its exploit by an unsophisticated attacker is provided in the CVE
along with instructions for removing the vulnerability (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). It is
important to note that the volume of reported vulnerabilities is doubling annually with no
expected rate decrease (Pethia, 2003).
Attributes for Defined Process
Defined evaluation activities ensure that a well-structured and comprehensive
evaluation is performed. Procedures are specified for the series of workshops required to
perform the methodology. Detailed instructions, provided for each workshop, include
preparation activities, task lists, worksheet templates, examples of anticipated outcomes,
and reference catalogs to be used. This level of definition provides a repeatable process
that serves as the framework for an ongoing risk management effort. Moreover, the steps
in the process and expected outcomes can be evaluated in advance of resource
commitment, thus, providing a means of establishing appropriate expectations for
decision makers. Tailoring requirements for specific types of organizations can be
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identified and incorporated in advance for each required activity (Alberts & Dorofee,
2001a).
With documented evaluation results, the sponsoring entity, or in this case the K12 school or school district, records the information captured within each activity to
produce a body of material that represents the organization's use of the OCTAVE
Methodology. That material becomes a permanent record that defines the security risks
of the organization and represents a formal attempt to address risks outside of acceptable
organizational tolerance levels. The documented results support implementation
decisions that are part of security mitigation plans and protection strategies (Alberts &
Dorofee,2001a).
The evaluation scope must be delineated carefully to assure inclusion of critical
organizational areas within the assessment. The resource and time limitations
established by organizational decision makers must be considered when defining the
segments of the organization to be included in the evaluation. Large and complex K-12
schools or school districts can manage the scope by including only a few departments
critical to their mission. These departments should represent a good sample of the K -12
school or school district as a whole (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
Attributes for Foundation for a Continuous Process
With the next steps, the OCTAVE Methodology is formally recognized as a basis
for planning. Effective adoption requires that plans developed within the OCTAVE
Methodology provide the basis for subsequent implementation as part of a complete risk
management process. Decision makers review the results ofthe evaluation process and
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determine follow-up actions to appropriately manage the security risks identified through
the application of the methodology (Alberts & Dorofee, 200Ia).
Senior management participation communicates active sponsorship to members of
the organization. Implementing plans to manage security risks requires resource
commitments from the leadership of the organization. Through active participation in the
process, decision makers gain an understanding of the importance of security risk
management and ensure that the mission, risk tolerance, and resource limitations of the
organization are represented appropriately (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). In addition, the
attribute catalog of practices, described previously with adaptable principles, applies to
the principle foundation for a continuous process.
Attribute for Forward-Looking View
A focus on risk requires consideration of the impact of potential threats instead of
simply the identification of all possible threats. Scarce resources are allocated to the
highest priority risks - those that would result in the greatest potential harm to critical
assets of the organization (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
Attributes for Focus on the Critical Few
Focused activities facilitate the delineation of security risk issues impacting
important information assets. A comprehensive view of all assets, all vulnerabilities, and
all security issues is not addressed within the methodology. The analysis process is
complex and becomes ineffective if too broad a perspective is attempted (Alberts &
Dorofee,2001a). In addition, the attribute evaluation scope, described with the defined
process principle, applies to the focus on the critical few principle.
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Attributes for Integrated Management
Organizational and technological issues must be examined in the security
evaluation. Security threats and serious risks can result from inappropriate and
ineffective organizational policies and practices. Moreover, serious risks can result when
technology vulnerabilities are not effectively addressed in the infrastructure (Alberts &
Dorofee,2001a). Activities within the methodology are structured to incorporate both
the organizational and technological views, which are critical to the fOlTIlUlation of an
effective protection strategy (Alberts & Dorofee). If an organization relies only on
vulnerability assessment tools to evaluate the security risk of the infrastructure, the
assessment will address only a small segment ofthe security risks that should be
considered (Alberts et aI., 2001). Vulnerability tools identify known weaknesses in the
technology, improper configurations of administrative functions such as accounts with
null passwords, and information a possible attacker can use to locate infrastructure
weaknesses (Parker, 1998). Vulnerability tools do not identify improper systems
administration that allows access to the wrong individuals, unknown vulnerabilities that
may allow future inappropriate access, or incorrect applications of policies and
procedures (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Organizational and information technology participation is required to address the
principle of integrated management. A range of perspectives across the organization is
necessary to identify the assets, threats, security requirements, and risks that are critical to
the organization. Without strong organizational participation in the evaluation's
activities, the mission of the organization cannot be represented properly, and without
strong technology participation, the infrastructure risks are not identified properly. A
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balanced perspective assures the appropriate consideration of both organizational and
technological issues (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). In addition, senior management
participation, described earlier in this report under the heading of Attributes for a
Foundation for a Continuous Process, applies to the principle of integrated management.
Attribute for Open Communication
A collaborative approach for sharing information and building consensus in
decision making is required to ensure that the broad range of perspectives represented by
analysis team members is considered in the evaluation. Participants see the value and
accept responsibility for implementing resulting plans if they are part of the process that
identifies the needs and establishes the plans (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a).
Attributes for Global Perspective
The attributes referenced as organizational and technological issues and
organizational and information technology participation, described earlier in this
dissertation under the heading of Attributes for Integrated Management, apply to the
principle of global perspective. Based on the application of other principles such as open
communication, the blending of participants from across the K-12 school or school
district should yield a global perspective.
Attributes for Teamwork
The attributes described earlier in this dissertation under the heading of Attributes
of Self-Direction, namely analysis team and augmenting analysis team skills, apply to the
principle of teamwork. The attribute described earlier under the heading of Attributes of
Open Communication, namely collaborative approach, applies to the principle of
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teamwork as does the organizational and information technology participation attribute
described under the heading of Attributes of Integrated Management.

Specific Procedures Employed
A tailored version of the OCTAVE Methodology to support this investigation was
designed for use in the K-12 schools and school districts (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The
unique requirements ofthe K-12 technology environment identified in the literature
search and the security practices unique to K-12 schools and school districts listed in
Appendix A were incorporated into the OCTAVE Methodology. The OCTAVE Catalog
of Practices and each activity, along with worksheets and step-by-step instructions, were
modified as needed to build a methodology uniquely tailored for this domain (Alberts &
Dorofee, 2001). Based on a review by Christopher Alberts, an SEI researcher and
developer of the OCTAVE Methodology, of the unique needs ofK-12 schools and school
districts that are relevant to information security (C. Alberts, personal communications,
December 13,2002), the following tailoring options within the OCTAVE Methodology
were selected for consideration:
•

Expansion of the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices incorporating requirements
unique to K-12 schools and school districts.

•

Adjustment of the data-gathering process used in the workshops for Phase 1:
Organizational View that is currently based on a hierarchical organization
structure, allowing for the collection of asset and security requirements from a
distributed organizational structure that included administrative staff, teachers,
parents, and students. Schools comprise a blend of three sub-organizations that

98

must be represented within the Organizational View. These sub-organizations
include administration to address the business processes of the K-12 school or
school district such as payroll and purchasing; teaching to address classroom
instruction and information distribution; and learning to address student
participation that may extend to parental involvement.
•

Augmentation of the guidelines and worksheet templates for defining threats to an
asset to provide a means for explicitly identifying authorized and unauthorized
individuals or groups of individuals. In the OCTAVE Methodology, individuals
who hold organizational positions that enable them to access an asset are called
insiders, and individuals or groups that should be denied access to an asset are
called outsiders. The designation of insiders and outsiders within a K-12 school
or school district is inconsistent and must be qualified for each asset. For
example, for classroom assignment folders, students and teachers are insiders and
administrative personnel are outsiders. For the payroll system, administrative
personnel are insiders and students are outsiders.

•

Adjustment of evaluation criteria to categories important to K -12 schools and
school districts. Productivity, reputation, and customer confidence, suggested by
the OCTAVE Methodology as evaluation criteria, are not as important in K-12
school and school district settings as regulatory compliance, curriculum
effectiveness, student performance on standardized tests, and community support
(Norris et aI., 2002).
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..

Adjustment of the tenninology used in worksheets and instructions developed for
medical, manufacturing, financial, and government agencies to incorporate K-12
school and school district tenninology.
The following steps, described in greater detail in Chapter 4, were perfonned by

this investigator to build the prototype K -12 Risk Methodology:
..

Identified security risks relevant to K-12 schools and school districts and security
practices that mitigate the risk from the literature search (see Appendices A and
B).

..

Expanded the aCTAVE Catalog of Practices to incorporate each security practice
unique to K-12 schools and school districts from Appendix A.

..

Examined the tailoring options within the aCTAVE Methodology to understand
the relationships among steps in the process and detennine how changes to one
area impacted other parts of the methodology.

..

Applied the tailoring options selected for consideration as appropriate to K-12
school and school district requirements. The selection process is described earlier
in this section of this document.

..

Evaluated the tailored methodology to assure compliance with the aCTAVE
Criteria.

..

Perfonned a risk evaluation using the tailored methodology at a selected K-12
school district. This process is further described in the remainder of this section
and in Chapter 4.
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•

Reviewed the methodology with experts from various K-12 schools and school
districts to confirm broad applicability. This process is further described at the
end of this section and in Chapter 4.
Based on the SEI's experience with inserting the OCTAVE Methodology into

multiple domains, this researcher determined that not every unique requirement for this
inquiry would be identifiable from the literature review (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
Following the approach used in the development of the OCTAVE Methodology for the
U.S. Department of Defense medical community, this researcher selected a pilot site for a
facilitated use of the K-12 Risk Methodology to identify additional tailoring needed to fit
the methodology to needs ofthe K-12 schools and school districts (Alberts & Dorofee).
Participants at the pilot site were required to learn and apply the tailored methodology for
their school and evaluate the results of the methodology, as well as the applicability to
their school setting. To be considered for the pilot site, the K-12 school or school district
was required to have the full age range of students and actively use technology within the
curriculum at most grade levels. To assure on-site availability and eliminate conflicts
with vendor contract provisions, technology support personnel were required to work for
the school or school district rather than an external provider.
The Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD) met the selection criteria and was
chosen as the pilot site. A leader from the SPSD coordinated the district's internal effort
to use the methodology. This individual was responsible for planning and budget
management within the SPSD and recognized the value of using the K-12 Risk
Methodology in justifying technology expenditures. To assure that appropriate
individuals were selected for participation on the analysis team, the SPSD leader
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reviewed the description for this research, specifically part of Chapter 1 of this document,
to gain an understanding of the importance of pilot site participation and the
responsibilities of the selected analysis team. Selected members of the teaching staff,
curriculum design staff, technology staff, and administrative staffwere chosen for the
SPSD analysis team. In addition, these individuals had good communication skills and
were interested in improving information security. The analysis team committed one day
a week for eight weeks to learn and complete the evaluation to meet the specified
timeframe.
This researcher conducted four guidance sessions with the analysis team to
familiarize participants with the methodology and review progress as the team performed
the methodology workshops. For Guidance Session 1, this researcher provided an
introduction to the issues of security risk management and an overview of the K -12 Risk
Management analysis team activities. The PowerPoint slide presentation Managing the

Risk ofInternet Connectivity (Woody, 2003) introduced the need for security risk
management in K-12 schools and school districts to SPSD analysis team participants.
During the remainder of the first session, the K-12 Risk Methodology materials used by
analysis team members in their execution of the methodology were reviewed. Those
materials consisted of worksheets and step-by-step instructional guidelines for each
activity to be performed. The activities were grouped by the phase in which they occur.
Appendix D contains a detailed description of each activity within each phase and the
title of each worksheet to be used by the analysis team to document the results of each
activity.
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For Guidance Session 2, this researcher returned to the SPSD when the analysis
team completed the required activities and outputs of Phase 1: Organizational View.
During this session, the analysis team presented the results for the following: assets,
areas of concern, security requirements, current protection strategy survey results, critical
assets, and threats to critical assets. As a consequence of questions from analysis team
members about the use of the Organizational View worksheets for constructing threat
trees, two separate workshops were required: Guidance Sessions 2A and 2B. During
Guidance Session 2A, analysis team questions were resolved. During Guidance Session
2B, the SPSD analysis team presented the completed worksheets for Phase 1. Work to be
addressed in Phase 2: Technology View was also discussed during Guidance Session 2B.
Phase 2 of the methodology is performed only if individuals knowledgeable in the use of
vulnerability assessment tools are available. The SPSD analysis team determined that
Phase 2 could not be performed because the school district did not have access to the
necessary expertise and could not purchase the expertise from external sources within the
time constraints ofthe pilot. As a consequence, the analysis team moved forward with
Phase 3: Security Strategy and Planning.
During Guidance Session 3 the results of the Phase 3 activities were reviewed.
Analysis team members presented their completed worksheets and answered the
following questions:
•

How has the use ofthe methodology expanded your understanding ofK-12 school
information security issues?

•

How have the plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies that were
developed with the methodology addressed school district security concerns?
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4&

How has use of the methodology prepared you to address information technology
(IT) decisions and security issues in your school district?
Guidance Review Sessions 2B and 3 identified additional K-12 school and school

district issues that were not included in the initial tailoring of the methodology. In
addition to responding to questions about the value of the methodology, SPSD analysis
team participants were asked for ideas about how to improve the methodology and its
effectiveness for K-12 schools and school districts in general. Members of the SPSD
analysis team provided information about the following:
4&

Gaps and issues not addressed by the tailored methodology that should be
incorporated,

4&

Areas where the structure and format hindered the SPSD analysis team's use of
the materials, and

..

Recommended revisions that would improve the usability of the materials.
All K-12 Risk Methodology outputs created during the SPSD use ofthe tailored

methodology remained the property of the SPSD and were not part of the reported
research results. This research focused on the methodology and its effectiveness for
helping K-12 schools and school districts, and SPSD as a sample member of this domain,
identify and address security risks through the application of a security risk assessment
methodology.
Because ofthe wide variation in school size and technology capability among K12 schools and school districts, an individual pilot site could not be considered a
representative sample (K. Krueger, personal communication, February 21,2003). To
expand the review process to a broader audience, the tailored methodology was presented
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for review and comment to a group often K-12 school officials, including school board
members, technology directors, and superintendents. Reviewers were members of the
Consortium for School Networking (CoSN), a national non-profit organization that draws
its members from K-12 schools and school districts across the country. In preparation
for this review, the CoSN assembled a Security Focus Group (SFG). Participants in that
group included three individuals serving on the CoSN executive board who previously
expressed interest in K-12 school security and several attendees at the K-12 School
Networking Conference 2003 in Arlington, VA who signed up to participate in the SFG
through self-selection. The SFG participants met once at the conference to review the
same PowerPoint slide presentation used as an introduction for the SPSD analysis team.
Communication with SFG participants was coordinated through an assigned member of
the CoSN executive board (S. Miller, personal communication, February 27,2003).
After the SPSD finished using the K-12 Risk Methodology, changes
recommended by analysis team participants were applied, and the updated version was
released to SFG members for their review. In addition to suggestions and questions
about specific methodology content, SFG participants were asked to respond to the
following questions:
..

How is the methodology applicable to your K-12 school or school district?

..

Is the provided material sufficient for use in your K-12 school or school district?

..

Has your concern about the K-12 school security issues increased, decreased, or
remained unchanged based on review of the methodology?
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Formats for Presenting Results
Two products in Microsoft Word format were assembled from this research. The
first product was the K-12 Risk Methodology based on the OCTAVE Methodology. That
product consisted of worksheets and step-by-step instructions for completing process
activities included in the security risk evaluation tailored for K-12 schools and school
districts using the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Major segments of
that first product are included in this report (Appendices E, F, G, and H) to illustrate
specific tailoring actions applied to the methodology.
The second product was a report highlighting the shortcomings and value of the
methodology as identified by the analysis team and CoSN Security Focus Group (SFG)
participants. That second report incorporated the lessons learned from tailoring activities,
and pilot and expert reviews of the methodology. The information in that report is
described in Chapter 4 and Appendix L ofthis document.

Outcomes
This research raised the awareness of security risk management issues for analysis
team participants at the selected pilot site. In addition, K-12 schools and school districts
represented by the participants in the SFG review group reported increased awareness.
Copies of the two products of this research were provided for use by CoSN members.
Since a high level of interest in information security was expressed by its members as a
result of this research, the CoSN announced an initiative for cyber-security in the K-12
schools and school districts. That initiative involved establishing funding for
development and dissemination of an assemblage oftraining and tools tailored to K-12
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school security (http://securedistrict.cosn.orgl). The focus of the U.S. on information
security underscores the importance of a viable methodology to address the risk ofK-12
school and school district Internet connectivity nationwide and contributes to the
involvement of school administrators in addressing issues and challenges in that area
(CIPB, 2002).
As a consequence of this investigation, a security plan developed by the analysis
team using the K -12 Risk Methodology was implemented at the SPSD. That plan
included action items for immediate needs, mitigation procedures for protecting critical
information assets, and a protection strategy for long-term security management of
critical technology resources within the K-12 school district. Team participants who
implement security plans are expected to become advocates for security risk management
and assist the CoSN in helping other K-12 schools and school districts benefit from the
use of this methodology. The SPSD analysis team participated in the announcement of
the CoSN cyber-security initiative at the National School Boards Association's (NSBA's)
2003 Technology Plus Learning Conference, October 2003, in Anaheim, CA.
Based on statements from SFG reviewers during the initial meeting at the 2003 K12 School Networking Conference, participants in the review process gained an
understanding of the issues of security risk management that are applicable to the K -12
school environment. They are expected to seek additional information about security
issues and support the planned CoSN initiative for applying security risk management
within their K-12 schools and school districts (S. Miller, personal communication,
February 27,2003).
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Through the application of a tailored risk methodology based on the OCTAVE
Methodology, the benefits of knowing the best practices assembled by SEI researchers
and incorporated into the OCTAVE Methodology through the OCTAVE Catalog of
Practices are available to K-12 schools and school districts. In the long term, through the
use of a consistent structure across a range of K -12 schools and school districts, patterns
for the best practices suited to the unique security risks and needs of the K-12
environment are expected to emerge. Those patterns can then be incorporated into an
enhanced K-12 Risk Methodology (K. Krueger, personal communication, August 26,
2003).
Researchers at the SEI continue to refine the OCTAVE Methodology based on
feedback from entities tailoring the methodology to unique needs such as K -12 schools
and school districts. This researcher used the methodology publicly available
(http://www.cert.org/octave) as of December 15,2002 for this investigation.
Refinements to the OCTAVE Methodology since that time should be reviewed and
incorporated into the K-12 Risk Methodology in future investigations to further enhance
the process if those refinements are appropriate for the needs ofK-12 schools and school
districts.

Resources Used
This researcher gained an understanding of the OCTAVE Methodology through
training and helping government agencies apply the methodology. An understanding of
the K-12 school environment has been gained through experience and document reviews
to successfully build a tailored version for use by the selected pilot site. As a member of

108

the Networked Survivable Systems technical staff at the SEI, this investigator worked for
two years with the SEI researchers who developed the OCTAVE Methodology and is
qualified to teach the OCTAVE Methodology. Moreover, this researcher worked with
licensed OCTAVE Methodology transition partners to develop automated tools for the
U.S. Department of Defense medical community to support the expanded use of the
methodology. In addition, this researcher has 25 years of application and systems design
experience with large complex environments for Yale University, Land and Legal
Records for West Chester County of New York, and the Administration for Children's
Services of New York City.
Knowledge of challenges and solutions available within the field of information
security protection was needed to conduct this investigation. Some of that expertise was
incorporated within the OCTAVE Methodology template worksheets and instructional
guidance that served as a basis for the K-12 Risk Methodology. This researcher
completed the SANS Institute Global Information Assurance Certification (GIAC) for
GIAC Security Essentials (GSEC) in January 2002 to better understand the focus and
limitations of the OCTAVE Methodology for security risk management.
A pilot site with a student body and teaching staff that serviced the full age range
ofK-12 students was required. Also, participants from a range of areas within the K-12
domain including teaching and technology support were required. The burden of
regulatory reporting imposed by NCLB requirements was given as the reason for several
possible sites declining to participate in this process. The Scarsdale Public School District
in Scarsdale, New York met the selection criteria and volunteered to be the pilot site.
The director of instructional computing led the analysis team in this effort. Selected
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analysis team participants at the pilot site contributed time to learn the steps ofthe
methodology, apply it to their school environment, and identify areas where the
methodology failed to meet their needs.
A resource to help identify experts in the K-12 school technology environment
who could perform the follow-up review of the material used in the pilot was critical to
the completion of this research. The executive director of the Consortium for School
Networking (CoSN) accepted this responsibility in exchange for use of the resulting
methodology content by Consortium members.

Reliability and Validity
Within the field of security risk management, no general measurements that can
define reliability and validity for K-12 schools and school districts are identified (Pethia,
2003). Much ofthe field expertise is contextual in nature and focused on defining
responses to vulnerabilities within the infrastructure as each vulnerability is identified
(Allen et aI., 2000). Validation is provided through a series of peer reviews performed by
individuals working within security management who address a wide range of security
challenges (Allen & Sledge, 2002). The tailored methodology for K-12 schools and
school districts was subjected to reviews by the pilot site and K-12 experts. This process
is similar to validation steps used for the OCTAVE Methodology (Alberts et aI., 2000).
Organizations that used the OCTAVE Methodology realized benefits that
included an increased awareness of applicable security issues and recognition that
security must address threats that have a real impact on the capabilities of the entities to
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perfoIm critical functions effectively. This same benefit was expressed by the pilot site
and SFG K-12 reviewers in their use ofthe K-12 Risk Methodology.
Another benefit of using the OCTAVE Methodology was the development of a
common understanding of the value of security risk management as a consequence of
understanding the real risks across the entity (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). As noted in the
feedback from the K-12 pilot site participants (see Appendix L), use ofthe K-12 Risk
Methodology provided similar benefits though improved decision-making that grew from
a shared understanding of the need for security and an increased awareness ofthe risks if
security issues were not addressed.

Summary
The OCTAVE Methodology was selected for use in this research effort as a basis
for introducing security risk management into K-12 schools and school districts.
Purchase, training, and licensing costs were not required for its use. Tailoring options
were available for addressing the unique requirements ofK-12 schools and school
districts. Because the methodology is used by a sufficiently broad range of organizations,
it is considered appropriate for addressing the security issues ofK-12 schools and school
districts that use Internet connectivity.
Based on an initial analysis of the methodology and confiImation with the SEI
researchers who developed the methodology, the OCTAVE Methodology was tailored to
fit the unique needs of the K -12 environment as identified by this researcher.
Requirements identified in the literature review were applied to the OCTAVE
Methodology to build a tailored version referred to as the K-12 Risk Methodology. This
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researcher had sufficient training and support from the SEI to construct an appropriately
tailored methodology. The OCTAVE Criteria were used to confirm completeness of the
tailored methodology as required for consistency with the OCTAVE Approach (Alberts
& Dorofee, 200Ia). A school district was identified to apply the tailored methodology

for initial validation. In addition, experts in the K-12 school domain were assembled to
review the methodology and provide further validation of its applicability to K-12
schools and school districts.
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Chapter 4
Results

Data and Process Analysis
This research consisted of four major segments: (1) building the tailored
methodology; (2) validating the tailoring process; (3) testing the tailored methodology in
a K-12 school district; and (4) reviewing the tailored methodology with K-12 school
representatives. The specific actions of each segment are summarized below to provide
sufficient information to support the findings and allow for replication as needed by other
researchers.

Building the Tailored Methodology
This researcher worked independently to build the K -12 Risk Methodology by
applying in-place tailoring options from the OCTAVE Methodology. Based on an initial
review of those options best suited to incorporate unique K-12 school security risk issues
as described in Chapter 3, the following changes were applied:
•

Expanded security practices to incorporate those important for K-12 schools but
missing from the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (see Appendix A);

•

Restructured data collection activities used in assembling an organizational view
in Phase 1: Organizational View to incorporate an expanded K-12 Catalog of
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Practices and include modifications to accommodate a distributed organizational
structure typical ofK-12 schools and school districts, as opposed to the
hierarchical structure embedded in the OCTAVE Methodology;
•

Augmented the threat profile content in Phase 1 to incorporate the unique
characteristics of information asset users within the K-12 environment that differ
from the delineations assumed by the OCTAVE Methodology;

•

Restructured Phase 3 worksheets to allow for evaluation criteria different from the
OCTAVE Methodology and incorporate the expanded K-12 Catalog of Practices
for mitigation and protection strategy considerations; and

•

Adjusted terminology within the methodology to remove the use of terms such as
business and customer that were irrelevant in the K-12 environment and
renumbered the materials to accommodate the restructured segments and
worksheets.

The application of each selected change to the methodology is described in detail in the
remainder ofthis section.
Expanding the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices
The OCTAVE Catalog of Practices is divided into two major groups: strategic
practices and operational practices. Practices within each group were determined to be
relevant to K -12 schools and school districts by this researcher and remained in the
expanded K-12 Catalog of Practices for the tailored methodology. This decision was
based on the number of security risks identified in the literature review for this
investigation that were addressed by security practices currently included in the
OCTAVE Catalog of Practices. A table containing 49 entries of security risks, associated
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outcomes, and the security practice that mitigates each risk is provided in Appendix B.
Those practices mapped to existing practice areas within the OCTAVE Catalog of
Practices. Security practices that are not in the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices but were
needed to address K-12 school and school district security risks (39 in all) were inserted
into the K-12 Catalog of Practices. Appendix A lists those practices. Those practices
were organized into four general categories that are referenced as educational security
practices in this document:
1. Content-blocking. This category includes practices that filter for pornography
and restrict access to inappropriate activities for minors.
2. Structured access. This category includes practices for equipment sharing,
privacy, and access rights within an environment that requires extensive resource
sharing.
3. Regulatory compliance. This category includes state regulations as well as
federal ones including the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), Protection of Pupil Rights
Amendment (PPRA), No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, and the USA
PATRIOT Act.
4. Acceptable educational use. This category includes restrictions against
commercial use of educational facilities, ethics, individual responsibilities for
using the infrastructure, and limitations for monitoring.
By keeping educational practices in a separate group within the expanded K-12 Catalog
of Practices, K-12 school and school district personnel could determine how well they
were addressing risk with respect to general security practices and how well they were
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meeting specific educational security practices. Appendix D includes the revised
structure ofthe OCTAVE Catalog of Practices as it was tailored for the K-12 Risk
Methodology.
Restructuring Data Collection
Data collection activities within Phase 1: Organizational View of the OCTAVE
Methodology are grouped into three processes that include similar activities, but are
structured to address three levels of an organization: (1) senior management, (2)
operational management, and (3) staff. Staff includes information technology (IT)
representatives (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). The main difference among these processes
is the worksheet survey form used to define the current security practices considered
relevant to each level of the organization. Within the staff level, technical staff and
organizational staff also use different survey instruments. These distinctions have no
relevance to K-12 schools and school districts (TSSA, 2001). Moreover, it is unclear
whether any selected subset of current security practices would be sufficiently universal
to all K-12 schools and school districts to be meaningful. Instead of creating separate
processes used by specific K-12 groups with an uncertain knowledge of relevance, a
single data-gathering process was built by collapsing all the separate activities into a
single process. This unified process was applied once by the pilot site, but could be used
repeatedly with varying participants for broader information gathering in Phase 1.
The data collection process for the K -12 Risk Methodology can be applied
through two distinct approaches that can be used separately or together depending on
school requirements. In the first approach, each member of the analysis team addresses
each activity in the data collection process independently. A group discussion is the next
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step to refine the perspective, share knowledge, and construct an agreed group output.
This approach was used by the Scarsdale Public School District analysis team during the
validation of the K -12 Risk Methodology.
The second approach is similar to using of data collection within the OCTAVE
Methodology. For this approach, the analysis team conducts a facilitated workshop with
a carefully selected group or groups of participants that represent one or more important
segments ofthe K-12 school or school district. The workshop can be repeated for
multiple groups based on the size and complexity ofthe sponsoring entity. Following the
workshops, the analysis team consolidates data from all workshops and uses that data to
construct an agreed group output. Participants in the facilitated workshop can include
teachers such as computer science instructors, parents, students at varying ages and
technology skill levels, and external support groups. These individuals are not required
to join the analysis team and commit to the full amount oftime required for methodology
deployment. That flexibility allows the methodology to be applied to individual schools,
school districts, and statewide programs with minimal adjustments.
Within Phase 1 ofthe OCTAVE Methodology, the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices
is applied through a set of practice survey worksheets used to gather information about
the current security practices (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). To incorporate the expanded K12 Catalog of Practices, some tailoring ofthe survey worksheets was required. That
expanded catalog includes strategic and operational practices from the OCTAVE Catalog
of Practices. Two surveys from the OCTAVE Methodology that incorporate these
practices, specifically, the Current General Security Practices Survey and the Current IT
Security Practices Survey, were maintained unchanged in the K-12 Risk Methodology
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(Alberts & Dorofee, 2001c). An additional survey was required to include educational
security practices. The Current Educational Security Survey was modeled from the
strategic and operational worksheets to gather information on current educational
practices (see Appendix F for the Current Education Security Survey). The questions in
this survey reflect the practices identified in Appendix A. These practices were
incorporated into the expanded catalog of practices for the K-12 Risk Methodology.
When assembling survey results from a range of participants into a consolidated
group response, the OCTAVE Methodology recommends a summative approach to
survey responses. Consolidated survey results reflect a count of each response to each
survey question (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). For a small group or wide range of
participant groups with varying levels of expertise, an, evenly weighted assembly of
responses is not appropriate. The K -12 Risk Methodology provides for a group procedure
that enables the analysis team to use the survey responses from all participants in
constructing a consolidated perspective. Survey responses from a range of sources can be
weighted differently based on the known expertise of the participants. This approach
builds an analysis team perspective on the current state of security practices within the K12 school or school district based on a qualitative assessment of survey responses.
Appendix G includes a Security Practices Summary that provides a combined survey
worksheet with results grouped by practice area. The analysis team can assure that all
perspectives are considered through team discussions even when the participant count is
skewed to selected participant groups.
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Augmenting Threat Profile Content
Threats within the OCTAVE Methodology are divided into those posed by
outsiders who do not have legitimate access to infonnation assets and insiders who have
legitimate access but may not use it appropriately at all times (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002).
This division is based on the SEI findings that entities must apply different mitigation and
protection strategies, depending on the origin ofthe threat (Alberts & Dorofee, 200lc).
The OCTAVE Methodology assumes insiders are employees of the entity and outsiders
are non-employees. Within K-12 schools and school districts, there are gray areas when
applying the insider and outsider designation. Students can function as either, depending
on the infonnation asset considered. Moreover, the role of parents in accessing student
infonnation is changing. Vendors may own and manage assets on behalf of the K -12
school or school district (AWS, 2002). Areas of concern identified about an asset within
the assessment process must be linked to specific school positions such as student or
teacher to establish appropriate relevancy. To make this distinction more explicit in the
K-12 Risk Methodology, a field for specifying the positions with legitimate access and
those without it was added to the asset description area of the Asset Profile Workbook.
The Asset Profile Workbook is a set of worksheets completed for each critical asset
selected by an analysis team within an application of the methodology. In that workbook,
the analysis team records relevant infonnation about a critical asset selected for
evaluation. Instructions for the analysis team in defining insiders and outsiders were
added to the guidelines for activity Al.3 to accommodate the Workbook change. See
Appendix E for a description of that activity. The roles of insider and outsider are
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specified to insure that all participants in defining threats to an infonnation asset share a
similar perspective of who should and should not be pennitted access to the asset.
Restructuring Phase 3 Worksheets
Three worksheets are used for the analysis process within Phase 3 of the
OCTAVE Methodology: (1) Evaluation Criteria, (2) Protection Strategy for Strategic
Practices, and (3) Protection Strategy for Operational Practices. Each worksheet required
adjustments to appropriately incorporate the needs ofK-12 schools and school districts.
The impact categories on the Evaluation Criteria worksheet represent major concern
areas for an entity in the event of a security breach.

The OCTAVE Methodology

incorporates the following basic areas of concern based on work with U.S. medical and
manufacturing organizations: reputation or customer confidence; life or health of
customers; productivity; fines or legal penalties; and financial impact. The research of
Norris, Soloway, and Sullivan (2002), in evaluating the impact of technology within the
classroom, identified the following categories of impact as appropriate evaluation criteria
for K-12 schools and school districts: regulatory compliance; classroom planning and
curriculum effectiveness; life, health, and safety of students, teachers, and staff; student
perfonnance on standardized tests and evaluations; family and community support;
school and district administration support; teacher preparation and technical support; and
other. The Evaluation Criteria worksheet was modified for use in the K-12 Risk
Methodology to reflect the recommendations of Norris et al.
OCTAVE Catalog of Practice categories are incorporated into Phase 3: Security
Strategy and Planning. Those categories fonn the structure of the Protection Strategy for
Strategic Practices worksheet and the Protection Strategy for Operational Practices
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worksheet. Those worksheets provide a series of questions for each practice area to be
used in the analysis. To appropriately incorporate the educational practices (added into
the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices for the K-12 Risk Methodology as described
previously in this document) the worksheets for Phase 3 activities were augmented with a
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices worksheet (see Appendix H). Although
closely following the format of the other worksheets used in assembling the protection
strategy, that worksheet emphasizes the educational planning practices instead of
strategic or operational practices.
Review of Terminology
The OCTAVE Methodology consists of 1,800 pages divided into 18 volumes.
Those volumes include a range of additional material such as technical reports and
background information relevant to individuals with an extensive background in
information security management but overwhelming to a group attempting to learn the
rudiments of a new topic area (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). To minimize the volume of
information imposed on the K-12 pilot group participants, only content relevant to the K12 Risk Methodology was included, and the text was condensed into a single manual.
That manual included step-by-step instructions for each activity of the K-12 Risk
Methodology grouped by phase. In addition, the manual included a section containing all
worksheets used once within the methodology activities. Worksheets that applied to each
critical asset and required multiple uses within the methodology activities were
assembled within a separate section in the manual for ease of duplication. Throughout
the manual, the terms business and enterprise were changed to the general term school.
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Also, the term department was changed to unit. (The complete table of contents for the
K-12 Risk Methodology manual is included in Appendix E.)

Validation o/the Tailored Methodology
This researcher conducted a review of each adjustment to methodology activities
and worksheets with SEI researchers who developed the OCTAVE Methodology. In
addition, as described in Chapter 3 of this report, the tailored methodology was reviewed
to assure conformance with the OCTAVE Approach. Conformance was measured
through a review using the OCTAVE Criteria, which are divided into ten principles
describing the methodology approach and fifteen attributes that identify how the
principles must be applied within the methodology. A detailed description of the
principles and attributes and an explanation of the relationships between them are
provided in Chapter 3.
Validating conformance of the K-12 Risk Methodology to the OCTAVE Criteria
required a review of guidance instructions to assure the appropriate application of each
principle and attribute (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a). Also, validation ofthe principles and
attributes based on the use ofthe methodology provided assurance of the appropriate
application of the guidance. Based on this review, the K-12 Risk Methodology
conformed to the principles and attributes ofthe OCTAVE Criteria. For each principle,
the table in Appendix I provides the following validation data:
•

In the column labeled Principle the name of the principle;

•

In the column labeled Applied assurance that the principle was applied;

•

In the column labeled When a definition of when the principle was applied;
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..

In the column labeled Applied to Methodology Guidance a description of the

application of the principle to the guidance; and
..

In the column labeled Applied by Pilot Site a description of use of the principle
by the pilot site.

All rows in the Applied column contained the yes, indicating successful confonnance.
The When column contained one of two options:
..

Unchanged, which means guidance and use in the tailored version were the same
as in the OCTAVE Methodology.

..

Tailored, which means the guidance and use were modified for the K-12 Risk
Methodology, and the mechanisms for maintaining confonnance are described the
columns labeled Applied to Methodology Guidance and Applied by Pilot Site.
The K-12 Risk Methodology confonns to the attributes ofthe OCTAVE Criteria.

For each attribute, the table in Appendix J provides the following validation data:
..

In the column labeled Attribute the name of the attribute;

..

In the column labeled Applied an assurance that the attribute was applied;

..

In the column labeled When a definition of when the attribute was applied;

..

In the column labeled Applied to Methodology Guidance a description of the

application of the attribute to the guidance; and
..

In the column labeled Applied by Pilot Site a description of the use ofthe
attribute by the pilot site.

The values used in the Applied and When columns are the same as described above for
the table of principles in Appendix I.
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Testing in a K-12 School District

Selection requirements identified in Chapter 3 were met by the selected entity.
Based on the information assembled from the school handbooks for each grade level,
interviews with the site coordinator and technical staff, this researcher applied the
selection criteria defined in Chapter 3 of this report and determined that the Scarsdale
Public School District (SPSD) met requirements for selection as the pilot site. Four
individuals were chosen by the site coordinator to join him as analysis team participants.
This researcher participated in four meetings with the analysis team, specifically
referenced as Guidance Session I, Guidance Session 2A, Guidance Session 2B, and
Guidance Session 3. An overview of those sessions is included in this section. In
addition, the SPSD analysis team met multiple times between each of the four sessions to
complete assigned segments of the methodology.
The SPSD consists of one high-school with an enrollment of 1,200 students, one
middle school with an enrollment of 900 students, and five elementary schools with
enrollments in each ranging from 350 to 500 students. Every school has at least one
computer laboratory for use by every grade level. In addition to the laboratory, every
classroom has active computer connections for instructional use by teachers. A fiber
optic Gigabit Ethernet wide-area network (WAN) interlinks all the schools. The
Technical Services staff, with third-party support, coordinates district-based technology
activities. Internet Service Provider (ISP) services, firewall operations, and content
filtering are handled by a third party. Students do not assist with network administration,
but they do assist with classroom audiovisual support. Students attend regularly
scheduled computer classes at all grade levels. The computer education curriculum
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includes courses addressing the following topic areas: computer operations; publishing
and presentation; creativity and design; problem-solving; and research. All students,
starting in kindergarten, are provided with access to the school network.
Initial Meeting
This researcher met with the technology coordinator to review requirements for
consideration as a pilot site for this investigation and confirmed that participants from the
SPSD could invest the required time to validate the K-12 Risk Methodology. A copy of
the first chapter of this document was provided to the SPSD coordinator prior to the
initial meeting. The coordinator shared the document with the technical services
supervisor and network specialist responsible for the general supervision of the school
district network infrastructure. During this initial meeting, the following topics and
concepts were reviewed:
•

Hardware, software, network infrastructure components and services, and
technical support from a system administration perspective;

•

Security policy, procedures, practices, monitoring efforts, and problems; and

•

Distinctive features of the K-12 population including student emollment
demographics, teaching and administrative staff demographics, technology use
and support in the school curriculum.
Each participant expressed a strong interest in the risk assessment process. No

previous risk or vulnerability evaluation work had been conducted by the participants
because of cost constraints. At the coordinator's suggestion, the analysis team included
participants in this initial meeting who represented the curriculum and technology areas.
In addition, an administrative manager and assistant manager joined the analysis team.
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The technology coordinator was the analysis team leader and handled all communication
between this investigator and the analysis team. Analysis team participants worked
together on other school district initiatives and shared information extensively.
Guidance Session 1
This researcher initiated Guidance Session 1 with a presentation using materials
from a CoSN conference presentation in February 2003 (Woody, 2003). In addition, a
brief description of the K -12 Risk Methodology, and an overview of the expanded
OCTAVE Catalog of Practices were provided. The SPSD analysis team determined that
the assessment would focus on the instructional technology, the administrative systems,
and Internet usage by the school district. For the validation process ofthe tailored
methodology, the analysis team selected one critical asset from each ofthe focus areas to
use in the methodology workshops. The student folder repository was selected to
represent instructional technology; the payroll database represented administrative
systems, and the ISP represented Internet usage.
Guidance Session 2A
The second meeting between this researcher and the SPSD analysis team was
scheduled to occur when the analysis team completed the Phase 1 activities. However,
team participants were unable to apply the generic threat trees to the selected assets.
Analysis team participants reported difficulty in identifying threats that had not actually
materialized. This researcher determined the participants were applying a reactive
approach to the analysis and had not considered the impact of potential threats. By
adjusting the original sequence of activities and developing evaluation criteria prior to

126

using the generic threat trees in Phase 1 instead of waiting until Phase 3, the analysis
team was able to proceed with the assessment activities.
To address the evaluation criteria, the analysis team chose to adjust the impact
areas provided in the K-12 Risk Methodology. The team members identified impacts in
terms of the highest priority for K-12 schools and school districts as follows:
•

Required by a regulatory mandate;

•

Led to an article on the front page of the local newspaper;

•

Resulted in parents calling members ofthe school board with complaints;

•

Affected the ability of teachers and students to meet their classroom schedule; and

•

Interrupted online services especially Internet access.
As a result ofthe dependency of all work at the school district on electronic

communication, a loss or interruption of online services was selected by the SPSD
analysis team as the most critical impact, and the team decided to use that as the only
evaluation criteria within the application of the methodology. The methodology allows
for the selection of multiple evaluation criteria, and the analysis team's decision to focus
on only one is unique. To apply the evaluation criteria to the selected threat paths and
determine the importance of each possible threat, varying degrees of impact were
established. The OCTAVE Methodology uses a qualitative scale of high, medium, and
low. The analysis team established the levels of impact for interruption of online services
as follows:
•

A low impact would involve up to a half-day interruption.

•

A medium impact would involve up to two days of interruption.

•

A high impact would involve any interruption that lasted two or more days.
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With defined evaluation criteria, the analysis team returned to the Phase I activity
(AI.6) of defining threats to the selected assets using the generic threat trees worksheets
in the Asset Profile Workbook. Those trees provided a template of potential threats that
should be considered when analyzing an asset (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001b). The
template, the same for both the K-12 Risk Methodology and the OCTAVE Methodology,
groups threats into four categories based on the threat source or access path used to reach
the asset:
•

Human actors using network access;

•

Human actors using physical access;

•

System problems such as viruses, software defects, system crashes, and hardware
defects; and

•

Other problems outside of the entity's control such as power supply problems,
telecommunications problems, and natural disasters.

Within each template group, asset threats are selected based on the following:
•

An actor who can be categorized as an insider or outsider of the asset;

•

A motive that can be deliberate or accidental, and only applies to human actor
threat sources; and

•

A security outcome that can be disclosure, modification, loss/destruction, or
interruption.

These combinations are organized graphically into a tree structure. The template for
Human Actors Using Network Access is provided in Appendix K for reference. Usually,
a subset ofthe possible threats applies to an asset, and the selected paths appropriate to
the asset are highlighted in the Asset Profile Workbook. However, the analysis team
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found no means of eliminating any ofthe paths and so chose to include all of them for
each critical asset.
Guidance Session 2B
Instead of constructing a team output for each critical asset as described in the
instructions, each SPSD team participant selected a single critical asset and individually
assigned an impact value to all the possible generic threats for the critical asset using the
single evaluation criterion established in Guidance Session 2A, specifically, loss or
interruption of online services. Next, each risk in the Human Actors Using Network
Access category for each critical asset was reviewed by the technology participants, and
impact values were adjusted to reflect existing protection mechanisms that reduced the
potential impact. Subsequently, all individual worksheets were discussed by the team,
and impact values were adjusted to reflect a team result. Though the analysis team used a
different sequence of steps, the results met the requirements for outputs of Phase I:
Organizational View.
The SPSD analysis team next considered the activities for Phase 2. This
researcher provided a brief review of the skills required to address the Technological
View. The technology participants confirmed that their school district had neither the
necessary skills nor a means of acquiring external expertise within the required timeframe
for the evaluation. Based on the lack of required expertise, the analysis team decided to
bypass Phase 2. The interactions between the school district and the service provider
were informal and undocumented. The technical supervisor accepted an action item to
document future interactions and discuss the possibility of a future vulnerability
evaluation ofthe school district infrastructure with third-party support. To initiate Phase
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3: Security Strategy and Planning, the team discussed which critical asset risks would be
carried forward for mitigation consideration and decided to consider only high impact
risks.
Guidance Session 3
The final session was scheduled when the SPSD analysis team completed Phase
3. The team selected three security practice areas for strategic improvement and
developed a plan for initiating improvement in each selected area. Selected analysis team
members were assigned responsibility for the detail planning and implementation of
improvement activities. The three areas were chosen to address the high-impact risks to
the critical assets. The coordinator for the analysis team presented the protection strategy
and implementation plan to the Scarsdale District School Board as the product of the
security risk assessment to obtain approval to address the remaining activities for security
risk management beyond the planning steps provided in the K-12 Risk Methodology.
SPSD analysis team participants reported an increased awareness of security risks
after completing the surveys in Phase 1. Participants also suggested that examples of the
completed worksheets for K-12 schools would clarify some of the activity instructions for
future K-12 school and school district users. Participants suggested the following two
sequence changes within the methodology based on problems encountered in its use at
the SPSD: (1) introduce action planning in the survey analysis activities of Phase 1 and
(2) move the activity of creating evaluation criteria to Phase 1 prior to addressing the
threat profiles.
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The SPSD analysis team agreed that the methodology was effective because of the
following characteristics:
..

The developer of the methodology was available to provide initial guidance as
well as follow-up visits. This guidance kept the team focused on the
methodology.

..

The methodology provided a structure for allowing the team to assess its school
district's security practices and make specific recommendations for improvement.

..

The methodology was not focused on specific technology products and could be
applied to all areas of the school district.

..

The methodology facilitated an examination of a wide range of security practices
and the development of recommendations based on selected critical assets.

..

The security review activities provided a means of viewing security information
from multiple perspectives, enhancing the confidence level of the analysis team in
planned improvements.

The SPSD analysis team coordinator (Gerald Crisi, personal communication, July 25,
2003) provided the following recommendations assembled from analysis team input to
better fit the methodology to the needs of other K-12 schools and school districts:
•

Provide a documented introduction to the methodology that highlights its value to
K-12 schools and school districts.

•

Stress the importance of completing the assessment before applying its results.
Participants at the SPSD considered implementing selected actions identified in
Phase 1. Only one of the three security practice areas selected for mitigation in
Phase 3 was identified in the earlier Phase 1 plan. Without completing the
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methodology, the analysis team would have initiated actions to address lower
priority risks without realizing the higher impact risks were not being considered.
Survey responses were provided by all analysis team participants (see Appendix L). The
individual evaluations supported the team summary.
This researcher facilitated a discussion with SPSD analysis team participants to
identify additional issues after receiving the survey responses. The following
recommendations for future uses of the tailored methodology were identified during that
discussion:
•

Schedule the introduction to the materials in multiple sessions to avoid
overloading individuals who are new to the concepts of risk and security with too
much information at once.

•

Schedule analysis team working sessions closer together to carry learning from
one step to the next. A great deal of review was needed to re-engage SPSD team
members between sessions.

•

Assemble worksheet information and notes from each meeting for distribution to
each team member to improve information sharing since not everyone can attend
each team meeting.

•

Consider team conversations that result in shared knowledge among the members
as a major value in using the methodology.

As a result of using the K-12 Risk Methodology, the SPSD analysis team participants
reported the following outcomes:
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•

Individual team members initiated changes within their specific areas to improve
procedures and accountability for security that had not been previously
considered.

•

The team members planned to meet quarterly to consider high-impact risks for
other information assets and to expand the use of the methodology within the
school district.

•

Survey worksheets were administered to groups ofteachers and students to
evaluate perceptions of security throughout the school district.

Review by K-12 School Representatives

Because there is a wide variation of size and technology capability among K-12
schools and school districts, an individual pilot site could not be considered a
representative sample (K. Krueger, personal communication, February 21,2003). To
expand the review process to a broader audience, the tailored methodology was presented
for review and comment to a group often K-12 school officials representing nine states.
Review participants were selected from the membership of the Consortium for School
Networking (CoSN), a national non-profit organization that draws its members from K12 schools and school districts across the country. In preparation for this review, the
CoSN assembled a Security Focus Group (SFG). Participants in this group included
three individuals serving on the CoSN executive board who previously expressed interest
in K-12 school security and attendees at the K-12 School Networking Conference 2003 in
Arlington, VA who signed up to participate in the SFG through self-selection. Each
participant was responsible for a student body that ranged in size from 2,500 to 6.5
million. Participants described their positions as follows:
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•

Director of instructional media and technology,

•

Chief information officer,

•

Associate superintendent,

•

Educator,

•

Director of technology,

•

Content director,

•

Consultant,

•

Executive director, and

•

School board member.
The SFG met once at the conference to review the same PowerPoint slide

presentation used as an introduction at the pilot site. Participants expressed the following
reasons for their interest in the methodology: (1) security is complex because the use of
technology in K-12 schools and school districts is controlled at the individual classroom
and student level; (2) existing resources are not sufficient for performing a complete
assessment; (3) K-12 schools and school districts must respond to conflicting mandates
for security from parents and regulators.
Each SFG participant received a copy of the K-12 Risk Methodology guidelines
and worksheets. Methodology changes identified by the SPSD analysis team required a
reordering of the activity steps. However, to avoid confusion of two versions of the
methodology with differing sequences, these recommendations were communicated to
the SFG review participants verbally by the CoSN coordinator.
Following the review of the K-12 Risk Methodology, SFG participants were
asked to complete a questionnaire. Seven participants representing six schools and
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school districts responded. The questionnaire contained seven statements to which the
SFG participant selected agree, disagree, or do not know responses.
The following summarizes the responses:
Statement
My school or school district currently addresses
security risk adequately.
Information security is considered in new
technology purchasing and implementation in my
school or school district.
My school or school district devotes time and
resources to security issues on a regular basis.
The K -12 Methodology presentation expanded
my concern of security risk in my school or
school district.
The presentation was adequate to understand the
purpose and scope of the K-12 Risk
Methodology.
The K-12 Risk Methodology is something I
would consider recommending for my school or
school district.
My school or school district would need training
and technology assistance to consider the K-12
Risk Methodology.

Agree

Disagree

Do not know

6

1

4

3

3

3

1

6

1

No response

7

7

3

2

1

1

Findings
As demonstrated by this investigation of the K-12 Risk Methodology including its
use by the Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD), a risk management approach can be
used by K-12 schools and school districts to improve the management of Intemet security
risks. In addition, the selected school district was able to self-direct its efforts in applying
risk management using the K-12 Risk Methodology. By applying the methodology, the
SPSD analysis team used risk analysis to identify high-impact security risks to critical
information assets. Subsequently, that team used risk mitigation to define a protection
strategy for addressing those security risks.
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At the SPSD and during the expert review, participants initially focused on
specific actions that could be resolved quickly until the impact of potential risks was
clarified. The opportunity to focus on a few critical assets provided by the K-12 Risk
Methodology instead of attempting an exhaustive review was cited as important by
participants in both the SPSD validation and expert review. According to findings from
this investigation, K -12 school and school district personnel have limited time to apply to
tasks outside ofthe daily responsibilities oftheir jobs, and these individuals benefit from
a process that helps define achievable results within a finite timeframe.
Regulatory compliance is a primary focus ofK-12 school administrators.
Reviews and audits are performed on a constant basis by local, state, and federal
authorities. None ofthe regulatory or audit controls for K-12 schools and school districts
mandate a security risk assessment. However, the growing visibility of problems related
to technology use in colleges and universities, and the increased visibility of technologyrelated incidents in K-12 schools and school districts has motivated K-12 administrators
to consider the value of a security risk assessment. By addressing security risk
management, an analysis team is prepared to respond to oversight inquiry when an
Internet security problem occurs in its community. This capability was validated when
the town of Scarsdale's Internet capability was compromised during the SPSD
methodology validation, and school district leaders were required to respond to questions
from the Scarsdale District School Board about the school district's Internet risk.
Linking the K-12 Risk Methodology with the Technology Support Index (TSI)
(http://tsi.iste.org/techsupport), an assessment tool for profiling the support programs of
K-12 schools and school districts provided by the ISTE, was suggested by SPSD analysis
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team participants. The TSI assessment identifies four areas: (1) equipment standards, (2)
staffing and processes, (3) professional development, and (4) intelligent systems.
Although the TSI assessment is not mandatory, it is used by K-12 schools and school
districts to justify resource allocations for technology. Within each TSI assessment area,
practices for technology are identified, but security practices are not included. In
addition, existing audit and regulatory requirements used by local, state, and federal
agencies to evaluate technology in K-12 schools and school districts should be expanded
to incorporate the appropriate emphasis on security management. Based on the report of
the Exploring the Future of Learning (EFL) Spring 2003 Education Forum, educators
respond when regulatory and audit requirements are instituted (Armstrong et aI., 2003).

Findings Specific to the Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD)
Identifying information assets, security requirements, threats, evaluation criteria,
impacts, and information security risks using the required worksheets within the K-12
Risk Methodology for documentation was time-consuming for analysis team participants.
The provided written instructions were sufficient after an initial introductory guidance
session. A K-12 school or school district learning the methodology would benefit from a
case study that supplied solution worksheets using a K -12 school or school district
example for use as a training tool. Examples for a hospital are provided with the
OCTAVE Methodology (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). Analysis team participants relied
extensively on additional explanations provided by this researcher in applying the
methodology, and compensating options for that individualized guidance are needed for
broad use of the methodology to be feasible.
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Technical personnel were not prepared to perform vulnerability evaluations at the
SPSD. The constantly changing mix of equipment within the network prohibited the use
of vulnerability tools that were equipment specific. The K-12 school district
infrastructure in this investigation was complex, spanning many locations and blending a
wide range of technology components. The need for a low-cost approach to technology
support eliminated the usage of many of the available vulnerability evaluation tools. K12 schools and school districts would benefit from the development of a shared pool of
tools, training materials, tips, and techniques based on security practices successfully
applied at other K-12 schools and school districts.
SFG Review Findings

The SFG review group demonstrated a strong interest in the use of a security risk
management methodology. The Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act
(HIP AA) regulations for security that were issued in February 2003 and mandated a risk
assessment intensified interest of this review group since many K-12 schools and school
districts must comply with HIP AA regulations. Such regulations specifically designate
privacy control of student information to the existing Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERP A) regulations, thereby, increasing the visibility of the K -12 school's
and school district's role in the privacy of each student's personal information.
Based on survey responses, only a portion ofthe participating K-12 schools and
school districts would be able to address security risk without additional support and
training. A means of providing a low-cost training option is needed for the broad
application ofthe K-12 Risk Methodology in K-12 schools and school districts.
Examples specific to the K-12 school environment and an introduction that helps an
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entity understand the value of a risk assessment, the selection of an analysis team, and the
establishment of an appropriate scope for an assessment can partially address the training
requirement.
SFG participants identified a major security risk for K-12 schools and school
districts that provide a technology learning environment and an administrative support
environment within the same infrastructure. A means of identifying security practices
that work well within the K-12 school domain and a mechanism for sharing these
practices with participants as lessons learned can benefit K-12 schools and school
districts with limited resources.
K-12 Risk Methodology Structure and Use
The addition of an introductory document to provide direction in the selection of
an analysis team and the scoping of an assessment is needed for new users. Also, based
on observations by this researcher, a flowchart to help the analysis team track where it is
at any point in the process would be beneficial. This flowchart could serve as a constant
reminder of the overall goal of the series of activities, thereby, keeping the analysis team
on track. The guidelines provide a complete and detailed process for using the
worksheets and developing a protection strategy.
Linkage of the risk assessment with existing audit and assessment tools already in
use in K-12 schools and school districts, such as the TSI assessment, can help provide a
way for administrators to coordinate risk assessment activities with existing workloads.
The survey instruments from Phase 1: Organizational View can also be used for multiple
purposes since these instruments are based on good security practices that are applicable
to a range ofK-12 school and school district audits and evaluations.
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Based on the SPSD usage, a reordering of selected methodology steps is needed.
By introducing the action list in Phase 1 instead of Phase 3, ideas generated in security
discussions can be documented. By moving the development of evaluation criteria into
an earlier position in the process, the analysis team will be better prepared to consider
potential threats and, thereby, avoid shifting from planning into execution mode with
each identified security need. However, the true measure of threats will not be realized
until the criteria are applied to value the threats, which cannot be accomplished until the
final steps in Phase 3.
Some terminology used within the K-12 Risk Methodology is not consistent with
common usage in the K-12 school domain. This researcher addressed major
inconsistencies as part of the tailoring effort. Examples specific to the K-12 school
domain can help clarify the meanings of terms not used regularly within this domain.
Importantly, a careful review by individuals closely involved in the K-12 school domain
should be considered before broad deployment of the K-12 Risk Methodology is
attempted to minimize questions and reduce potential confusion.

Summary of Results
K-12 schools and school districts can apply security risk management using the
K-12 Risk Methodology as confirmed by its application at the selected pilot school
district and its review by a group ofK-12 school experts. Constraints of time and
resources hamper broader use unless K-12 schools and school districts are mandated to
perform a risk assessment or recognize the value of performing a risk assessment based
on the impact of network security problems. At a minimum, the use of pieces of the
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methodology such as survey worksheets from Phase I: Organizational View can provide
a starting point for considering the security practices needed for Internet security in K -12
schools and school districts.
The K-12 Risk Methodology provides a low-cost approach to security risk
management that incorporates sufficiently unique characteristics ofK-12 schools and
school districts to be highly effective. Training support, expanded introductory materials,
and automated tools to help manage the information collected using the methodology can
enhance adoption by improving the mechanisms for learning and using the K-12 Risk
Methodology. The changing and uncertain regulatory climate combined with a lengthy
budget and approval cycle for funding underscore the importance of planning for security
risk management in K-12 schools and school districts. With the K-12 Risk Methodology,
investment for security can be planned to focus limited resources on the greatest security
risks.
K-12 schools and school districts cannot continue to rely on teachers to control
security within the classroom when these individuals are provided with limited
preparation. Problems stemming from the lack of appropriate monitoring can be
expected to increase as student use oftechnology with Internet connectivity extends
beyond classroom time. Students cannot be used as resource extensions without effective
management and monitoring. K-12 schools and school districts have an opportunity to
address information security risk within the context of what is appropriate to each entity
before general mandates are legislated.
By monitoring issues relevant to higher education, K -12 schools and school
districts have the opportunity to recognize potential security problems and plan
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appropriate responses instead of reacting to a realized impact. This planning opportunity
may not remain available for a long period of time since behavior patterns point to K-12
students closely following those of older students. The increased visibility ofK-12
student involvement in worm, virus propagation, and other criminal Internet activities
that jeopardize critical national infrastructure can be expected to be accompanied by
efforts to control the environments that provide Internet access to those individuals.
K-12 schools and school districts should proactively seek to influence the
technology solutions for security available for use in classrooms. A shared repository of
effective security practices should be established that identifies security implementation
requirements for widely used K-12 software and hardware. Shared training programs for
security awareness and guidelines for the unique needs ofK-12 schools and school
districts can augment limited staff technical skills.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusion
This research demonstrated that security risk management can be applied by K-12
schools and school districts to address the security risks of Internet connectivity. This
research also demonstrated that increased understanding of the impacts of security risks
for Internet connectivity is a sufficient motivator for K-12 school and school district
administrators to identify ways to address risk mitigation.
Expanded awareness of security issues by stakeholders within K-12 schools and
school districts benefits administrators, teachers, curriculum developers, infrastructure
support staff, students, and parents. From a shared understanding of the security threats
to the classroom and their potential impacts, planned approaches can be developed to take
advantage of lower cost opportunities and existing capabilities. A planned and reasoned
approach effectively counters expensive politically motivated reactions performed to
appease the vocal discord that arises from a crisis. Given the susceptibility of Internet
connectivity to increasingly harmful security events, expanded Internet connectivity for
the classroom will lead to an increase of security challenges for K -12 administrators
(Pethia, 2003). Without planned security management, reactive responses can leave K-12
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schools and school districts vulnerable to repeated security occurrences whose root
problems are unaddressed.
Not all stakeholders require the same level of awareness. K-12 administrators
need to understand the impact of security issues and ways the K-12 school and school
district can effectively address those issues. Teachers and parents need to be aware ofthe
steps taken by the K-12 schools and school districts to address security risk. Teachers
also need to understand and follow procedures for reporting problems and identifying
new areas of risk that may appear as classroom technology use expands and changes.
Students need to be aware of the K-12 school's and school district's focus on addressing
security risk, appropriate behavior patterns, and the penalties and sanctions they will face
if their behavior deviates outside of expected norms.
K-12 school and school district personnel must recognize that the introduction of
technology into the classroom environment is accompanied by an unknown level of
security risk that must be managed. Students cannot be viewed as replacement resources
for skilled staff, and student involvement in technical support must be closely and
effectively managed. By performing a security risk assessment using the K-12 Risk
Methodology, school personnel gain an increased awareness of the security risks within
the context of their domain. Within the assessment, participants identify the greatest
risks so that mitigation efforts can be focused on the most critical challenges.
According to this research, K-12 school districts such as the Scarsdale Public
School District (SPSD) lack the expertise to address vulnerability evaluations and
security audits. A structured assessment process tailored to the K-12 school domain that
provides a means for identifying and correcting technology vulnerabilities can enhance
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security functions provided by current K-12 technology staff. However, it is important
that K-12 schools and school districts do not rely solely on technology solutions. K-12
school and school district administrators must also address the strategic and educational
security practices required in effective security risk management.
The K-12 Risk Methodology provides a low-cost solution that allows schools and
school districts to approach the risk assessment activities over an extended period of time.
General security practices incorporated into the K-12 Catalog of Practices provide an
increased awareness of risk areas that K-12 school and school district personnel must
consider and appropriate practices that should be applied at each entity. The K-12 Risk
Methodology is a planning process that guides K-12 school personnel in assembling an
information protection strategy. To realize the full benefit of security risk mitigation,
school and school district personnel must execute the resulting plan.

Implications
In the process of conducting this investigation, this researcher introduced a wide
range of individuals within the K-12 school domain to issues of security risk. This
researcher spoke at the following conferences and presented issues related to the need for
security risk management in the K-12 school domain:
•

Consortium for School Networking, CoSN K-12 Networking Conference,
Arlington, Virginia, February 2003, a panel presentation titled Meeting the

Security Challenges of the Connected Schoolhouse;
•

Exploring the Future of Learning (EFL) Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., April
2003, a two-day facilitated discussion of invited participants to identify critical
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educational challenges. This researcher proposed K-12 security needs in a
presentation titled The Security Challenges of the Internet; and
•

The FBI Infraguard of Pittsburgh hosted a one-day conference for K-12 school
and school district administrators held at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, P A,
November 11, 2003. This researcher delivered a presentation titled Addressing
the Risk ofInternet Connectivity for K-12.
The Scarsdale Public School District (SPSD), the pilot site for this investigation,

was selected by the National School Boards Association (NSBA) as one of the top five
technology schools in the U.S., and participants from the analysis team shared their
application of security risk management at the award presentation in October 2003
(http://www.nsba.org). In addition, the April 2003 issue of School Planning &
Management Magazine, a publication for K-12 administrators, contained an article by
Enderle (2003) titled "Are School Networks as Safe as We Think?" That article
referenced this research effort and a cyber-security initiative established by the
Consortium for School Networking (CoSN).
Based on its K-12 school and school district members' need for help in managing
security risks, the CoSN established a partnership for launching a new initiative called
Cyber Security for the Digital District (http://securedistrict.cosn.org). That partnership
involved the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and vendors that sell security tools and
services within the K-12 school domain, such as Symantec and SurfControl. That
initiative, which builds on this research, will develop a program to accomplish the
following goals:
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•

Promote an awareness of technology security issues that must be considered in the
K-12 schools and school districts.

•

Identify K-12 school and school district best practices for information security
that can be adopted as K -12 infrastructure standards and incorporated into training
and tools that provide information about security options to network
administrators.

•

Promote the inclusion of digital-age ethics in the K-12 school curriculum.

•

Show school decision makers and technology directors how to improve the
security for systems that handle data collection, transmission, storage, retrieval,
and distribution of sensitive information.

•

Provide publications to the K-12 vendor community to clarify the needs of
information security in products designated for the K-12 school and school
district.

This researcher has no formal involvement with the funded project beyond supplying a
copy of the K-12 Risk Methodology for use by CoSN members at the completion ofthis
investigation.
Specific actions planned by the CoSN to address initiative goals include the
following:
•

A white paper to define security risk management issues in terms appropriate for
K -12 school and school district administrators.

•

Training programs for K-12 school and school district administrators in the
application of the K-12 Risk Methodology.
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..

A survey of the security problems and practices in use within the K-12 schools
and school districts to identify common problems and best practices.

..

Enhancement of the usability of the K -12 Risk Methodology by addressing
formatting issues identified by participants in this research and automating the
assembly of required documentation.

..

The creation of a Web site for school network administrators to serve as a
resource for K -12 security information, training, and vulnerability assessment
tools. That site will parallel other CoSN leadership initiatives including Taking
Total Cost of Ownership to the Classroom (http://www.classroomtco.org) and
Safeguarding the Wired Schoolhouse (http://www.safewiredschools.org).

..

A presentation of Web interactive conferences with participation from network
leaders, security consultants, and vendor representatives to debate information
security issues in K-12 schools and school districts.

..

Tools developed or assembled to help local education leaders and network
administrators analyze and address K -12 information security risks and
infrastructure vulnerabilities.

..

Workshops, conference presentations, and online courses developed to clarify
information security issues, demonstrate available tools, and feature action plans
for K -12 personnel.

..

Articles published in magazines and professional journals, such as School
Planning and Management Magazine, that target K-12 school board members,

administrators, and other K -12 decision makers to broadly distribute ideas and
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increase awareness ofinfonnation security solutions for K-12 schools and school
districts.

Recommendations
The educational results of current legislative efforts to insert technology into the
classroom are unclear (Armstrong & Casement, 2000). Measurements that will become
available through further educational research should be applied to evaluate security
practices in use by K-12 schools and school districts. Measurement of the effectiveness
of security practices will provide a means for a stronger alignment of applied security
actions with the educational mission.
A single methodology approach for security risk management was considered in
this research. Comparing the results of using the K-12 Risk Methodology with other
widely used risk assessment methodologies, such as the Facilitated Risk Analysis Process
(FRAP) or the Infonnation Protection Assessment Kit (IP AK), could enhance the options
available to K-12 schools and school districts in addressing a security risk assessment.
Such a comparison could also expand the understanding of security risk analysis in the K12 school domain.
Issues related to security awareness and training should be reinforced consistently
for students beginning at the kindergarten level and continually as they progress through
all levels of the educational system. Research should be conducted to detennine whether
the consistent application of good security practices that are structured using a unifonn
risk methodology and adopted by K-12 schools and school districts improves the
adoption of ethical behavior by K -12 learners.

149

Advanced training of K -12 technical staff in security for new technology areas
should be considered. If a K -12 school or school district initiates a program that
introduces hardware and software new to its technology infrastructure, such as a wireless
network, funding should be allocated for security. That funding should be spent on
training technical support personnel about security problems and practices for the new
technology. Funding should also support implementation of monitoring capabilities to
support an acceptable level of security risk. This process may require a change in the
way new technology is implemented in the K-12 classroom.
Based on feedback from the SPSD analysis team and responses to the survey
questionnaire by K-12 school and school district representatives in the Security Focus
Group (SFG), K -12 schools have not planned for security management. This lack of
planning is exhibited in the K-12 administrative responses to security incidents reported
in the news media. Harsh responses such as felony charges and jail sentences for student
incidents of adjusting or deleting files (Legon, 2003) indicate an administrative reaction
instead ofa planned response. Only 19% ofK-12 schools and school districts have
acceptable use policies (AUPs) (NSBF, 2002a). If appropriate ethical training for
students is not applied and appropriate use policies are not in place and enforced, security
breaches from K -12 students can be expected to increase.
Higher education institutions are bound by many of the same federal regulatory
requirements such as FERPA and HIPAA that apply to K-12 schools and school districts.
Similar security risks are applicable to both domains because both types of institutions
must support teaching, learning, and administration (Salomon et aI., 2003). Findings from
the application of security risk management in K-12 schools can serve as a foundation for
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the application of security risk management in community colleges, colleges, and
universities.
K-12 schools and school districts have the opportunity to prepare for problems
with technology use by monitoring what is occurring in college and university
environments and learning from the experiences of those institutions. As technology use
in K-12 classrooms increases, administrators must assume that the associated security
management problems experienced in higher education will also appear in their K-12
schools and school districts. K-12 administrators have an opportunity to establish
appropriate authority figures knowledgeable in technology to reinforce appropriate
behavior patterns for students (Verton, 2002), but doing so will require an expanded
investment in technical staff resources that are documented as under-funded (NSBF,
2002B).
As a large consumer group oftechnology, K-12 schools and school districts have
an opportunity to influence technology developers to provide more secure products.
Technology currently in use in K-12 classrooms is not secure by design, and vendors
serving the K-12 market must be encouraged to improve the functionality of available
security (Armstrong et aI., 2003). Expanded technical training of teachers and staff
responsible for technology management in K-12 schools and school districts is a
necessity (Schwartau, 2001). It is no longer sufficient for self-taught teachers and
volunteers to be assigned full responsibility for the technical infrastructure when Internet
connectivity is added to it (Kenneally, 2002).
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Summary
This researcher introduced security risk management concepts and a structured
methodology for evaluating security risk to K-12 administrators. The OCTAVE
Methodology was tailored to incorporate security practices and measurements unique to
K-12 schools and school districts, and was successfully applied by the Scarsdale Public
School District (SPSD) to identify and plan for security risk mitigation.
In contrast to medical, financial, and federal-government agencies, security risk
management is not mandated for K-12 schools and school districts. Based on responses
from participants of the SPSD analysis team and the SFG review group, this investigator
determined that limited awareness of security issues resulting from Internet connectivity
and the lack of funding available to maintain technology security are major causes of
poor security management within K -12 schools and school districts. K -12 administrators,
staff, and teachers would benefit from the application of a structured methodology
tailored to the needs ofthe K-12 domain. In addition, K-12 administrators would benefit
from a formalized means of sharing security practices and security technology expertise.
Through the CoSN and its planned distribution ofthe K-12 Risk Methodology to its
membership along with supplemental educational and technical support tools, low-cost
security risk management processes can become available to individuals responsible for
Internet connectivity in K-12 schools and school districts.
School administrators and teachers are pressured by potentially competing
demands to improve minimum student learning as measured by the NCLB regulations
and to apply technology within the K -12 school and school district infrastructure as
emphasized by the E-rate program. As a result, technology installed using E-rate funding
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has not been consistently applied within the K-12 curriculum except by individual
teachers with sufficient training and technical support to incorporate technology usage
into their classrooms (Cuban, 2001). The lack of standard practices for technology
training, support, and protection within the K-12 classroom has contributed to a lack of
regard for technology security by teachers and school curriculum developers (TSSA,
2001). In contrast, technology dependency has increased within the administrative
functions in K-12 schools and school districts where regulatory monitoring in response to
the NCLB Act has forced extensive automation through external sources (AWS, 2002).
In order to understand and address the security needs of this complex and changing
technology environment, K-12 school and school district administrators can benefit from
the planned approach to information asset identification, security requirement
identification, and security threat identification and assessment provided by the K-12
Risk Methodology.
Educational oversight organizations such as the Department of Education (ED)
have not recognized a responsibility for balancing the expanded reporting and data access
requirements with appropriate security risk management requirements. In addition, K-12
school and school district administrators and school board members have not recognized
their responsibility to evaluate the security risk of the technology infrastructure to
establish acceptable use policies in the same manner as acceptable facility use and risks
to student health and safety are evaluated and addressed.
Federal, state, and local regulators for K-12 schools and school districts must
consider the importance of security risk management in the funding and monitoring of
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K-12 school and school district technology use. The appropriate consideration of
security for Internet-accessible infonnation assets under the responsibility of each K-12
school and school district must become standard practice. The similarity of security risk
management issues in K-12 schools and school districts to those of institutions of higher
education has not been recognized by ED. Federal funding is available to colleges and
universities to address security risk but not to K -12 schools and school districts.
Acceptable levels of security risk must be established and monitored to assure the privacy
and protection ofK-12 school and school district online resources.
Based on responses of the SFG, all participants in the technology decisions within
K-12 schools and school districts require training to understand the security risk that is
introduced through Internet access. In addition, training for K-12 decision-makers must
support the development of an understanding of available measures for addressing
security risk, implementation and maintenance mechanisms for continued security risk
management, and resource levels needed to support effective security risk management.
The lack of technology expertise for general technology support, which has been
augmented by student assistance (NSBF, 2002a), is further aggravated by the lack of
understanding of the need for security risk management by K-12 school and school
district administrators.
The appropriate level of participation of students and teachers in K -12 school and
school district technology support must be established. Involvement developed
infonnally based on individually acquired technical expertise and technical staffing
shortages has created potential security risk that must be addressed. Within each K-12
school and school district, a planned level oftechnology access for students and teachers
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based on a security risk management plan that defines the appropriate level of
participation for students and teachers can be established using the K-12 Risk
Methodology.
Security risks within each K -12 school and school district are not well understood
by those that plan and support the technology infrastructure. Content filtering has been
the focus of concern for technology use based on regulatory mandate. This focus fails to
address the wide range of risks to data quality and connectivity from both inside and
outside sources that can occur through technology access. Based on the experience of
SPSD, use of a well structured security risk methodology that includes the evaluation of
current practice with a catalog of good security practices can enhance the concern for
security by analysis participants.
K-12 administrators must recognize the complexity of the technology
infrastructure available to support the teaching and administrative needs within each K12 school and school district. Technical staffhired or contracted to provide support and
maintenance must acquire sufficient skill to address technology infrastructure
vulnerability evaluation and security monitoring. The skills needed to assist in
performing the activities of Phase 2 in the K-12 Security Risk Methodology are critical to
the ability of an entity to effectively recognize, resist, and recover from security events
affecting the technology infrastructure. The technology support for the complex
infrastructure implemented in K-12 schools and school districts must include in-depth
security risk management expertise.
It is incumbent upon the leaders ofK-12 schools and school districts, such as

school board members and school administrators, to assign responsibility for security risk
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management and monitor the effectiveness of applying security practices.
Inappropriately managed Internet connectivity can have serious impacts on the ability of
K-12 schools and school districts to function effectively. This investigation has shown
that use of the K-12 Risk Methodology can aid K-12 schools and school districts in
addressing security risk management for Internet connectivity.
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Appendix A
Security Practices Unique to K-12

School
Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Access to quality
content must be
funded by
someone.

Payment for technology access
will be required without
advertising dollars and may
replace book purchases for
libraries.
Library materials are not
readily available on the
Internet. Quality does not
always fit into the appropriate
educational segment for
learning.

Learning may be
jeopardized if
appropriate content
quality standards are
not imposed.
Learning may be
jeopardized if
reliance on digital
technology replaces
paper books too soon.

Content
blocking

ALA,1999

Acceptable
educational
use

ALA,1999

Level of availability will be
skewed to those with greater
technology access.

Digital divide may
impact educational
capabilities of those
with less access to
technology.

Acceptable
educational
use

ALA,1999

Total reliance on generalized
software is not realistic based
on the limitations of the
technology.

By providing means
Content
for human oversight
blocking
& including local
requirements (defined
by parents and local
authorities) the
school can provide a
better overall result.
Provides controlled
Content
environment without
blocking and
arbitrary limitations
structured
imposed by the
access
technology, but may
exclude content
critical to specific
learning
Establishes a baseline Content
that can be
blocking and
maintained between
structured
multiple users for the access
same equipment but
requires technology
resources to establish
and maintain

Search engines
are based on key
words provided
by supplier. They
cannot be equated
with library books
that are selected.
Placement of
Internet in
learning must be
defined. Only
small segment of
world information
is digitized.
Means for
identifying
acceptable and
unacceptable Web
sites is needed.

Extended use of
specific portals
instead of general
searches to focus
student learning
can standardize
availability of
content.
Establish
bookmark file to
focus student
activity and
provide consistent
content access.

Portals are restricted to a
subset of content and not
always maintained consistently
(e.g., science
[http://www.enc.org], math
[http://forum.swarthmore.edu],
language arts
[http://www.eserver.org]).
Providing a consistent student
interface that is repeatable
across multiple class visits

Chapin,
1999

Chapin,
1999

Chapin,
1999
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Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued)

School
Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Web-based
utilities can
establish a means
for classroom
collaboration and
sharing of files
using free Web
products.
Students should
be protected from
inappropriate
content.

Systems must be established
that can appropriately
control what is shared and
with whom. Access must be
controlled and maintained.

Techniques of sharing can
be compromised to allow
outsiders to see and
change the contents
inappropriately.

Acceptable
educational
use

Bell,2001

Parents, teachers, and
students need to know the
limitations of the blocking
capabilities of the school.

Poorly educated users will
react to problems as
technology failings when
they do not understand the
limits of implemented
choices. Education of the
parents in adopted
processes shows due
diligence.
Verification that parental
interests are considered
shows recognition of
parent's role in defining
access for the child.

Content
blocking

NSBF,
2002b

Acceptable
educational
use

NSBF,
2002b

Acceptable
educational
use

Brewin,
2001

Content
blocking and
acceptable
educational
use

Brooke,
2001

Parental guides
for limiting
child's use of
Internet and
monitoring sites
are important
High cost of
connectivity may
require
outsourcing,
sharing of
resources across
multiple school
districts, or
sharing with
libraries or
corporate
environments.
Chat rooms
provide
inappropriate
meeting grounds
for children and
harmful elements.

Failure to consider parental
wishes when controlling
Internet connectivity may
lead to adverse publicity.

Establishing an Internet
service provider to cut costs
and provide extensive
software to students at low
cost

A Web site that provides
daily tips to promote online
safety is
http://www.chatdanger.com
which claims 80,000
visitors.

Requires collective
buying such as statewide
to establish sufficient
volume for cost effective
technology purchasing;
requires tight
administration of access
to meet the restrictions
applied by software
provider licensing and
appropriate isolation of
content for each group
sharing the resource base
Children must be
educated in the risks of
technology use as well as
its value; parents and
teachers must know
where to locate
information to help them
in the technology
management of children.
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Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued)

School
Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

COPPA
compliance
requires carefully
controlled private
information
collected on
children. This
regulation applies
to all children
under the age of
13.
COPPA personal
data must be
protected if
collected online.

COPPA regulations require
conspicuous posting of privacy
policy and verifiable parental
permission for all data
collected. Actions must match
posted policy. Parents must
have a means to revoke
consent. Security and integrity
of the collected data must be
assured.

Compliance failures are
prosecuted by FTC, and
schools share in the
liability if violations
occur using school
connectivity.

Regulatory
compliance

Cannon,

First and last name, physical
address, email address, screen
name, other online identifiers,
telephone number, and social
security number must be
protected. Cookies and other
persistent electronic location
identifiers are considered
personal data.
Submission of site information
to FTC for registration
requires special controls and
proof of compliance.
Repetitive stress injuries are a
high risk when work spaces
are not tailored to incorporate
ergonomic considerations of
small and growing bodies.

School choices for
connectivity
management may
violate COPPA
compliance without
careful review.

Regulatory
compliance

2001

Registration as a safeharbor provides
validation of
compliance.
The school may incur
liability for excessive
technology interaction
of children at too early
an age without proper
consideration of the
desks, chairs, posture,
and other factors that
contribute to
maintaining healthy
bodies.
Internet connectivity
may continue to be
custodial in nature
without proper
incorporation into the
learning environment.

Regulatory
compliance

2001

Safe-harbor status
is available from
COPPA.
Typing skills must
be taught to
children to make
use of keyboard
input
mechanisms.
Curriculum
planning must
establish a point
in time when this
skill is required.
Are Internetfacilitated
learning
experiences being
provided?

Exploration of the
capabilities of the
digital learning
environment are
still underway.

A definition of learning
experience must be established
to assure proper use of all
types of access. Internet
connectivity is only one
portion of the social context
necessary for learning from
this media.
Peer-to-peer relationships and
communications with outside
experts have been identified as
effective learning models but
require extensive connectivity.

Is this level of access
cost justified? How will
this level of access be
managed so as not to
disrupt other modes? Is
the cost of control too
high?

Acceptable
educational
use

2001

Cannon,

Cannon,

Biersdorfer,

1999

Acceptable
educational
use

2002

Acceptable
educational
use

2002

Bruckman,

Bruckman,

159

Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued)

School
Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Should
technology use be
linked with test
scores and student
performance?

Existing metrics for
evaluating success of an
application may not be
appropriate.

Acceptable
educational
use

Schulte &
Keating, 2001

Number of
"student
suspended" days
was identified as a
metric for
educational
interest.

Gains in state mastery test
gains identified as
increased with computer
installation.

Acceptable
educational
use

Davis, 2000

Teachers who
understand and
use technology as
a new means of
communication
can gain student
involvement.
Asynchronous
communication
can provide
broader
availability.
Immediate
grading and
analysis facilities
promote
immediate
feedback.
Federal regulation
must be included
as appropriate.

Students reluctant to
communicate in class
have been known to
participant online in class
discussions.

Funding sources have
used poverty as a primary
driver for technology
need based on the
assumption that the
lowest performers need
the greatest technology
access.
Cost of technology does
not include sufficient
levels of assurance for
quality use. Teacher
training seen as key to
making gains. (Cost is
greater than equipment
and software.)
Removal of the prejudices
that visibility adds to the
communication can be
beneficial.

Acceptable
educational
use and
structured
access

Chamberlin,
2001

State and local
regulation must be
included as
appropriate.

Requires different mode
of communication and
instructor thinking

Rules of engagement need
to be established or the
access path will be
abused.

Acceptable
educational
use

Chamberlin,
2001

Requires specific
technical tools and
individual student access
to execute

Requires greater
management to provide a
view of performance over
time and assurance of
privacy of each
participant
Title I, Title II, Title III,
Title IV, Title VI
compliance may add to
data needs and expand
potential for abuse.

Acceptable
educational
use

Chamberlin,
2001

Regulatory
compliance

Chambers et
al.,2000

Regulatory
compliance

(Chambers et
al.,2000)

Expanded regulatory
oversight with the Goals
2000: Educate America
Act and Elementary and
Secondary Education Act
(ESEA)
Standards, assessments,
curricula, teacher
preparation, and
professional development
must include technology
considerations.

Funding sources are
requiring measurements
of success that expand
data collection and
control (e.g., NCLB).
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Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued)
School
Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Marketers are
disguising
advertising as
educational
content to capture
youth spending.
Compliance with
Americans with
Disabilities Act
must be provided.

Evaluation mechanisms for
vendor-supplied materials
are not standardized and
may not consider the
consequences of alternate
content usage.
Technology is frequently a
support mechanism through
the use of adaptive
technology.

"Free" equipment may
not be usable because
of the control aspects
used by the supplier.

Acceptable
educational
use

Colkin, 2001

Structured
access

Cunningham,
2000

Children must be
taught the value of
computers and of
things other than
computers.
Controlled access
to content is
available through
simulated
Internet.

Human interactions are
identified as an area that is
being lost with computer use
especially for younger
children.
Technology is applied
inappropriately and content
is controlled excessively
within a limited closed
environment.

Acceptable
educational
use

Davis, 2000

Acceptable
educational
use

Davis, 2000

Policies, quality
of available
materials, and
availability of
consistent
connectivity limit
computer
classroom use.
Content filtering
must be applied
appropriately to
provide effective
blocking of
undesirable
material with
minimum impact
on access to
appropriate
material.
Use oftechnology
in the classroom
changes the
manner in which
assignments are
approached.

Goals for technology use in
the classroom are unclear.
Expectations of each
stakeholder are not being
met, causing frustrations.

Technology solutions
for disability divide
may not be workable or
may compromise
student learning if not
managed properly.
Balanced curriculum
must incorporate both
computer use and
human interaction with
peers and teachers.
EKlDS by Silvertech
Inc. is an example of a
closed environment that
is considered safe for
children, but it is
unclear if it addresses
learning needs.
Administrative support
and teaching tools are
not sufficiently
consistent for
classroom reliance.

Acceptable
educational
use

Sarkar, 2002

Filtering best practices
should be applied to the
selection and
implementation processes.
Choices for filtering must
reflect the planned use of the
Internet for instruction and
research.

Mechanisms to override
the filtering must be
available to allow
choice to overcome
limitations ofthe
technology.

Content
blocking

Balkin et aI.,
1999

Formal and consistent
structure cannot be assumed
to exist with Internet
materials, and each class use
will vary.

Teachers must change
their expectations and
approach to materials to
match the environment
of the Internet.

Acceptable
educational
use

NETS, 2002
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Security Practices Unique to K-12 (continued)

School
Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Use ofE-Rate
funding requires
monitoring of
effective use of
technology.

Reporting is required to the
Schools and Libraries
Division (SLD) of the
Universal Service
Administration Company
(USAC) of the Federal
Communications
Commission (FCC).
Control of use of digital
materials is complicated by
the changing regulatory
environment.

Schools must develop a
technology plan that
specifies incorporation
of technology into
curricula.

Acceptable
educational
use and
regulatory
compliance

ED,2000b

Students and teachers
must be educated in the
restrictions that apply to
copyright materials.
Violations can put the
school programs at risk.
Gauging local interest
and value is a
continuously changing
effort.

Acceptable
educational
use and
regulatory
compliance

Gaunt, 2002

Acceptable
educational
use

GAO,2001

Acceptable
educational
use

Meyer, 2000

Acceptable
educational
use

Sonwalker,
2001

Regulatory
compliance

ED, 2002a and
ED,2002b

Regulatory
compliance

EPIC, 2003

Copyright
restrictions on
digital materials
are in flux.

Expectations in
the use of
technology vary
by region and
economic level of
school districts.
Funding for
technology and
ongoing support is
dependent on
goals shared with
the public.

Appropriate use of
technology must be linked
to the local characteristics of
Internet users.

Experience in other projects,
such as public
transportation, shows that
including public opinion
within the planning can
greatly improve acceptance.

Choices of
technology must
match the learning
needs of the
classroom.

Teaching needs must drive
the selection of appropriate
technology.

Written
permission is
required from
parents for release
of any child
education
information or
from the child
when reaching age
18.
Parents have the
right to inspect all
survey instruments
that are used to
collect data from
children.

Regulations such as Family
Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) and
Protection of Pupil Rights
Amendment (PPRA) apply
privacy restrictions to use
and disclosure of student
personal information.

2001 education bill
addresses indirect use of
data collected for
educational purposes from
third parties and sold to
others.

Establishing shared
goals can benefit the
acceptance of limitation
choices. Expectations
must be controlled
carefully to avoid
additional regulatory
oversight.
A shared forum for
identification of needs
and evaluation of
technology that
incorporates planned
use is needed.
Directory information
may be disclosed
without consent, but
parents must be notified
with an option to
exclude their child's
data.

Failure to comply
places the school at risk
if collected information
is used improperly.
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Appendix B
K -12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices

School Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Tracing physical
location of
machine

Physical location of
equipment can be
traced with data
provided from a
Web site.
Vendors are
providing content
but not always
supporting the
educational needs of
students.
Widely used school
applications (e.g.,
Cafe Terminal the
online cafeteria
payment system by
Comalex, Inc)
collect inappropriate
data in violation of
the COPPA.
Appropriate
notification of
parents is needed in
all actions.

Child can be located by
sources that may do harm.

Security
management

Moad,2001

Learning is disturbed by
inappropriate content, and
behavior is influenced
inappropriately.

Security
policies and
regulations

ALA,1999

Schools using
applications that collect
inappropriate information
will be penalized.

Security
management

http://www.co
malex.com

Informed parents will
raise concerns within
school channels instead of
attacking educational
efforts.

Security
policies and
regulations

Chapin, 1999

Established rules must be
enforced, or they will be
ignored.

Security
management

Chapin, 1999

Establish specific start-up
and shutdown procedures
that limit reliance on
individual actions and
remove personal
information between uses.

Information
technology
security

Chapin, 1999

Enhance the
educational
opportunities but
minimize the
entertainment
functions.
Children's personal
information must
be protected from
applications
collecting private
information
inappropriately.

Acceptable use
policy should be
linked to filtering
mechanisms in use,
and parents should
be notified of the
policy restrictions
imposed by the
school.
Monitoring of log
files collected by a
browser, filter, or
proxy Web server
can identify
acceptable usage
problems.
Shared machines
provide access to
private information
through caching,
browser history
file, personal
bookmarks, and
cookies.

AUP enforcement
and a means for
updating filtering
processes to
maintain currency
are required for
effective
enforcement.
Allows students
using the same
equipment to see
and plagiarize what
others students are
doing (privacy
invasion).
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued)

School Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Desktop security
can be impacted by
actions of the user.

Access to infected
email and
acceptance of
cookies can
compromise user
privacy and device
software.

Information
technology
security

Chapin, 1999

Outbound text
filters can be used
to block personal
information in chat
rooms, emails, and
Web forms.
Training is
required for
educational use of
tools.

Technology is only
partially effective.
Requires links with
AUP and training of
individuals in
acceptable use
Technology will not
help if users are not
knowledgeable in
the use of the
available tools.
Proper use of
facilities, protection
of passwords, and
protection
mechanisms in place
must be part of
standard
teacher/aide training.
Assurance is needed
that access to
student personal
information is
limited to caregivers
and teachers.

Internet access can
adversely impact the
desktop, rendering it
unusable. Restrictions on
what the user is allowed
to do and what functions
are automated must be
considered.
Validation of acceptable
activities is needed. Will
chat and peer-to-peer be
allowed? Will email be
available?

Information
technology
security

Chapin, 1999

Security
awareness and
training

Strauss, 2002

Security
awareness and
training

Strauss, 2002

Information
technology
security

O'Toole, 2002

Physical
security

O'Toole, 2002

Teachers require
training in specific
equipment and
capabilities of
school.

Control of access
to private student
information is
needed.

Lockdownof
machines to avoid
unanticipated
compromise is
needed.

Physical and
software control is
needed to avoid
unexpected software
changes.

Resources to address
proper training of
teachers, aides, and
students must be
considered.
Reliance on teachers
when they are not
properly trained is
ineffective and will
subject the students to
potential harm.

Information availability
must be balanced with
effective authorization
and authentication
mechanisms. Control of
access must define and
limit who can view and
change data.
Physical control of the
machine can allow
complete compromise of
all standardized
limitations.
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued)

School Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Means for
identifying
inappropriate
behavior on the
system is needed.

Mechanisms must be
in place to control
who can view and
adjust information
logs.

Information
technology
security

Mackenzie &
Goldman,

Mechanism for
enforcement of
violations must be
delineated clearly.
Mechanisms are
needed to limit
traffic on network.

Who is the
enforcement agentstudents, teachers, or
administrators?
How much remote
access will be
provided to parents,
teachers, students, or
community access?
Remote access for
students and
teachers traveling?
Confirmation that
AUP has been read
and understood is
needed.

Monitoring is required to
assure compliance.
Access to monitoring
information must be
controlled, or violators
will remove the evidence.
All participants must be
aware of who is
monitoring and why.

Security
management

Mackenzie &
Goldman,

Are those
accessing the
network tested
before access is
granted to validate
comprehension of
AUP and other
training?
Formal procedures
exist for
establishing
computer abuse,
reporting problems,
and adjudicating
violations.
Procedures for
handling computer
violations include
identification of
when police are to
be notified

Clear definition of
what constitutes
resources under
control of the
school

Greater compliance
is expected with
assurance of
consistency and
knowledge in
advance of
processes.
Potential abuses
include sexual
harassment, spamto
mailing lists, forging
mail, sniffing the
network, port scans,
cracking passwords,
commercial use of
the network
Restrictions of
inappropriate
behavior require
clear definitions of
acceptable use.

2000

2000

The establishment of
priorities for critical
applications and the
prioritization of classroom
needs over casual use may
be required to assure asset
protection.

Security
policies and
regulations

Mackenzie &
Goldman,

Confirmation of
knowledge of AUP
provides greater leverage
in enforcement.

Security
management

Mackenzie &
Goldman,

Procedures require the
identification of problems
and resources for problem
resolution.

Information
technology
security

2000

Recognition of problems
that extend outside of the
control of school
administration and how
they are to be addressed
must be established in
advance of the situation.

Security
management

Mackenzie &
Goldman,

Appropriate use must be
defmed in advance of
providing access, and use
must be monitored.

Security
management

2000

2000

Mackenzie &
Goldman,

2000

Mackenzie &
Goldman,

2000
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued)

School Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Handling of chain
mail and pyramid
schemes - potential
for mail storms
with class lists

Inappropriate
structuring of
internal technology
use can lead to
internal denial of
service.
How will shared
devices be
evaluated? With
logon usage to
identify who is using
machines, how can
sharing of access
passwords be
prevented?
How can the
potential for selling
access to illegal
materials be
managed? How can
processes such as
scanning be limited
to legitimate
purposes?

Teacher and technology
support training is
required to learn how to
recognize and respond to
potential problems in
advance.
Monitoring of individual
actions requires individual
identification.

Information
technology
security

Mackenzie &
Goldman,
2000

Information
technology
security

Mackenzie &
Goldman,
2000

Policies and procedures
are needed.

Security
policies and
regulation

Mackenzie &
Goldman,
2000

Due diligence
requires attention to
known technology
vulnerabilities (e.g.,
SANS 20 highest
security holes).
Formal training,
informal training,
sharing of problems
with other sites?

Resources needed to
apply all known
corrections can be high.
Consider must be given to
the value of standardized
installations.
Consider the need for
training technical support
in security issues.

Information
technology
security

Mackenzie &
Goldman,
2000

Information
technology
security

Mackenzie &
Goldman,
2000

Control of illegal
Web sites and
machines using
illegal access to
enhance capabilities
inappropriately is
needed.

The level of control for
machines inserted into the
network will define the
level of security possible.

Security
policies and
regulations

EDUCAUSE,
2002

Do mechanisms
exist for tracking
specific actions
back to specific
individuals for
redress?

Education is
needed for students
and teachers on
copyright
restrictions.
Limitations for
educational
material are based
on licensing
agreements.
Implementation of
available
technology
standards is needed
to prevent known
problems.
What is an
appropriate
education of
systems
administrators?
Who can add
machines to the
network? How are
they controlled?
Can personal
machines of
students, faculty, or
parents be added to
the network?
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued)

School Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Do individuals set
up their own
passwords or are
they assigned?
What forum exists
for raising and
evaluating security
issues? Does this
include technical,
admin,and
teachers?
All users of the
network are
educated as to
security threats and
prevention options.

Easily guessed
passwords provide
an opening to the
network for anyone.
Shared forum to
identify problems
before they are
widespread will
enhance response
without increased
cost.
Student, teacher, and
administrator access
should be dependent
on the level of
training completed.

Passwords that are too
hard to remember require
greater support assistance.

Security
management

Verton, 2002

Communication among
all participants in the
organization is needed for
effective security.

Security
management

EDUCAUSE,
2002

Security
awareness and
training

Lesniak, 2002

Anti-virus software
is available, used,
and updated on all
levels of
connectivity
(desktop/laptop,
server, network).
Are patch levels of
all software
maintained to
acceptable
currency? Who
defmes acceptable?

Protection of the
infrastructure from
externally
introduced malicious
software is needed.

Failure to require training
for network use will allow
users to make mistakes
that harm the
infrastructure through
ignorance.
Protection may be
required at multiple
levels,especially with
mobile devices.

Information
technology
security

Lesniak, 2002

Information
technology
security

Lesniak, 2002

Information
technology
security

Lesniak, 2002

Information
technology
security

Lesniak, 2002

Someone is
assigned the
responsibility for
environment
security and
monitors the
available
knowledge sources
(e.g., SANS,
CERT/CC).
Unneeded services
are removed, and
passwords are
controlled for all
devices.

By not applying
patches, the software
remains vulnerable
to compromise
through a known
opening.
Identified
vulnerabilities are
doubling annually.
Support of effective
connectivity requires
constant vigilance.

The greater the level
of resources on a
device, the greater
the level of required
support.

Patch application is
resource intensive and
time-consuming. Many
applications may be
disabled when changes
for which they were not
validated are applied.
Resources must be
assigned to monitor and
support the infrastructure.

If services are available
but not used, there is a
tendency to limit support
to reduce resource usage.
Known problems are not
fixed leaving
vulnerabilities available
for exploit.
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued)

School Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Response team
exists and knows
what to do if the
network has
problems.

When the
infrastructure is
compromised,
resources must know
what to do to
address the problem
quickly and restore
connectivity.
Without appropriate
monitoring, the
students who know
the network can
become inside
threats.

Security attacks will
happen, and methods for
addressing them are
required.

Information
technology
security

Lesniak, 2002

Reliance on resources that
are not contractually
obligated to maintain an
effective environment
poses a high risk with
very little recourse in the
event of problems.
School resources will be
placed at risk if users of
these resources do not
take their responsibilities
seriously.

Information
technology
security

Verton, 2002

Security
policies and
regulations

Colkin,2002

How are
technically skilled
students identified
and managed?

How are ethical
issues of copyright
and intellectual
property being
communicated to
network users?
Biometrics devices
represent a means
of authentication
that is easy to use
and can be
implemented
without reading
skills.
Internet
connectivity
provides access to
a broad range of
non-educational
opportunities.
Wireless
connectivity
provides flexibility
for workspace and
teaching locations.
Clear definitions of
the level of privacy
and what
monitoring is being
done must be
communicated.

What enforcement
options exist for
these issues,
regardless of the
media?
Passwords require a
level of reading that
may be above some
of the K-12 school
users.

Biometrics are more
expensive to implement
but more difficult to
bypass.

Information
technology
security

Carr, 2001

Entertainment
options consume
bandwidth that is
needed for other
purposes.

Control of the use of
available infrastructure
resources requires
restrictions to nonessential services.

Security
management

Clark, 2001

Security for wireless
connectivity is
extremely limited.

Can wireless be limited to
areas where functionality
exceeds risk?

Information
technology
security

Cope &
Brewin,2000

Employees and
students anticipate
privacy while using
a computer.
However,
monitoring facilities
allow administrators
to see everything.

Infrastructure
administrative capabilities
must be severely
restricted to minimize the
risk of inappropriate use.

Security
management

Cohen, 2000

168

K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued)

School Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Communication of
acceptable and
unacceptable reuse
of available digital
material must be
part of the teaching
process.

Violation of
copyright laws can
be accomplished
easily with current
technology.
Continuous
reinforcement of
appropriate use is
needed.
Agreement on what
is meant by safety
and achievement is
needed at each
organization.

Tools and their use can
overwhelm students.
Care must be taken in the
construction of
assignments to
differentiate original work
electronically from
plagiarism.

Security
policies and
regulations

Clayton &
Watkins, 2002

Policies and procedures
must be consistent with
local goals to facilitate
achievement.

Security
policies and
regulations

NSBF,2002b

Development of a
consistent approach for
access and control across
all classes can simplify
administration and use.

Security
policies and
regulations

Eisler, 2000

Technology planning
must be based on the
connectivity decisions of
participants.

Security
policies and
regulations

Norris &
Soloway, 2001

Students can be exposed
to content from shared
vendor environments
against planned policy.

Collaborative
security
management

Radcliff,2001

Internet access
requires balancing
oftwo
requirements:
keeping children
safe and increasing
student
achievement.
Control of access
and clarity of
structure can be
provided through
the use of portals.

Providing access
though school
infrastructure for
equipment not
owned and
controlled by the
school is needed.
Outsourcing
technology support
with insufficient
control of vendor's
decisions may
compromise
security.

Development is
required to build and
support portals, but
single sign-on and
customization
creates a simplified
learning
environment.
The level of security
available to be
considered will be
limited, based on the
level of control
participants are
willing to accept.
Protection from
pornography will not
be available if
outsourcing
organizations are not
applying consistent
protection
mechanisms.
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K-12 Security Practices Consistent With OCTAVE Catalog of Practices (continued)

School Context

Security Risk

Consequence

Security
Practice

Reference

Access to email
addresses and
contact information
linked with a
school can
compromise child
safety.
Establishing
curricula based on
availability of
specific Internet
sources can be
risky.
Volunteer sources
and corporate
donations must be
evaluated, based on
the organization's
goals.

Control of
information
unknowingly shared
through outside
access via the
Internet can put a
child at risk.
Web-based sources
may not represent
viable businesses,
and materials may
not be consistently
available.
Limited availability
and limited control
of volunteers may
mean additional
support must be
absorbed by the
organization.
Appropriate use of
content is not readily
provided by the
delivery
mechanisms of
technology.
Filtering, acceptable
use enforcement,
and data
management
practices should
match posted
information policies.

Schools must educate
students about the value
of keeping their network
access private.

Information
technology
security

Rosencrance,
2002

Web sources must be held
to the same standards as
other information sources
to assure that appropriate
educational standards are
maintained.
Volunteer sources must
be held to the same
security standards as other
information resources.

Collaborative
security
management

Schulman,
2001

Collaborative
security
management

Schneider,
1999

Guidelines for use must
be understood before
access to technology is
provided.

Security
awareness and
training

Colkin, 2002

Consistency is required
across all parts of the
organization for effective
management of
information protection.

Security
awareness and
training

Chapin, 1999

Introduction of
technology requires
inclusion of
appropriate ethics
for use of delivery
media.
Web site and
Internet access
policies should be
highly visible for
reference by
students and
parents.
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Appendix C
Mapping OCTAVE Principles to Attributes
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2001a)

Principle

Attribute

Self-direction

Analysis team,
Augment analysis team skills

Adaptable measures

Catalog of Practices,
Generic threat profiles,
Catalog of Vulnerabilities

Defined process

Defined evaluation activities,
Documented evaluation results,
Evaluation scope

Foundation for a continuous process

Next steps,
Catalog of Practices,
Senior management participation

Forward-looking view

Focus on risk

Focus on the critical few

Evaluation scope,
Focused activities

Integrated management

Organizational and technological issues,
Organizational and information technology
participation,
Senior management participation

Open communication

Collaborative approach

Global perspective

Organizational technological issues,
Organizational and information technology
participation

Teamwork

Analysis team,
Augment analysis team skills,
Collaborative approach,
Organizational and information technology
participation

171

AppendixD
Catalog of Practices for K-12 Risk Methodology
I.

Strategic practice areas
a.

Security awareness and training

b. Security strategy
c.

Security management

d. Security policies and regulations

II.

e.

Collaborative security management

f.

Contingency planning/disaster recovery

Operational practice areas
a. Physical security
1.
11.

Physical security plans and procedures
Monitoring and auditing physical security

h. Information technology security
1.

11.

System and network management
System administration tools

iii. Monitoring and auditing information technology security
IV.

Authentication and authorization

v. Vulnerability management
VI.

Encryption

vii. Security architecture and design
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Catalog of Practices for K-12 Risk Methodology (continued)
c. Staff security
1.

Incident management

ii. General staff practices

III.

Educational practice areas
a. Content blocking
1.

Filtering pornography

ii. Blocking access to inappropriate activities
111.

Monitoring to limit censorship

b. Structured access management
i. Privacy including the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERP A) and Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA)
11.

Resource sharing management

iii. Access rights management

c. Regulatory compliance
1.

11.

Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
Copyright and licensing laws for digital media and the Technology
Education and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act for the
educational use of electronic media

111.

Federal and state reporting

iv. Protection against criminal use of technology to violate state or federal law
including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act
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Catalog of Practices for K-12 Risk Methodology (continued)
d. Acceptable educational use
1.

11.

111.

Participant's responsibilities (varies by age)
Organizational responsibilities
Ethics
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Appendix E
Table of Contents for K-12 Methodology Instructional Guidance

During Phase I
Activity

Description

Worksheets

AU

Identify Assets and
Relative Priorities

Identify assets that are used by the organization.
Then, select the most important assets to the
organization and discuss their rationale for
selecting them.

Asset worksheet
(Wl.1)

Al.2

Select Critical Assets

Identify assets that can have a large adverse
impact on the organization if harmed.

Al.3

Identify Areas of
Concern

Identify scenarios that threaten the most
important assets, based on typical sources and
outcomes of threats. Consider impacts to the
organization for those scenarios.

Asset Profile
Workbook (one for
each critical asset)
Areas of Concern
worksheet (W1.2)
Asset Profile
Workbook

A1.4

Identify Security
Requirements for
Most Important
Assets
Current Protection
Strategy Practices and
Organizational
Vulnerabilities

Identify the security requirements for the most
important assets. Select the most important
security requirement for each important asset.

Asset Profile
Workbook

Complete surveys to indicate which practices are
currently followed by the organization's
personnel, as well as ones which are not
followed. After completing the survey, discuss
specific issues from the survey in more detail.

Current General
Security Practices
Survey (Wl.3)
Current
Educational
Security Survey
(Wl.4)
Current IT Security
Practices Survey
(W1.5)
Protection Strategy
worksheet (W1.6)
Security Practices
Summary (W 1.7)

A1.5

Al.6

Identify Threats to
Critical Assets

Threats are identified from areas of concern
mapped to structured profiles.

Asset Profile
Workbook

A1.7

Identify Evaluation
Criteria

The organization uses evaluation criteria for all
activities. Areas of greatest impact must be
identified and applied to security.

Identify Evaluation
Criteria (Wl.8)
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Table of Contents for K -12 Methodology Instructional Guidance (continued)

During Phase 2 (Optional)
Activity

Description

Worksheets

A2.1

Identify Key Classes of
Components

The analysis team establishes the system(s) of
interest for each critical asset. The team then
identifies the classes of components that are
related to the system(s) of interest.

Asset Profile
Workbook

A2.2

Identify Infrastructure
Components to
Examine

The analysis team selects specific components to
evaluate. The system(s) of interest is automatically
selected for evaluation. The team selects one or
more infrastructure components from each key
class to evaluate. In addition, the team also selects
an approach and specific tools for evaluating
vulnerabilities.

Asset Profile
Workbook

A2.3

Run Vulnerability
Evaluation Tools on
Selected Infrastructure
Components

The IT staff or external experts conduct the
vulnerability evaluation. They are responsible for
running the vulnerability evaluation tools and
creating a vulnerability summary for each critical
asset prior to the workshop.

N/A

A2.4

Review Technology
Vulnerabilities and
Summarize Results

The IT staff members or external experts who ran
the vulnerability tool( s) present a vulnerability
summary for each critical asset and interprets it for
the analysis team. Each vulnerability summary is
reviewed and refined if appropriate.

Asset Profile
Workbook
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Table of Contents for K-12 Methodology Instructional Guidance (continued)

During Phase 3
Activity

Description

Worksheets

A3.1

Identify the Impact of
Threats to Critical
Assets

The analysis team defines impact descriptions for
threat outcomes (disclosure, modification, loss,
destruction, and interruption). The impact
description is a narrative statement that describes
how a threat ultimately affects the organization's
mission. The combination of a threat and the
resulting impact to the organization defines the
risk to the organization.

Asset Profile
Workbook

A3.2

Create Risk Evaluation
Criteria

The analysis team creates evaluation criteria that
will be used to evaluate the risks to the
organization. Evaluation criteria defme what
constitutes a high, medium, and low impact.

Asset Profile
Workbook

A3.3

Evaluate the Impact of
Threats to Critical
Assets

The analysis team reviews each risk and assigns it
an impact measure (high, medium, or low).

Asset Profile
Workbook

A3.4

Create Mitigation Plans

Create risk mitigation plans for each critical asset.
A mitigation plan defines the activities required to
mitigate the risk/threats to the critical assets.

Asset Profile
Workbook
Security
Practices
Summary
worksheet
(1.7)

A3.5

Create Action Plans

Create action plans for near-term activities that are
needed to address security areas but do not require
specialized training, policy changes, or other
longer term steps.

Asset Profile
Workbook
Security
Practices
Summary
worksheet
(1.7)

A3.6

Create Organization
Protection Strategy

Create a protection strategy for the organization.
That strategy defmes how the organization will
enable, initiate, implement, and maintain its
internal security.

Security
Practices
Summary
worksheet
(1.7)
Asset Profile
Workbooks

Appendix F
Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet

Practice

How is this practice used by your organizatiou?

Content Blocking
Policies aud procedures for applying content blocking have been defined, and installed software and
hardware filtering tools are set up to implement the policy.

Yes

No

Unknowu

Content blocking is applied appropriately to all available services (Internet, email, chat services, and
applications) and to all types of communication mechanisms available within the organization
(desktop, laptop, wireless, cell phone, remote devices of varying kinds, etc.) based on policies that
may vary by role and student age.

Yes

No

Unknowu

A reporting and correction capability exists for problems with content blocking. Default settings for
filtering can be adjusted to correct problems. The responsibilities for problem identification and
problem correction have been assigned within the organization.

Yes

No

Unknowu

Content-blocking policies and procedures are in accordance with parental and local defmitions of
inappropriate content (Internet sites, spam, ads, solicitations, etc.).

Yes

No

Unknowu

Digital content used for education is evaluated for validity and appropriateness to assure that
learning is not jeopardized through the use of online content instead of textbooks. This process is
consistently applied to all learning materials.

Yes

No

Unknowu

Content-blocking mechanisms are sufficiently supported to maintain a consistency as online content
and capabilities expand.

Yes

No

Unknowu

Purchase arrangements for technology, which includes vendor monitoring, are evaluated for
consistency with content-blocking policies and procedures.

Yes

No

Unknowu

Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet (continued)

How is this practice used by your organization?
Structured Access Management
Technology choices are matched to the needs of the technology participants.

Yes

No

Unknown

Mechanisms have been established to assure that individuals sharing equipment cannot infringe on
the privacy of others using the same equipment.

Yes

No

Unknown

content is available through the use of bookmark files, portals, and other structures that
assure consistency without reliance on specific access devices.

Yes

No

Unknown

Policies and procedures for remote access to information are established and consistently managed.
They include security considerations appropriate to the devices and applications involved.

Yes

No

Unknown

Technology access and availability is consistent with organizational policies for compliance with
the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Yes

No

Unknown

Software- and equipment-selection processes include consideration for physical and online security
throughout the useful life of the purchase.

Yes

No

Unknown

Implementers and monitors are aware of control mechanisms (physical and online), and mechanisms
exist for the identification, reporting, and correction of problems throughout the useful life of the
technology.

Yes

No

Unknown

Regulatory Compliance - Children'S Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
Controls are in place to assure that all private information for children under the age of 13 is not
released without parental consent.

Yes

No

Unknown

Monitoring mechanisms are in place to assure that children cannot reach sites that do not
appropriately apply COPPA restrictions in collecting information.

Yes

No

Unknown

Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet (continued)

Practice
Regulatory Compliance -

corpA (continued)
Yes

No

Unknown

Appropriate use of digital materials is actively encouraged.

Yes

No

Unknown

Discussions of ethical behavior and definition of appropriate use occur on a regular basis at all
levels of technology participants.

Yes

No

Unknown

Penalties for inappropriate behavior are understood as required by all levels of technology
participants. Monitoring mechanisms are established appropriately.

Yes

No

Unknown

Validation mechanisms have been identified and are applied periodically to digital content to
confirm appropriate licensing management.

Yes

No

Unknown

Information collection to support mandated Federal reporting is defined and consistent with
organization policies of privacy.

Yes

No

Unknown

Information distribution is handled in compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA) and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA).

Yes

No

Unknown

Compliance requirements linked to standards, assessments, curricula, teacher preparation, and
professional development are consistent with organizational policies and good practices for secure
use and availability.

Yes

No

Unknown

Programs for inserting technology into the organization provide clear consideration for
organizational policies and good practices for secure use and availability.

Yes

No

Unknown

Safe-harbor status has been established internally, and sites approved as such have been identified
for use by children under the age of 13.

Regulatory Compliance - Copyright and Licensing Laws

Regulatory Compliance - Federal and State Reporting

~"'V

Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet (continued)

Practice

Is this practice used by your organization?

Regulatory Compliance - Protection Against Criminal Use of Technology
Technology users are aware of the restrictions to external sites imposed by the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PARTIOT) Act, and organizational use policy provides a means for enforcing
these restrictions.

Yes

No

Unknown

Mechanisms are in place for identifying the inappropriate use of organization facilities with respect
to generating potential harm to other sites, and the capability to identify violators and impose
penalties on their actions is in place.

Yes

No

Unknown

Standards of conduct for individuals with technical skills and system access that would allow them
to violate federal and state restrictions are clearly defined and enforced.

Yes

No

Unknown

The acceptable use of all educational equipment and services is defined carefully for all technology
participants.

Yes

No

Unknown

All technology participants exhibit an understanding of the required policies and procedures for the
use of educational technology.

Yes

No

Unknown

External groups such as parents, school boards, and other influential local organizations are clearly
aware of the acceptable use of educational equipment and services, and support the organization in
its implementation.

Yes

No

Unknown

The appropriate use of technology in meeting the goals of the organization is clearly defined and
applied by all decision makers.

Yes

No

Unknown

Acceptable Use Management

Current Educational Security Practices Survey Worksheet (continued)

Acceptable Use Management (continued)
Penalties for inappropriate use are clearly defmed and understood by all technology participants.

Yes

No

UnlalOwn

The use and responsibilities for participants in special programs with technology components have
been clearly defmed and communicated to all participants.

Yes

No

UnlalOwn

Acceptable use includes the communication of the risks of technology use to participants.
Acceptable Use Policies have been appropriately defmed and communicated to all participants
(teachers, students, parents).

Yes

No

Unknown

A process monitoring acceptable use has been defined and implemented. That includes a means for
participants to report problems and threats conveyed through the technology.

Yes

No

Unknown

Licensing restrictions and other limitations for the use of technology are communicated clearly to all
participants.

Yes

No

Unknown

Mechanisms have been established to identify an unacceptable use and link it to the appropriate
individual for evaluation and application of penalties.

Yes

No

Unknown
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Appendix G
Security Practices Summary
Based on responses to the surveys, summarize the results in the following tables:

Summary of General Security Practices
Practice Area

Status

Security Awareness and Training

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Security Strategy

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Security Management

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Security Policies and Regulations

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Collaborative Security Management

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Contingency PlanninglDisaster Recovery

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Physical Security Plans and Procedures

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Physical Access Control

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

System and Network Management

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Authentication and Authorization

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Incident Management

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

General Staff Practices

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Summary of Educational Security Practices
Practice Area

Status

Content Blocking

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Structured Access Management

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Regulatory Compliance - COPPA

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Regulatory Compliance - Copyright and
Licensing Laws

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Regulatory Compliance - Federal and
State Reporting

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Regulatory Compliance - Protection
Against Criminal Use of Technology

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Acceptable Use Management

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research
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Security Practices Summary (continued)

Summary of Information Technology (IT) Security Practices
Practice Area

Status

Security Awareness and Training

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Security Management

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Security Policies and Regulations

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Monitoring and Auditing Physical
Security

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

System and Network Management

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

System Administration Tools

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Monitoring and Auditing IT Security

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Authentication and Authorization

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Security Architecture and Design

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Vulnerability Management

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

Encryption

Fine

Needs Improvement

Needs Research

AppendixH
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices Worksheet
Protection Strategy for Educational Practices
Content Blocking (EDt)
Questions to Consider
•

What training and education initiatives could help your
organization maintain or improve its content-blocking practices?

•

What funding level is appropriate to support your contentblocking needs?

•

Are your policies and procedures sufficient for your contentblocking needs? How could they be improved?

•

Who has responsibility for defming and implementing the
details of content-blocking? Should anyone else be involved?

•

How are problems identified and addressed? Would
adjustments in these procedures improve the value of contentblocking?

•

What external experts could help you with defining and
implementing content-blocking? How will you communicate
your requirements? How will you verify that your requirements
were met?

Strate2ies

Issues: What issues related to content-blocking cannot be addressed by your organization?

Protection Strategy for Educational Practices Worksheet (continued)

Protection Strategy for Educational Practices
Structured Access Management (ED2)
Questions to Consider
•

What training and education initiatives could help your
organization maintain or improve its technology selection and
distribution practices?

•

What funding level is appropriate to support your technology
infrastructure needs?

•

Are your policies and procedures sufficient for your technology
access and availability needs? How could they be improved?

•

Who has responsibility for defining and implementing the
decisions on availability, distribution, and access control?
Should anyone else be involved?

•

How are problems identified and addressed? Would
adjustments in these procedures improve the value of
technology?

•

What external experts could help you with defining and
implementing appropriate levels of availability and access? How
will you communicate your requirements? How will you verify
that your requirements were met?

Strategies

Issues: What issues related to structured access management cannot be addressed by your organization?

Protection Strategy for Educational Practices Worksheet (continued)

Protection Strategy for Educational Practices
Regulatory Compliance (ED3)
Questions to Consider
•

What training and education initiatives could help your
organization maintain or improve its regulatory compliance
practices?

•

What funding level is appropriate to support your regulatory
compliance needs?

•

Are your policies and procedures sufficient for your regulatory
compliance needs? How could they be improved?

•

Who has responsibility for defining and implementing the
details of regulatory compliance? Should anyone else be
involved?

•

How are problems identified and addressed? Would
adjustments in these procedures improve the level of regulatory
compliance?

•

What external experts could help you with defining and
implementing levels of regulatory compliance? How will you
communicate your requirements? How will you verify that your
requirements were met?

Strategies

Issues: What issues related to regulatory compliance cannot be addressed by your organization?

Protection Strategy for Educational Practices Worksheet (continued)

Protection Strategy for Educational Practices
Acceptable Use (ED4)
Questions to Consider
•

What training and education initiatives could help your
organization maintain or improve its acceptable use practices?

•

What funding level is appropriate to support your establishing
and monitoring acceptable use?

•

Are your policies and procedures sufficient for your acceptable
use requirements? How could they be improved?

•

Who has responsibility for defming and implementing the
details of acceptable use? Should anyone else be involved?

•

How are problems identified and addressed? Would
adjustments in these procedures improve the compliance of
acceptable use?

•

What external experts could help you with defining and
implementing appropriate levels of acceptable use? How will
you communicate your requirements? How will you verify that
your requirements were met?

Strategies

Issues: What issues related to acceptable use cannot be addressed by your organization?
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Appendix I
OCTAVE Criteria Principles to K-12 Risk Methodology
Principle

Applied

When

Self-direction

Yes

Unchanged

Adaptable
measures

Yes

Tailoring

Defined process

Yes

Tailoring

Foundation for
continuous
change

Yes

Tailoring

Forward-looking
view

Yes

Tailoring

Critical few

Yes

Unchanged

Applied to Methodology
Guidance
Requirement for selection of
pilot site

Applied at Pilot Site

The site managed all of
their analysis and
planning steps with
training guidance from
this researcher.
Evaluation criteria adjusted
The site applied the
to fit K-12 schools and
practices from the
tailored K-12 Catalog
catalog of practices
expanded to include
of Practices to their
educational issues; other
planning and decision
measurements like
making. The site
vulnerability catalog were
selected ITS own
unchanged from OCTAVE
unique evaluation
Methodology.
criteria for valuing
threats.
Detailed guidance, adjusted
The site followed much
of the sequential
for changes to Phase 1 and
3, is carried from OCTAVE process defmed in the
Methodology.
guidance.
Guidance instructing
The site discussed
analysis team to consider
monitoring the
establishing a foundation for implementation of its
continuous change is carried plans and review of the
from the OCTAVE
assessment results
Methodology.
annually to confirm
continued validity.
Also follow-on
assessments with
additional assets to
refme the
organizational threat
perspective were
identified.
Guidance instructing
Security requirements
analysis team to focus
and planning
beyond the current issues to
incorporated changes
consider future requirements expected in funding,
is carried from the
responsibilities, and
OCTAVE Methodology.
connectivity proposed
for coming school
years.
Focus on subset of assets,
A subset of assets was
mapping threats to a range,
selected to identify
threats. A subset of
and prioritization of threats
carried over from OCTAVE potential practices was
Methodology.
selected to focus
limited resources and
address the greatest
threats.
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OCTAVE Criteria Principles to K-12 Risk Methodology (continued)
Principle

Applied

When

Applied to Methodology
Guidance
Phase 3 continues to include
strategic and organizational
perspectives that were
expanded to include the
educational perspective.

Integrated
management

Yes

Tailoring

Open
communication

Yes

Unchanged

Workshop format carried
over from OCTAVE
Methodology.

Global
perspective

Yes

Tailoring

Summarization process for
survey results added to
provide a consensus process
for current practices. Other
workshops carried over
from OCTAVE
Methodology.

Teamwork

Yes

Unchanged

Requirements for pilot site

Applied at Pilot Site
Both strategic and
organizational issues
were included in
planning. Educational
issues were not viewed
as potential threat areas
for the pilot site.
Dialogue about security
issues among
participants in the
analysis team was
identified as a key
result in the pilot
survey responses.
Members of the
analysis team provided
a range of expertise that
spanned beyond the
teclmical aspects of
security into the
educational curriculum
and administrative
management.
The work was
addressed by an
analysis team of five
individuals, and each
contributed to the
success of the result.
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Appendix J
OCTAVE Criteria Attributes to K-12 Risk Methodology
Attribute

Applied

When

Analysis team

Yes

Unchanged

Augmenting
analysis team
skills

Yes

Unchanged

Catalog of
practices

Yes

Tailoring

Generic threat
.prbfile

Yes

Unchanged

Catalog of
vulnerabilities

Yes

Unchanged

Defmed
evaluation
activities

Yes

Tailoring

Documented
evaluation results

Yes

Tailoring

Applied to Methodology
Guidance
Requirement for site selection

Applied at Pilot Site

Team of five
individuals agreed to
perform the assessment.
Consideration for
Consideration was
completeness of analysis team given to augmenting the
at pilot site and considered for team with technical
expertise for Phase 2
Phase-2 decision
but was detennined to
not be an appropriate
choice at this time.
OCTAVE Catalog of Practices The expanded catalog
expanded to incorporate
of practices through the
survey and protection
educational issues
strategy worksheets was
incorporated into the
methodology and
applied.
OCTAVE Methodology threat F our generic threat
profiles carried over to
profiles were used for
tailored methodology
threat consideration.
unchanged
They were expanded
with two additional
threats considered
important to the pilot
site.
OCTAVE Methodology threat Consideration for a
profiles carried over to
catalog of
tailored methodology
vulnerabilities was
provided in Phase 2, but
unchanged
Phase 2 was not
peformed by the pilot
site.
Step-by-step guidance
Detailed guidance is provided
was provided. In some
for each activity and includes
instructions for all worksheets. areas, the analysis team
chose to vary the
sequence based on their
organizational issues.
Worksheets
were
Worksheets are provided for
completed, and a
all steps of the evaluation to
summary report of the
provide a location for
documenting each step of each findings was prepared.
activity.
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OCTAVE Criteria Attributes to K-12 Risk Methodology (continued)
Attribute

Applied

Wben

Applied to Methodology
Guidance

Evaluation scope

Yes

Unchanged

Activity in the planning
session with the pilot site

Next Steps

Yes

Tailoring

Phase 3 is a planning process
that establishes a protection
strategy for the organization to
implement.

Focus on risk

Yes

Tailoring

The evaluation criteria are
changed, but use of the
evaluation criteria as applied
to threats to establish a
prioritization based on the
impact is carried over
unchanged.

Focused activities

Yes

Tailoring

Organizational
and technological
issues

Yes

Tailoring

Organizational
and information
technology
participation
Senior
management
participation

Yes

Tailoring

Activities are formed to
maintain the focus of the
analysis team on each separate
issue (asset identification,
security requirements, threat
evaluation, impact evaluation,
analysis and planning) that
builds in a logical sequence to
produce the resulting plan.
Activities are based on the
catalog of practices that is
expanded to include
educational issues in addition
to organizational and
technological ones.
Requirement for the pilot site
selection

Yes

Tailoring

The coordinator for the
analysis team was responsible
for keeping senior
management appraised of the
status and results

Applied at Pilot Site
A specific range of
organizational units
(those under the
responsibility of
analysis team members)
was selected.
The pilot site selected
three areas of practices
to apply and developed
a plan for addressing
the next steps in the
application effort.
The impacts of threats
were evaluated based
on evaluation criteria
important to the
organization. Plans
were defined in Phase 3
based on the highest
risks, which resulted in
different selections than
those initially identified
in the data-gathering
steps of Phase l.
Each step assembled
another layer of
information that formed
a broad picture of threat
and opportunities for
protection based on the
current environment.

The application of a
broad catalog of
practices provided
inclusion of both types
of issues.
The analysis team
included both
organizational and
technical participation.
Senior management
received interim
briefmgs and will be the
recipient of the final
output - a security risk
management plan.
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OCTAVE Criteria Attributes to K-12 Risk Methodology (continued)
Attribute
Collaborative
approach

Applied
Yes

When
Unchanged

Applied to Methodology
Guidance
Selection of the analysis team
was based on communication
needs with a focus on teamwork.

Applied at Pilot Site
Analysis team
participants had a
working relationship
that was augmented
by the use of the risk
assessment
methodology.
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AppendixK
Generic Threat Tree Example
Human Actors Using Network Access
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AppendixL
Pilot Site Survey Responses
JOB TITLE: Technology Coordinator
1.

How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding ofK-12 school information
security issues?

The methodology was highly effective in increasing my understanding ofsecurity issues in three distinct
ways. First, having an expert work with us to understand security issues in general prOVided an
important overview of the process and highlighted important areas of concern. Second, having access to
tools and strategies (the workbooks) allowed us to understand the specific issues that we had to address.
Finally, the methodology prOVided formal opportunities to discuss our current security practices with my
colleagues. Although we have opportunities to work together, we never had a chance to share and
discuss our security practices. The methodology prOVided the opportunity for the administrative,
technical, and instructional technology staff to engage in serious discussions about security.

2.

How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the
methodology addressed the school's security concerns?

With the installation ofa wide area network and the increasing reliance on Web services, I became
very concerned about protecting the integrity ofour data, as well as the privacy ofstudents and staff. I
was also concerned that we did not have important security procedures in place at all levels of the
system. The methodology confirmed that we needed to address our security concerns, and allowed our
group to come to that conclusion by collaboration and focused discussion.
The methodology also provided:
1. Opportunities for our group to have discussions about important security issues
2. A framework and context for the discussions
3. A sense of commitment from all parties to develop an action plan and to make security a district
priority.
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Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued)
JOB TITLE: Technology Coordinator (continued)
3.

How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information teclmology (IT)
decisions and security issues in the future?

The methodology established a process for discussions and security reviews that our team will
continue to use. It also emphasized the importance of continued security awareness and increased our
commitment to making sure that we have appropriate security measures in place.
4.

Other comments or suggestions?

The security methodology allowed us to engage in our own problem-solving strategies by reflecting on
our current practices and engaging in dialogue about possible solutions. It was effective because we
took ownership over our problems rather than having an outside consultant provide us with solutions.
The methodology effectively guided our discussions and helped us to understand the threats to our
security. The emphasis on a collaborative exploratory process allowed us to begin to make meaningful
changes in our security practices and commit to ongoing review and improvement.

JOB TITLE: Technical Supervisor

1.

How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding of K -12 school information
security issues?

It has given us a template to refer to so that we can organize our security objectives, risks, and policies.

2.

How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the
methodology addressed the school's security concerns?

The methodology addressed all ofour security concerns and in fact enlightened us to several security
issues that we would not have addressed without the methodology.
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Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued)
JOB TITLE: Technology Supervisor (continued)

3.

How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information technology (IT)
decisions and security issues in the future?

The methodology has prepared us to address future security decisions by enabling us to focus on the
weak areas in our security. Without the methodology, too much time may have been spent on
redundant tasks. The methodology will enable us to approach foture security issues in an organized
manner.

4.

Other comments or suggestions?

The methodology that you present has given us the foundation to build good IT security policies.
Thank you.

JOB TITLE: Network Specialist

1.

How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding ofK-12 school information
security issues?

The methodology increased the awareness of the participants about certain areas ofsecurity that were
not previously addressed.

2.

How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the
methodology addressed the school's security concerns?

The plans developed by the methodology have included certain aspects ofsecurity that need to be
reviewed and developed.
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Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued)
JOB TITLE: Network Specialist (continued)

3.

How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information technology (IT)
decisions and security issues in the future?

The methodology focused the group to formulate a plan ofaction to rectifY outstanding security issues.

4.

Other comments or suggestions?

Continue development ofadditional descriptions and additional instructions to alleviate confusion.
Include examples and case studies. A Web site with forms and sample tools would be helpful.
Recommendations for the scope ofparticipants may help other school districts. A timeline to follow to
complete the methodology would help.

JOB TITLE: Administrative Manager

1.

How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding ofK-12 school information
security issues?

This methodology really gives me an approach to begin seriously thinking security technology. The
approach is more of a template to jump start us and get us to focus on the issue. Considering all ofus
who participate in the program, we would neve, r or it might be virtually impossible, find the time to talk
about preventive security. Furthermore, the methodology helps me to focus on specific issues such as:
student records, the human factor, and definitely physical security.
2.

How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the
methodology addressed the school's security concerns?

The methodology helps me to look at our security in stages instead ofjust finding solutions to
problem;, for example, critical asset, user community, and system problems. It also helped me to
examine our security practices which in most cases I would never find the time to even address.
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Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued)
JOB TITLE: Administrative Manager (continued)

3.

How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information technology (IT)
decisions and security issues in the future?

The key here is that the methodology will help me to prepare or develop long- and short-range plans to
upgrade my security-related services.
This will include us establishing clear policies and procedures for my user community.
Enforce password policies andfind a way for us to better keep track ofpeople (users) entering and exit
our system.

4.

Other comments or suggestions?

The session meetings as a group gave me a new approach of evaluating and looking at information,
technology security, staff, and physical security.

JOB TITLE: Asst. Computer System Manager
1.

How has the use of the methodology expanded your understanding of K -12 school information
security issues?

The methodology allowed me to organize my concerns and ideas about security issues and risks. It
helped me focus on the essential risks and gave me a way to define procedures for a solution to the
issues.
2.

How have plans for actions, mitigations, and protection strategies developed with the
methodology addressed the school's security concerns?

The plans developed using the methodology gave me something concrete to work with.
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Pilot Site Survey Responses (continued)
JOB TITLE: Asst. Computer System Manager(continued)
3.

How has use of the methodology better prepared you to address information technology (IT)
decisions and security issues in the future?

The methodology has given me aframework to address security issues; a way of taking large
amorphous issues and translating then into smaller more manageable pieces that can be solved in a
more effective manner.
4.

Other comments or suggestions?

Because of the limited time and personnel in a school environment, some of the format should be
collapsed a bit.
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AppendixM
Abbreviations
ABA - American Bankers Association
ACLU - American Civil Liberties Union
AICP A - American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
ALA - American Library Association
AOL - America Online
ASL - American Student List
AUP - acceptable use policy
BGP - border gate protocol
BSI - British Standards Institute
CERT/CC - Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination

Center
CDA - Communications Decency Act of 1996
CFAA - Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
CIPA - Children's Internet Protection Act of 2000
CIPB - Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
CIS - Computer Intrusion Squad
COBIT - Control Objects for Information Technology
COPA - Child Online Protection Act of 1999
COPPA - Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
CoSN - Consortium for School Networking
CSI - Computer Security Institute
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Abbreviations (continued)

CVE - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DHHS - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

DHS/IAIP - U.S. Department of Homeland Security Infrastructure
Analysis Infrastructure Protection
DMCA - Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
ECPA - Electronic Communications Privacy Act
ED - U.S. Department of Education
EFL - Exploring the Future of Learning
EPIC - Electronic Privacy Information Center
ESEA - Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
FBI - Federal Bureau ofInvestigation
FCC - Federal Communications Commission
FERPA - Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
FOIA - Freedom of Information Act
FRAP - Facilitated Risk Analysis Process
FTC - Federal Trade Commission
GIAC - General Information Assurance Certification
GISRA - Government Information Security Reform Act
GLBA - Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
GSEC - GIAC Security Essentials
HIP AA - Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act of 1996
BP - Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection
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Abbreviations (continued)

ICCSTM - iWatchdog™ Commercial Certification Service
ICRA - Internet Content Rating Association
IP AK - Information Protection Assessment Kit by the CSI
ISACA - Information Systems Audit and Control Association
ISO - International Standards Organization
ISP - Internet Service Provider
ISTE - International Society for Technology in Education
IT - Information Technology
LAN - local area network
MPEG - Moving Picture Experts Group
NCAC - National Coalition Against Censorship
NCLB - No Child Left Behind Act
NCREL- North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
NETS-A - National Education Technology Standards for School
Administrators
NETS-S - National Education Technology Standards for School
Students
NETS-T - National Education Technology Standards for School
Teachers
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
NRCCUA - National Research Center for College and University
Admissions
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Abbreviations (continued)

NSBA - National School Boards Association
NSBF - National School Boards Foundation
OCTAVE - Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation
PICS - Platfonn for Internet Content Selection
PPRA - Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment
PTA - Parent Teacher's Association
RIAA - Recording Industry Association of America
SANS - System Administration, Audit, Network, Security Institute
SEI - Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute
SFG - Security Focus Group of the CoSN
SLD - School and Libraries Division
SPSD - Scarsdale Public School District
TEACH - Technology Education and Copyright Harmonization Act
of2001
TSI - Technology Support Index
TSSA - Consortium for Technology Standards for School
Administrators
UFCWS - United Federation of Child Safe Web Sites
U.S. - United States
USAC - Universal Service Administration Company
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Abbreviations (continued)

USA PATRIOT - Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism
UT - University of Texas
W3C - World Wide Web Consortium
WAN - wide-area network
WBEC - Web-Based Education Commission
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